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ABSTRACT 
The character of state interaction matters. This dissertation quantifies this 
interaction from 1960-2001 and then forecasts it from 2010-2050. I contribute to the field 
of International Relations by improving traditional measures of Realism and Liberalism, 
quantifying new perspectives sensitive to cultural interaction, and statistically evaluating 
these indices relative to the occurrence of conflict. It is the first step in an academic 
research agenda that desires to expand the scope of possibility regarding the modeling of 
International Relations theory for the purpose of theory evaluation and policy analysis. 
This dissertation spans two fields of study that do not typically overlap:  
International Relations and Integrated Assessment Modeling. I begin by laying a broad 
foundation to bridge this chasm. I do this by first exploring knowledge constraints 
associated with forecasting. This leads to an overview of my conceptual and empirical 
tool for calibrating my final model: the historic occurrence of international conflict. Next, 
I introduce conceptual and applied systems theory, which leads to an overview of the 
International Futures (IFs) model.  
I then explore Liberalism and Realism as they have been traditionally 
operationalized at the macro-level.  A newly quantified variable—referred to as the 
Cultures of Interaction Index— is introduced that builds on Liberal notions and tries to 
explain some aspect of intersubjective norms and values operating in a dyad. I perform 
iii 
 
statistical analysis on these indices and show that using IR theories in conjunction 
explains more of the historic occurrence of conflict—and thus the character of state 
interaction—than using any theoretical tradition in isolation. I then endogenize 
Liberalism and Realism in IFs and use the cultural measure as an exogenous constant. I 
am interested in whether the stock of culture in a dyad and growth in Liberal notions of 
interdependence can off-set negative pressures arising from Realism.  
Most dyads improve their character of interaction to 2050, but some become more 
conflictual, including China – US and China – India. The analysis is extended by looking 
at long-term structural shifts in the global system:  depleted fossil fuel reserves, stressed 
fresh water availability and tension from domestic instability. I conclude by offering a 
series of next steps that builds upon this work and recommendations for policy planners 
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1.  Introduction and Overview 
The character of state interaction matters. Cooperative engagement among dyads 
can foster human development, economic growth and peace. Non-cooperative or 
conflictual dyads can become mired in vicious cycles potentially leading to armed 
conflict. The 20
th
 century witnessed the consequences of the most destructive output of 
poor state interaction:  large-scale war killing millions of people and destroying trillions 
in capital. 
International Relations (See Box 1, below) provides plausible explanations—
many empirically verified—for why state dyads respond differently to internal and 
external conditions. IR has been historically dominated by rationalist debates between 
two theoretical approaches:  Liberalism and Realism.
1
 Liberals, on the one hand, argue 
that high levels of interdependence lead to more pacific, mutually beneficial long-term 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this project I capitalize Liberal and Realist to emphasize that I am highlighting an ideal-type 
representation of these substantive theoretical positions within IR. Neither position is a monolith, but their 
operationalization at a macro level treats them similarly. 
Additionally it is important to emphasize at this early stage that the primary goal of this project is the 
quantification and forecast of theory. Thus, it neglects theoretical work done at the margin of each main 
theoretical position. For example, I am not interested in the multiple variations of balance of power theory, 
or democratic peace theory. Instead, I am interested in the fact that material power is important for Realists 
and interdependence is important for Liberals and how these have been traditionally operationalized. 
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relations. Realists, on the other hand, point to the importance of international anarchy 
which creates uncertainty about state survival and requires that states focus on the 
accumulation of relative material power (defined in various ways). A third approach has 
been developed over the last two-plus decades. This approach is characterized by non-
rationalist accounts of state behavior. These new theories largely use constructivist 
methods that emphasize the 
role of language, ideals, norms, 
and culture, which are 
understood to be created and 
evaluated through inter-
subjective meaning-making. 
These alternative accounts have 
gained traction in providing 
explanation for state behavior, 
but they have not supplanted 
the broad, explanatory power 
provided by previous Liberal 
and Realist theories about state 
behavior in the international system. 
Theories are sets of principles and assumptions used to create hypotheses within 
academic fields. Within IR, theories provide analysts with frameworks for evaluating 
how changes in the environment are likely to impact state behavior. Each theory—
whether a substantive approach (like Liberalism or Realism) or a method of inquiry (like 
Box 1:  Typology of Theory: 
International Relations (IR) is a sub-field (I will 
refer to it as a field in this dissertation) within the 
discipline of Political Science whose subject is 
the behavior of states. Realism and Liberalism are 
both substantive approaches to doing the work of 
IR that make similar ontological, epistemological 
and methodological assumptions and choices 
about their subject of inquiry and come to 
generalized conclusions about state behavior. I 
refer to Realism and Liberalism as standard 
bearer accounts as well for the reasons listed 
above. Constructivism is not a substantive field, 
but a method of inquiry that privileges the 
exploration of intersubjective meaning as a driver 
of state behavior. It is not a substantive 
approach—like Realism and Liberalism—
because it comes to no generalized conclusions 





Constructivism)—offers information that can help humans more accurately understand 
state interaction and behavior. The quantification of theory can extend the utility of an 
abstract theory by forcing making theoretical assumptions to be explicit, testing theories 
against other quantified variables and producing objective measures that can be formally 
modeled for the purpose of planning for the promotion of human development. 
Since state behavior matters and IR provides tools for assessing this behavior, a 
forward-thinking policy analyst should be interested in forecasted, quantified IR theories. 
Large structural shifts loom on the long-term horizon:  transitions in national material 
capabilities, changes in international organization penetration, reductions in fossil fuel 
resources, changing availability of fresh water resources, and destabilizing impacts from 
state fragility. How these trends impact dyadic state behavior may be important enough to 
warrant the establishment of institutions and resources that reasonably can mitigate 
plausible negative scenarios. 
There is currently no model to forecast the character of bilateral state 
interaction—explained in more depth below and introduced in Box 2—that is quantified, 
modeled as being integrated to other key global systems, and that deploys a long-term 
horizon. This dissertation remedies this deficiency by quantifying IR theory (from 1960 
to 2001) and endogenously forecasting it within the International Futures (IFs) integrated 
assessment tool from 2010 to 2050. This first chapter lays the foundation for this tool-
building exercise by introducing this project in general terms. Forecasting is not a well 
understood activity within IR, and IR theory is not well understood within the forecasting 
community. Because I rely heavily on both fields, this chasm in familiarity compels me 
to take multiple steps back to shape expectations about my scope. 
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The first block laid in this dissertation foundation identifies the kinds of things 
that we can and cannot reasonably say about the future. This is the focus of the first half 
of Chapter 2. The future is fundamentally unknowable, but we plan as if we have some 
insight on what lies around the next bend in history. I refer to this as the “problem of the 
future”, characterized by our 
fundamental need to prepare 
for a future that we 
fundamentally cannot know. 
To plan effectively we need 
to seriously consider what 
kinds of things we can know 
about the future. Variables 
that we can be modeled over 
long time horizons are those 
with well understood stocks and flows. It is possible to forecast both continuity and 
change in these cases.  
Up to this point, the dependent variable of this analysis was referred to obliquely 
as the “character” of dyadic interaction in the international system. We are able to intuit 
that one dyad has a better character of interaction than another.  For example, Belgium 
and the Netherlands cordially interact; Iran and the US have unpleasant relations. 
However, to create a quantitative forecast, intuition is not sufficient. Instead, we need an 
operationalized dependent variable that can help to tell us when our model accurately 
explains the character of a dyadic interaction.  Again, see Box 2. The occurrence of 
Box 2:  Character of State Interaction 
We know when two states have better or worse 
characters of interaction. States that have enduring 
international rivalries (like India and Pakistan) have 
relations that are characterized by conflict. Most 
members of the European Union have relations that 
are characterized by cooperation. Quantifying this 
historically is difficult and requires a dependent 
variable that represents the character of state 
interaction. For this project the onset of conflict is 
used as this calibration tool as it represents a 





armed conflict that leads to battle deaths between sovereign states serves as the 
operationalized dependent variable in this project. I use this as my calibration tool both 
conceptually and empirically in order to create indices that represent the character of state 
interaction across time. The occurrence of armed conflict between two states 
unambiguously identifies the full deterioration of the character of dyadic interaction.. It 
represents one extreme of a quantified index that gets at something that is difficult to 
otherwise operationalize. The second half of Chapter 2 provides an overview of this 
variable by exploring how international conflict has been empirically and theoretically 
treated in IR. 
At the end of Chapter 2 readers will have a good understanding about the kinds of 
things that we can reasonably say in forecasts and how this is related to the 
operationalized dependent variable used in this project. However, getting from this 
understanding to a long-term integrated forecast is no simple task. Chapter 3 lays the next 
block in this dissertation’s foundation by providing readers with an overview of literature 
and methods related to theoretical and applied approaches to working with complex 
systems.Long-term integrated assessment forecasts rely on the interaction of variables 
both across and within a wide range of key global systems. These approaches leverage 
both conceptual and applied systems theory. Chapter 3 introduces conceptual systems 
thinking, focusing on system interaction, characteristics and delineation. This theory 
forms the basis for making practical modeling decisions, referred to as applied systems 
thinking. Applied systems approaches—often using systems dynamics methods—form 
the backbone of our forecast tool. Chapter 3 ends by generally introducing the IFs model 
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structure, developed primarily by Barry B. Hughes over the past three decades and now 
housed in the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures. 
Chapter 4 turns from issues of forecasting to our understanding of state behavior 
in the international system. Here I evaluate the key and generalized arguments within the 
field of IR (See Box 1). I focus on Realism, Liberalism and their critics and place special 
emphasis on how these measures have been traditionally operationalized. Both 
substantive fields in IR are broad in scope, and my account in Chapter 4 is not meant to 
fully capture the breadth of either field. Instead, here I am interested in laying out 
approaches to understanding state behavior and what kinds of variables have historically 
been leveraged to quantify these theories. 
I attempt to extend this analysis. I 
do this by “pulling threads” from critical 
perspectives of rationalist accounts in 
general, and Liberalism and Realism in 
particular. I argue in Chapter 4 that both 
standard bearers of IR have been criticized 
for being excessively parsimonious, poorly 
treating complex networks of relationships 
and not giving full shrift to the importance 
of interdependently created norms and 
values. I am interested in explaining 
cultural understanding between states using 
Katzenstein’s definition of norms:  “collective expectations for the proper behavior of 
Box 3:  Distinguishing CoI Index 
from Liberal Index: 
Countries can have high CoI Index 
scores but low Liberal scores, and vice 
versa (Chapter 5). Historically, 
countries with high CoI Index scores 
and low levels of Kantian Liberalism 
existed throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa and in the former Soviet 
Bloc during the Cold War. Countries 
with low CoI Index scores and high 
levels of Liberalism exist currently in 
dyads that are small and physically 
distant, like Mongolia and Luxembourg. 
There has been a convergence between 




actors within a given identity” (1996, 5). I used these criticisms to build a quantified 
measure that explains some of the characteristics highlighted by these critical 
perspectives. This third measure in my dissertation is referred to as the “Cultures of 
Interaction Index” (CoI Index) and it is created using a dyad-first operationalization itself 
constructed from five sub-indices that captures complex networks and tries to draw out 
an understanding of culturally driven interactions between states at a dyadic basis (See 
Box 3).  
Quantifying theory—the job of Chapter 5—is useful but also deeply problematic. 
It is useful because, when a theorist sits down and translates an analytical framework into 
a quantitative index, she is forced to evaluate extant data (or create her own) and make 
clear-cut assumptions about how her concept can be transferred into numbers. This 
reduces hand waving and promotes transparency for the purpose of comparison and 
evaluation. There are infinite ways to operationalize either Realism or Liberalism. My 
approach to solving this potentially debilitating issue is to evaluate my quantification 
standards using the following criteria.  First, has this approach to operationalization been 
used by others (in at least general terms) in academic literature? Second, can this 
operationalized index be formalized and modeled within an integrated assessment tool 
like IFs? Third, is there a straightforward way that I can build upon previous 
operationalization while retaining the second criteria? I make theoretical and applied 
contributions to the field by producing new data and quantifying both accounts using 
methods that are novel. Quantifying theory is problematic because it can be overly 
restrictive, and reduce the nuance and character of questions asked by a substantive 
approach or method. 
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After building the two standard-bearer accounts in IR, I turn to the alternative 
approach outlined in Chapter 4, the CoI Index. Here my goal is not to create a measure 
that can currently be forecast within the IFs system—it is hard enough to forecast 
Liberalism and Realism, let alone to construct a new approach out of whole-cloth and 
forecast it as well. Instead, my goal here is to create a historic data series that can be used 
as a tool for statistical analysis and as an initializing value in my forecast exercise. The 
CoI Index largely builds upon previous operationalization of Liberalism and Realism, and 
should be seen as a quantified compliment 
to those approaches instead of a refutation. 
As this measure cannot be forecast, it is the 
core of my uncertainty going forward (See 
Box 4). 
The final section of Chapter 5 
evaluates a claim that has been tacit 
throughout this introduction:  IR produces a 
series of tools that are more useful when 
used in an integrated analysis than when 
taken as separate explanations for behavior 
in the international system. I evaluate this 
by taking my three indices—the Realist, Liberal and CoI—and creating a series of 
logistic regression models that are fit to the historic occurrence of conflict (measured in 
various ways). Here I find that an approach that simply adds up the three indices 
produces a stronger fit to the historic data than any of the approaches in isolation. This 
Box 4:  Can we Forecast Culture? 
Chapter 2 argues that forecasted 
variables need well understood stocks 
and flows. Culture can act as a stock 
across time—we can measure it 
based on a public opinion poll of 
values, or by using other proximate 
measures. However, understanding 
its flow is much more difficult, and it 
appears to be discrete:  whether Saudi 
Arabia and Iran move from a 
conflictual culture to a cooperative 
one is contingent on drivers of 
behavior well outside the scope of 
this analysis. Thus, the CoI Index 
remains an exogenous component of 
this forecasting project. 
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both validates my contribution in adding the CoI Index to this analysis as well as my later 
use of the Integrated IR Index (the addition of Realism, Liberalism and CoI Index scores) 
to produce analysis on the future of state behavior. 
With my historic analysis completed, I turn to the Base Case behavior of IFs in 
Chapter 6 (See Box 5). I operationalize my analysis by using the same Liberal and Realist 
measures that I created and analyzed in Chapter 5. I 
initialize each dyad’s score with the 2001 CoI Index 
score (the most recent historic data available) and 
keep this flat across my time horizon (2050). The 
Realism and Liberal indices vary and form the core 
of my analysis.
2
 I find that, on the whole, the 
character of dyadic interactions is improving, though 
serious problems persist. I then explore some of 
these most dangerous dyads—including China – US 
and China – India. I end this chapter by going on a 
global tour of regional powers and the forecast Integrated IR Index. This analytical 
exercise highlights the scale of applicability of the tool created in this project, which only 
begins to scratch the surface of possible utility. 
                                                 
2
 Each dyad’s Integrated IR score forecast is initialized using 2010 values for Liberalism, Realism and the 
CoI Index.  The CoI index remains constant across the time horizon.  Both Liberalism and Realism change 
across time and the CoI index remains the large scenario oriented uncertainty (in other words, if a dyad 
experiences a deterioration across time we can talk about how much an increase in the CoI Index would 
need to compensate for this deterioration).   
The inability to forecast the CoI Index is another reason why standard Liberalism is not operationalized 
initially on a dyadic basis.  Forecasting dyadic relations—such as trade—from the ground up is beyond 
current capabilities in a large-scale, long-term model. 
Box 5:  What is the Base Case 
of IFs? 
The Base Case is a scenario 
produced within the IFs model 
that continues policy choices, 
technological advances, 
economic decisions, and natural 
system behavior similarly to its 
behavior since the end of the 
Cold War. This scenario does 
not include radical change and 




Base Case behavior considers the impact of Liberalism, Realism and an initial 
condition that attempts to explain the culture of interaction between a pair of states. 
Because these forecast variables are themselves comprised of sub-measures, and each of 
these sub-measures is deeply endogenized within the IFs system, they already consider 
impacts from structural shifts in the international system. However, the treatment of 
structural shifts within IFs does not directly connect to changes in the character of 
bilateral interaction.  In other words, the structural shifts—such as running out of fossil 
fuels—will impact economic variables and thus relative power, but they will not directly 
drive state behavior in the model that I created. 
I extend the analysis of Chapter 6 by evaluating the potential impact on the 
character of state interaction of three structural transitions on the global horizon in 
Chapter 7. First, as many countries with low levels of fossil fuel reserves begin to run 
out, a relatively larger amount of production will shift to countries with extensive 
reserves. This has the potential to impact dyadic relations between these countries 
andGreat Powers trying to keep global markets churning. Second, the increasing pressure 
put on freshwater systems from agricultural production and population growth for dyads 
that share a river basin may have dramatic impacts on vulnerable dyads. Third, I measure 
the disruptive power of state instability in politically relevant dyads using an index-
approach to analyzing vulnerability to domestic conflict.  
This analysis identifies new hot-spots not identified in Chapter 6 that should be 
relevant to policy planners and analysts. An example of this output is shown below in a 





 that deteriorate over time, indicating that improvements in interdependence 
(Liberalism) are outstripped by deteriorations in other drivers. The size of the country 
name in the visualization below correlates to the number of deteriorated dyadic 
relationships forecast over the next four decades. As a point of reference, Iraq and 
Mauritania are forecast to have 10 dyadic relations that reduce in character. 
 
Word Cloud of Dyads with Deteriorated Total Scores between 2010 and 2050 
 
I draw the following conclusions from this dissertation. They are likely relevant to 
forward thinking policy analysts: 
 
 Gains in Classical Liberal drivers—trade, democracy and embeddedness in 
international political systems—are forecast to improve state relations across the 
great majority of dyads  
                                                 
3
 The fully quantified index, explored in Chapter 7, contains the following:  fully endogenized Realist, 
Liberal, Fossil Fuel, State Fragility and Water indices and an exogenous CoI value that stays flat across the 
forecast horizon pegged to 2001 values. 
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 Pressures from relative material power are forecast to have destabilizing impacts 
on Great Powers relations in spite of gains made by Liberalism:  China – India, 
China – US and India – US 
 Stabilizing interventions brought about by state fragility are forecast to be less 
common, though some states remain concerns over the next four decades:  
Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Chad and Myanmar 
 Fossil fuel production is forecast to become increasingly concentrated (mostly in 
OPEC countries) and will continue to remain a key for Great Power planning 
even as the world moves towards greater renewable energy production 
 Water resources are forecast to become more constrained in key river basins 
(North-East Africa, Middle East, Central Asia), leading to the possibility of 
deteriorated relations among states in these regions 
 The following states experience a confluence of pressures that do not outstrip 
gains from Liberalism, and should be of general concern:  Iraq, Mauritania, 
China, Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan 
 Central Asia remains a serious concern for deteriorated interstate relations driven 
by low levels of growth in Liberalism coupled with the rapid rise of Turkmenistan 
(and their increased importance as a gas exporter), pressure from water stress and 
slow improvement in state fragility 
 
This dissertation is one stage in a broader project designed to model IR and forecast 
the character of state relations. It is a tool building exercise, and more tools need to be 
developed to finally accomplish this ambitious task. I have created new data and 
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structures that will form the basis of projects going forward that attempt to further 
evaluate how states have interacted in the global system. Future work should address 
broader networks of alliances internationally, take more care to treat regional power 
distribution to identify politically relevant dyads, and conceptually hone quantified 











2. The Future and Conflict 
“We shall see strange things before we die. Dare we guess at what they will be?” 
-Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski4 
 








Humans are stuck in the present but constantly moving through time. Because we 
(generally) desire to make a better life for ourselves and community, the constant tick-
tick-tick of existence compels plan us to for what lurks around the corner. However, what 
lies ahead is fundamentally unknowable. We are stuck with the problem of the future:  we 
are compelled to plan for it (and take action based on those plans) but we are unable to 
know what it holds (and thus unable to know if the decision we are taking is the right 
one). 
                                                 
4
  (Organski 1958, 433) 
5
 (Midlarsky 1975, xvii) 
6
 (Jervis 1991, 39) 
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Our understanding of the past and present informs our understanding of the 
future, though all three time-spaces are fraught with epistemological complexity and 
uncertainty. The past is filtered through the subjectivities of the many who tell its stories 
and the traces of evidence that remain in the present. The present is complicated by the 
number of interacting variables and complexities occurring at any given point and the 
limitation of being one subjectivity occupying only a very limited terrain. The future is 
shrouded in a veil of uncertainty. 
We are tied to a need to understanding the future, and the first section of this 
chapter sets a framework for thinking about what we can and cannot know. We act as if 
we know things about the future in the same way that we act as if we know the past. We 
have no absolute reason to believe that either fully corresponds to “reality”. We are 
forced to make decisions about what is salient, more plausible and to learn from our 
mistakes along the way.
7
 
Putting forward an epistemology of the future
8
 sets the path for understanding the 
kinds of things that we can say about conflict over a 40 year time horizon. This is the 
goal of the second half of this chapter. This project cannot forecast when two countries 
will go to war over the next 40 years; that is beyond all human knowledge. However, 
informed by IR scholarship, we can analyze and assess the relative pressures acting on a 
dyadic relationship in the international system. Chapter 3 builds on this by presenting a 
                                                 
7
 This approach to decision making is partially argued for by Sharon Welch (2000). 
8
 This section of Chapter 2 does not more broadly engage in debates about epistemology. Instead, the 
purpose of this chapter is to bring people up to speed on the kinds of variables that we can forecast over 
long time horizons. 
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Box 6:  What do we want to forecast? 
This chapter will argue that the variables 
that we are most interested in forecasting 
are those where we can reasonably 
measure both continuity and change. 
Forecasting things like a sunrise is 
uninteresting because we only understand 
continuity and not change in its behavior. 
Forecasting population is interesting 
because we understand both continuity in 
the trend as well as change. 
theoretical and applied systems framework for understanding these questions, along with 
an introduction of the specific modeling technique. 
Humans have a long history of trying to explain war. This has led to studies, 
theories, and findings on the subject. These previous works are useful, and form a block 
in the foundation of this project. However, as long-term forecasting is constrained by 
methods, technologies and epistemology, expectations about the scope and scale of what 
can be said reasonably about the future of war needs to be established. 
Epistemology of the Future 
We know absolutely nothing about the future because it has not occurred. The 
events of the next decade, day or minute are not knowable in any absolute sense. That 
said, there is reasonable evidence to 
assume that many currently observed 
phenomena will continue tomorrow, 
and for some time. In fact, we live our 
lives as if there is much continuity 
between the past, present and future. 
This section introduces 
characteristics related to the type of 
variable that we are interested in forecasting over long time horizons (See Box 6). First, it 
must be a continuous trend, or at least a trend that can be understood in continuous terms. 
Second, the variable must have well understood stocks and flows that can be quantified. 
Stocks are the foundation of forecasting:  they are accumulations of things that remain 
relatively consistent across time periods, such as population or capital.  Flows take away 
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or add to stocks in any given period of time. Finally, the system in which the dependent 
variable is situated must be understood well enough to be able to forecast both continuity 
and change. We cannot forecast discrete events. However, we can use conceptually well 
understood continuous trends to measure the probability of the occurrence of a discrete 
event, related to our understanding of its historic occurrence. We also are not interested in 
forecasting trends where the underlying stocks and flows are not understood. In these 
variables—things like the force of gravity or the sunrise—we can understand continuity, 
but have no ability to measure change. All of this is outlined in more detail below. 
The past tells us that there are things that we have been able to successfully know 
about the future and other things that have evaded human foresight. It is important to 
distinguish between different types of dependent variables and what we can know about 
their behavior. To begin this exploratory process, I present a taxonomy that distinguishes 
the degree to which variables have been accurately forecasted on one axis and our 
understanding of causality
9
 related to their forecast on the other axis. The variables 
identified in Figure 2 should be understood as descriptive categories. This section should 
be seen as a compliment to Chapter 3 which fleshes out the concepts discussed here in a 
systems framework. 
                                                 
9
 The treatment of causality in this section ignores the obvious problems associated with the term. Causal 
relationships are difficult to understand—especially in the study of war—and our understandings of 




Figure 1:   Epistemology of the Future 
 
Starting in the bottom left of Figure 2, humans are unable to forecast the specific 
movement of particles that results from being bombarded by atoms—Brownian Motion—
and we have no understanding of the causal mechanisms that drive its behavior (in fact, 
the longitudinal trend of Brownian Motion is a synonym for randomness). On the other 
end of this cross-cutting axis we have World Population which we have forecast both 
continuity and change with high levels of accuracy and whose causal mechanisms we 
understand clearly. The alternative cross-cutting axis describes a different set of 
dependent variables. Gravity is in the bottom right of Figure 2, the force of attraction 
between objects with mass. We have been very accurate in our historical forecast of 
Gravity (so accurate that many would not even claim it to be a forecast), however we do 
not understand its deeper causal mechanisms. Many physical “constants” or “laws” fall 
into this category. The top left category—an Earthquake—is a category where we 
19 
 
understand the causal mechanisms that behave on the relationship, but have little ability 
to forecast it accurately. 
Figure 2 draws attention to the distinction between forecasting continuity and 
forecasting change. In the top right we have a good understanding of forecasting both 
continuity and change in these dependent variables:  we understand when population 
systems grow, when they peak and when they decline. On the bottom right we have the 
ability to forecast continuity, but not change. There is no mechanism—either theoretical 
or applied—for understanding if and how the forces of gravity will change from one year 
to the next. We rely on the assumption that, because they haven’t changed, they won’t 
change. 
The difference between continuous trends and discrete events is also identified in 
Figure 2. First, continuous trends are those that can be measured (at least perceived) and 
have a clear trajectory across time. These events—like the average change in temperature 
across seasons in a given year—have cyclical behavior that produces patterns. Discrete 
events are defined as those that occur independently of driving variables,
10
 such as the 
occurrence of a violent conflict between parties, the occurrence of a natural disaster or an 
unexpected interpersonal gesture. An Earthquake and the drivers of Brownian Motion are 
two events that appear to be discrete when they occur. The force of Gravity and World 
Population appear to be continuous trends. 
The difference between a continuous trend and a discrete event hinges on two 
concepts:  the treatment of time and our measurement of causal mechanisms. The 
                                                 
10
 There are actually no discrete events in the world, as this would require a fully closed system with no 
drivers. Events appear to be discrete at times when we do not understand the causal logic. When discrete 
events are referred to in this project it should be understood to be referring to apparently discrete events. 
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treatment of time is one way to distinguish the top right and top left of the diagram, 
above, though it is also relevant for our understanding of the bottom two dependent 
variables. Most dependent variables are discrete at extremely long time horizons. Take 
global population as an example. If the time horizon is the last 200 year, or so, the trend 
appears to be continuous. This is not the case if the trend is taken over a much longer 
time horizon. Figure 3 shows global human population with a multiple billion year time 
horizon. At this level of distance, human population appears to be a discrete event. In 
terms of our diagram above, it would fall into the upper left category, as we have a good 
understanding of the causal mechanisms that are at play for the advent and growth of 
human civilization (evolution from more primitive organizes, organization into families 
and societies, the advent of farming, cities, etc.) but would have a nearly impossible time 
forecasting when this event would have occurred over the course of known history. 
 
Figure 2:  Global Population - Long Time Horizon 
 
If our time horizon is extremely short, even an earthquake can appear to be a 
continuous event. If our perception of time was shortened to Planck Time (the time 
required for light to travel 1.616199×10
−35




















Billions of Years Ago 
World Population Over Time 
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gradually increase in strength, plateau and decline. It would appear to be a continuous 
event. However, because our filter is the human mind, generally accepted perceptions of 
time should be the reference point used to assess whether we have the ability to forecast 
dependent variables, and an Earthquake and Global Population stand at opposite ends of 
this spectrum. 
The second distinction between discrete and continuous events relies on our 
ability to understand and operationalize conceptual variables. We have a good 
understanding of what causes earthquakes. Shifts in tectonic plates along well established 
fault lines produce massive amounts of friction and vibrations that shift the earth’s crust. 
However, we are both limited in our deeper understanding of the drivers of earthquakes 
and our ability to operationalize key variables. The exact reason that plates shifts is not 
fully known, and could be due to changes in electromagnetic fields, pressures deep within 
the earth or long-standing movements that have been building pressure for thousands of 
years. Additionally, our ability to measure the exact amount of pressure between plates, 
the composition of the earth in areas most vulnerable, and the broader impacts from 
shifting plates on the other side of the world is impossible to operationalize. In other 
words, we do not have a global model of tectonic plates and geography that is sufficiently 
complex to capture the necessary effects to deal with accurate prediction of an 
earthquake. 
We can understand and forecast global population levels with much more 
accuracy than we can the occurrence of an earthquake because we both understand the 
causality in population systems and are also able to operationalize key variables 
effectively. Population growth and change is contingent on well understood driving 
22 
 
mechanisms. At its most basic on a global level it is directly driven by two variables:  
fertility and mortality rates. Fertility rates are driven by income, contraception use, infant 
mortality and female education. Mortality rates are driven by levels of income, 
technology and the prevalence of certain types of diseases. 
This moves us to an important component of variables that we can forecast well 
and that we understand causally:  stocks and flows. These concepts are treated in more 
detail in Chapter 3, but I introduce them now. To forecast continuity and change in a 
variable with accuracy—especially over a long time horizon—it is important to have a 
continuous dependent variable with well understood stocks and flows. In population 
systems, the stock from year to year is the overall number of people who are alive. 
Globally, there are two flows:  births and deaths. First, as explained above, being able to 
operationalize these measurements is crucial. Second, the systems most easily forecasted 
are those with relationships where the stock remains fairly consistent for the time horizon 
in question and the flows do not change dramatically. See Figure 4 that traces the stock of 




Figure 3:  Population Stock verses Population Growth Rate 
 
While I have used population systems as my example of variables that are 
accurately forecast and well understood conceptually, I could substitute the overall size 
of the economy as well. Global economic output (as measured by GDP and which is not a 
stock, but a flow) is similar to global population in that it is a continuous trend for a 
human oriented time horizons whose underlying components are well understood. 
Broken down, economies are made of three things:  the overall stock of capital, the stock 
of labor and the stock of technology. We have clear measures of each of these three 
stocks, we understand why they grow and shrink year to year (the strength of the flows) 
and this allows us to talk about the long-term propensity for growth in an economy. 
Economies are, however, different from population systems, in that their year-to-
year growth projections are less smooth. Figure 5 shows the growth in global GDP over 
time as compared to the annual growth rate in global GDP. The growth rate over time 
experiences movement around a central trajectory (shifting from a moving average of 
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nearly 4% down to a moving average closer to 3%), but these shifts are difficult to 
forecast over a long time horizon. GDP growth rates are typically forecast over a shorter 
time horizon (both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund forecast country-
level GDP growth rates over three year time horizons). 
 
Figure 4:  GDP verses GDP Growth Rate 
 
The annual growth rate (the rate of change in the overall flow of GDP year to 
year) is forecast over a short time horizon effectively because it is driven by variables 
that we understand well but that change rapidly. For example, supply, demand and price 
are all components of short-term growth and these are all mediated through billions of 
individual subjectivities, which are less well understood (thus, things like “consumer 
confidence” and “market sentiment” become drivers of growth in short term models, but 
not long-term models). Government policy decisions—effectively discrete events that we 


















































































































































growth rates. The frequency and intensity of storms—something that certainly evades a 
long-term time horizon forecast—also impact GDP growth rates. 
The focus of this project is international conflict, which is a discrete event similar 
to the occurrence of an earthquake. Like earthquake forecasts, forecasts of international 
conflict rely on measuring variables that are associated with the discrete event and that 
also have characteristics that are conducive to accurate long-term forecasts (well 
understood stocks and flows, continuous trend, etc). They thus become forecasts of the 
probability, or likelihood of the discrete event happening. 
Probability is a measure of certainty related to the occurrence of a discrete event 
in a time-period. These measures can take various forms but two are particularly relevant 
to this project:   
 the output of a model fit to the previous occurrence of the discrete event  
 a conceptual index of variables associated with the discrete event 
 
Both of these approaches are discussed in greater detail later in this dissertation.  
This chapter takes this conceptualization of what we can say about the future and 
applies it to our understanding of international relations. The occurrence of war appears 
to be a discrete event whose causal mechanisms we fairly well understand. We have a 
hard time operationalizing some of these measures with long time horizons. I will use this 
framework to identify the specific dependent variable measured in this project. This then 
leads to Chapter 3 which provides a systems theory conceptual and practical framework 
to talk about how we model and how we produce long-term forecasts of continuous 
trends with well understood and operationalized causal mechanisms. 
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Treating War:  Calibration Device 
I am interested in quantifying the character of state interaction in the international 
system. Do states interact in ways that are agreeable or disobliging? A quantitative 
measure of this must be calibrated to some dependent variable that is not a part of the 
original index creation process (thus avoiding multicollinearity). This section introduces 
the operationalized variable that I use for this calibration:  the occurrence of international 
war.  
We intuitively know when states have better or worse relations. We know, for 
example, that the US has a better relationship with the UK than the US does with Cuba. 
In an ideal world this information would be easily quantified and validated for a large 
number of dyads. An operationalized measure like this could then form the backbone of 
the forecast analysis pursued in this project. However, information of this kind does not 
exist. Because of this I am forced to select an alternative measure that gets at some 
component of the character of dyadic interaction in the international system. 
International war involves organized violence between states and results in the 
slaughter of humans. It generally occurs when the relationship between a dyad has 
fundamentally deteriorated, resulting in physical violence being the accepted vehicle for 
solving political disagreements. Dyads with cooperative patterns of interaction do not 
typically go to war, and examples are scarce across time relative to the total number of 
dyad-years. 
This is the first reason that war is a fundamental part of this dissertation. I use it as 
a measure of dyadic relations that have clearly deteriorated. The “worst” scores in my 
Integrated IR Index should show the occurrence of conflict, while the “best” scores 
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should correlate with non-conflict. War is also fundamentally important for this analysis 
because it is an operationalized series that is not used as a component of Realist, Liberal 
or CoI Indices. We cannot use levels of bilateral trade as a dependent variable to point to 
which dyads have better interaction because it is a sub-measure used in the creation of 
my indices. Similarly we can’t use embassies, treaties, IGOs or levels of democracy. As 
such, we need an “outside” variable to play the role of calibrator. 
The second reason that war plays a key role in this analysis is that I am most 
concerned with which dyads are most likely to experience a future deterioration in the 
character of their interaction across time. I am less concerned with dyads that are likely to 
improve the character of their interaction, though the identification of this is a useful 
output of this project. My most obvious normative concern in this project is the 
avoidance of armed violence between states, and improving our ability to identify where 
conflict is likely on the horizon. This value is the second reason that an exploration of 
armed conflict is an important component to this analysis. 
As the operationalization of war plays such an important role in this analysis, I 
feel compelled to treat the literature around it seriously. I use the remainder of Chapter 
2—building upon the analysis done earlier—to argue for the specific kind of dependent 
variable that we want to use to determine whether states have better or worse relations. 
War occurs when distinct political groups engage in armed violence in an attempt 
to resolve a disagreement. The above definition works conceptually, but is difficult to 
operationalize. For the purposes of measuring war’s occurrence, scholars and 
practitioners use definitions that emphasize battlefield fatalities. The threshold for 
conflict varies by the index in question (for Uppsala, it is 25 battle deaths over the life of 
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the conflict, for Marshall, it is 500, and for the COW group, it is 1,000 (Gleditsch et al. 
2002; M. Marshall 2003; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Singer and Small 1994)). 
These events are grouped by the kind of units engaged in violence:  either 
domestic (civil war, for example) or international (between two sovereign states). The 
historic distribution of international conflict is different from the distribution of domestic 
conflict. Some examples from different data sets below help illustrate this. Overall, the 
stories told by the different operationalizations of conflict are the following: 
 international conflict is a relatively rare event 
 domestic conflict occurs more frequently than international conflict 
 domestic conflict occurrences/magnitudes peaked at the end of the Cold War and 




The first is the data on war compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Group (UCDG) in 
Sweden and displayed in Figure 6 (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Gleditsch et al. 2002; 
Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). The number 
of conflicts has grown from a low point in the early 1950s of around 15 on an annual 
basis to a peak of over 50 during the turmoil at the end of the Cold War. After this peak, 
the overall number of conflicts decreased to less than 40 conflicts annually for most of 






Figure 5:  The UCDP Data (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom, Högbladh, and 
Wallensteen 2006; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005) 
Figure 6 also highlights the relative frequency of interstate conflicts to all other 
types of conflict since the end of WWII. There has also been great growth in intrastate 
conflicts over time, rising from less than 10 per year to almost 50. Interstate conflicts 
have been a relatively small portion of the overall conflict mix over time representing at 
most 5 incidences of conflict in a given year, and as few as zero. 
The data in Figure 7 track a similar trend, and are compiled by Marshall at the 
Center for Systemic Peace (M. Marshall and Cole 2009; M. Marshall 2003). This graph 
measures the overall magnitude of conflict, and not the numbers of conflicts, as were 
being measured by the UCDG group above. In spite of the different dependent variables 
the two graphs show a similar trend:  overall, conflict starts out at a relatively low level at 
the end of World War II, climbs to the end of the Cold War, and then eventually falls 
again, but not yet to the level experienced directly after 1945. The Center for Systemic 
Peace group and the UCDG group both show similar distributions in the breakdown 
between domestic and international conflict. “Societal Conflict”—domestic war—starts 
out at a very low level after WWII, grows quickly and consistently, and then falls sharply 
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after the end of the Cold War. International conflict remains relatively low throughout the 
entire period. 
 
Figure 6:  Center for Systemic Peace Historic Conflict Data:  Total Magnitude of Conflicts (M. Marshall and 
Cole 2009) 
Figure 8 explores the Correlates of War Data (Singer and Small 1994; Singer 
1972; Singer 1978; Sarkees and Schafer 2000) and was re-produced from data published 
by Sarkees, Wayman and Singer (2003). These numbers explore a longer time horizon 
than either the UCDG or Center for Systemic Peace data. It again compares international 
and domestic conflict, though this time does so in terms of the number of conflict onsets 
by decade. The occurrence of international conflicts peaked at the end of the 19th 
century, with 20 per decade. This distribution has since waned through the 20th century. 
Civil wars, on the other hand, show a different distribution entirely. The number of onsets 




Figure 7:  COW Data:  Civil and International War (Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, and Singer 2003) 
 
Domestic conflicts have occurred more frequently than international conflicts. 
This has led to an increase in focus on these types of conflict in the academic and policy 
oriented literature, specifically since the end of the Cold War. This focus has been largely 
warranted, though scholars and practitioners should not neglect the occurrence of 
international disagreements as a key issue moving forward. As Chapter 1 indicated, while 
large-scale international conflict is on the decline and the relative frequency of small-
scale international disagreement is also in retreat, the absolute number of Militarized 
Interstate Disputes continues to grow.  
While the world has learned lessons from the destruction of previous large-scale 
conflicts, militarized disagreement between states continues. These disagreements often 
lead to confrontation that falls short of the traditional measure of 1,000 battle deaths. 
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) are used to operationalize these lower-threshold 
conflicts. This measure is defined as: 
“Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or 
use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the 
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. 
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Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual 
combat short of war” (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 163) 
 
The line graph below takes MIDs and measures them two ways:  first, their 
absolute value across time and second as a percentage of the total states in the 
international system (Russett, Singer, and Small 1968; Singer 1980). This figure tells two 
stories about the development of international disagreement. The blue line measures the 
percentage of total possible dyads that are involved in a Militarized Interstate Dispute in 
any given year (using a 5 year moving average). Throughout the 19
th
 century, around 1 
percent of total possible dyads were involved in conflict. This measure spikes during 
World War I and World War II up to over 3.5 percent. It falls quickly at the end of World 
War II and continues to decline to the end of the time horizon. As of 2000 less than 0.5 
percent of total possible dyads experienced international conflict. The probability of a 
state in the latter half of the 20
th
 century engaging in a Militarized Interstate Dispute was 
lower than at any other point since the beginning of the 19
th





Figure 8:  Militarized Interstate Dispute - 5 Year Moving Average, Measured Two Ways (Ghosn, Palmer, and 
Bremer 2004, 3; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) 
The red line tells a different story by measuring the absolute number of MIDs. It 
demonstrates relatively low levels of overall conflict in the 19
th
 century with spikes 
during World War I and World War II, a similar story to the measure of percentage of 
dyads with conflict. However, the two accounts diverge in second half of the 20
th
 century. 
Here decolonialism and the end of the Cold War birthed new states and new conflicts. 
These new countries offset the absolute jump in MIDs, making the increase in conflict 
difficult to see in the relative measure. 
A state at the beginning of the 21
st
 century could, on the one hand, consider itself 
lucky:  the probability of involvement in a MID was lower than at any point in the 
previous two decades (not to mention there being an impressively small chance of 
involvement in a massively destructive war). On the other hand, a state might engage the 
international system warily:  the absolute number of small international conflicts was on 
the incline. States continue to disagree, finding reasons to quibble, which can lead to 




























































disagreements can weaken previously strong relationships and produce issues for foreign 
policy and diplomatic engagement. 
This section of Chapter 2 explores the literature on international conflict. It builds 
a foundation that is linked back to the discussion at the beginning of this chapter. I argue 
that, if we are interested in modeling and forecasting international conflict, we need to 
hone in on a dependent variable that is conceptually well defined with a continuous 
historic trend and well understood stocks and flows. 
This project forecasts vulnerability to international conflict in the same way that a 
seismologist forecasts an earthquake. Instead of trying to predict the occurrence of a 
discrete event, I measure continuous and conceptually well understood trends that are 
linked to the occurrence of international conflict and that are informed by IR theory. This 
allows me to create indices that measure the relative likelihood of international conflict 
occurring between two pairs of states. I begin by tracing fundamental concepts in the 
study of international conflict. 
Fundamental Concept:  Levels of Analysis 
The “Levels of Analysis” debate informs theories that identify the causes of 
international conflict. This is important for this dissertation because I am drawing on 
theory that operates at the systemic level
11
 but I eventually operationalize things entirely 
at the dyad level. I introduce this concept here to inform the kinds of things that we can 
say about the future of international conflict. Explanations for the causes of war take 
place at three levels:  humans, the state and the international system (Waltz 1959). 
                                                 
11
 Structural Realism clearly is a system theory in IR, Wendt’s Cultures of Anarchy is clearly at the system 
level and Cosmopolitanism is at the system level as well, among others. 
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Individual system theories—the most granular level of analysis—highlight drivers 
of international conflict that take place at the level of human decision maker. These 
explanations for the conditions for war deal with human nature, psychology, perception 
and personality. Much of the structure of this outline of human causes from war draws on 
Cashman (1993). 
Human nature has been considered to be a driver of international conflict for 
some time. Authors like Hobbes, Spinoza and Freud all identified aggression and hostility 
as core components of human nature and behavior. These, it was thought, were the 
fundamental drivers of conflict between people. Extrapolated, these also became the core 
drivers of war. These are the necessary conditions for war. 
Another group of theorists eschewed the rigid essentialism of discussions of 
human nature and instead focused on aspects of human emotion, personality and 
perceptions. Some, like Adorno, identified specific traits that made someone more likely 
to make dogmatic decisions, and thus predisposed some to be inflexible in problem 
solving, potentially leading to choices made that emphasized violence. Etheridge, for 
example, categorized personalities in the Johnson administration as being either 
introverted or extroverted. Those who were extroverted tended to prioritize inclusive 
policies towards the USSR compared to the more introverted (1978).  
Misperception has also been explored by a variety of authors as a driver of 
international conflict (Jervis 1976; Levy 1983). By perceiving reality to be different than 
it is, leaders may make decisions that promote conflict by 1) believing that opponents are 
more belligerent than they are; 2) misunderstanding an adversary's level of material 
power; 3) believing that war is an inevitability; 4) expecting war to be short and not 
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costly; 5) not understanding third party states' goals and desires; or 6) not understanding 
the other's worldview (Cashman 1993). 
A third kind of explanation for drivers of war bridges individual systems and state 
systems. This group of theories focuses on how state decision making can be made by a 
kind of group-think mentality that drives misperceptions, thus leading to conflict. Janis, 
for example, argues that there was pervasive groupthink in the Kennedy administration, 
thus leading to the Bay of Pigs invasion (1982). Another kind of bridge between the 
psychic system and state systems is game theory, stimulus response theory and 
rationality. These approaches anthropomorphize the state into a rational actor who is 
(typically) interested in maximizing security. 
In international conflict, states do not go to war by themselves; they always need 
a partner (though this partner may be unwilling). Thus, the second level of analysis—
state systems—focuses on how domestic pressures and bi-lateral pressures can lead to 
war or peace. At this level of analysis, the most germane drivers of international conflict 
are relative to one state's position to another. Geographic continuity has been shown to be 
the main driver of international conflict, for example (Bennett and Stam 2004). Territorial 
disputes are one of the main drivers of international conflicts, and have been shown to be 
one of the main causes of conflicts over time (Jensen 1982). Many states have gone to 
war with a neighbor when this neighbor has shown high levels of instability and is itself 
weak. Blainey argues that, from 1815 to 1939, a full 15% of conflicts have occurred 
directly after a neighboring country has been engaged in civil conflict (1973). Others 
have argued that states have used intentional conflict as a way of mitigating negative 
implications of domestic instability (Rosecrance 1963). This "diversionary theory of 
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conflict" has been shown to be a driver of US involvement in military activities during an 
election year (Ostrom and Job 1986). Maoz has found that there is a link between 
domestic revolutionary movements and international conflict. When states emerge from 
their own revolutions, they tend to be more heavily involved in international conflict 
(Maoz 1989). 
Additionally, states can be differently constrained by their own government 
systems. States that are more pluralistic in their decision making, it is argued, have a 
harder time amassing troops for conflict. On the other hand, states that are autocratic may 
have a less difficult time urging young people to go into battle, as there is a monopoly on 
decision making. This explanation for war is dealt with in the section below, outlining the 
international system. 
The international system does not go to war, but it is an important theoretical 
level of analysis related to the drivers of international conflict. Instead, of going to war, 
the international system is the context in which wars occur. The international system 
level is also a fundamental component of understanding the difference between Realist 
and Liberal accounts of conflict. 
Realists argue that international conflict will always be with human beings—no 
matter how altruistic our intentions are—because the international system is not 
structured hierarchically. Stemming from Hobbes, these authors argue that hierarchically 
organized systems allow for the promotion of peace and stability because there is an 
authority that can establish peace through force. Since the international system is not 
itself structured hierarchically, states are forced to fend for themselves. These conditions 
create a self-help system and lead to distrust and violence. 
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On the other side of the coin, Liberals argue that the international system contains 
pieces of interdependence and norms that exist beyond the direct control of states. 
International agreements, though they are not made binding by an international hegemon, 
still change the cost of state-based decisions. When states agree to economic, political or 
other international treaties and agreements, they increase their interdependence with other 
states, thus bringing about a context where some decisions can be made on a level 
ideational plane.  
Causes and Correlates of War 
Suganami argues that there are three types of questions about the cause of war 
(1996). The first are questions concerned with the necessary conditions for war. The 
second are interested in the kinds of conditions that tend to be present when wars occur. 
The third are questions concerned with how a particular war came about at a particular 
point in time.  
These questions highlight broad differences in our understanding of war. The first 
question focuses on the kinds of things that have to exist for war to take place, a kind of 
question interesting for philosophers. The third question concerns specific wars, the kind 
of thing germane to regional experts. This project is invested in building a model that 
highlights answers to the second question. This approach shapes the following 
conceptualizing of a model of international conflict. 
The "kinds of conditions" that are frequently present when international conflicts 
occur are the causes or correlates of war. Specifically leveraging the work of the 
Correlates of War project (Singer 1972), this dissertation privileges an understanding of 
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correlation over causation, or, in Suganami's words, an understanding of the "kinds of 
conditions" that are frequently present when war occurs (1996). 
So, what then are the conditions that tend to be present when wars occur?  Recent 
work by Bennett and Stam has quantitatively assessed the relative strength of different 
drivers of international conflict on the history of war (2004). It has found that, in the 
diagram below, the variables on the left decrease the likelihood of international conflict 
while the variables on the right increase the pressure for international conflict. They are 
organized by the relative strength of these variables impact, from stronger effect (on the 
top) to weaker (on the bottom). 
 
Figure 9:  Probabilistic Drivers of War (Bennett and Stam 2004) 
Drawing on lessons from the first section of this chapter, many of the variables in 
the diagram above can be useful for long term forecasting. In other words, they are 
variables where we can reasonably model both continuity and change across time. These 
types of variables mush have well understood stocks and flows. For example, any 
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measure of material power—and thus drivers of both Power Transition theory and 
Balance of Power theory—rests on an understanding of military spending and growth in 
overall GDP. The deeper stocks of those measures are capital, labor and technology. It is 
impossible to forecast continuity and change over long-term time horizons for other 
variables in this list.  
Take, for example, membership in NATO. Whether NATO is a relevant alliance 
grouping in 20 years is a difficult to ascertain because modeling change in that driving 
variable requires understanding the deeper drivers of membership and how these are 
likely to change. We simply do not have adequate information (either conceptually or 
quantitatively) to forecast continuity and change within this variable, and it thus becomes 
inadequate for thinking about the long-term behavior of states.  
Bennett and Stam are just the latest in a long line of researchers who have 
quantitatively explored the conditions that are frequently present for the occurrence of 
war. These include Wright (1964), Singer (1972; 1978; 1994), Singer and Small (1994; 
1966), Ray (1995; 1993), Diehl (1988; 1983; 1985) etc. While quantitative models are 
useful, the study of war suffers from a variety of problems that make them incomplete. 
First, wars happen very infrequently. This makes their statistical evaluation very difficult. 
For example, there are approximately 16,000 pairs of countries in any given year. 
However, the number of conflict pairs engaged in war is very small, somewhere in the 
range of 0-10 per year. Thus, approximately only 0.03% of all country pairs are involved 
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in conflict in even the most violent of years.
12
 This presents problems for statistical 
analysis.  
War and the Future 
Long-term forecasts of the occurrence of war can be conceptualized using the gas-
and-rag metaphor. The rag represents a pair of countries. The amount of gas on the rag 
indicates the vulnerability that these countries have to conflict. This is the continuous 
trend with well understood stocks and flows that are measured in this project. 
If a dyad has high levels of gas on their rag then they are more vulnerable to a spark 
causing a fire. Sparks are the wild-card events that take place at levels-of-analysis that are 
overly granular for this project (such as leadership decisions, the specific occurrence of 
mass movements, etc). We cannot forecast sparks, but we can measure continuity and 
change in the amount of gas on the rag over long time horizons. 
The gas on the rag—the output of the project—is the likelihood that a pair of 
states will experience conflict in a given year. Likelihood—or probability—is a measure 
of our confidence in the outcome of an event and can be measured in various ways. 
Others—see the discussion of Bennett and Stam above (2004)—have created quantitative 
models with the historic occurrence of conflict that accurately fit a statistically significant 
probability to the occurrence of conflict. I do not replicate this work. Instead, I am 
interested in the likelihood of conflict as measured through a conceptual index. 
Conceptual indices are useful for analyzing international or domestic conflict. The 
historic occurrence of conflict is a very rare (as a percentage of possible occurrences) and 
                                                 
12
 This is conflict defined by 1,000 battle field deaths, since 1960. 
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is driven by variables that significantly differ across cases. The characteristics of 
quantitative date related to international conflict can pollute results produced by 
probabilistic measures because the data do not conform to normal sampling, among other 
problems. Thus, an index measure of conflict can be a useful addition to pure statistically 
driven models. The distinction between using probabilistic and index models already 
exists in the field of measuring domestic fragility to conflict.  
 But measuring the amount of gas on the rag for any given dyad is contentious. IR 
theory tells us that there are competing accounts of the drivers of vulnerability to conflict, 
with Liberals and Realists standing largely in opposition. This project takes this division 
and works it into a framework for analysis. I operationalize these two IR theories and add 
a third built on standard criticisms of both Liberalism and Realism. I use these three 
operationalized IR theories to build an index of the dyad-year threat of international 
conflict between each pair of states in the international system.  
This chapter has set one block in the foundation of the dissertation by presenting a 
framework for understanding what we can say about the future as well as introducing our 
understanding of international relations theory vis-à-vis war. Bringing these two threads 
together points to what I am modeling and analyzing. The dependent variable measured 
in this dissertation is the dyadic vulnerability to conflict operationalized through an index 
built from IR theory and forecast from 2010 to 2050 and it is a proxy for the character of 
state interaction (discussed in Chapter 1). I cut into this problem using state dyads as the 
level of analysis informed by the system level of analysis but rejecting the human system 









3.  Systems Theory and Modeling:  From Concept to Integrated 
Application 
“Every living organism is essentially an open system”  
-Ludwig von Bertalanffy13 
 




Chapter 2 outlined a foundation for thinking critically about epistemological 
considerations associated with the long-term forecast of pressures associated with 
international conflict as a proxy for the character of dyadic interaction. There I concluded 
by highlighting what we can reasonably forecast over long time horizons:  vulnerability 
towards international conflict using variables taken from IR theory with continuous 
trends, stocks, and flows. I used Chapter 2 to identify the dependent variable, but the 
method leveraged to produce results remains unspecified. 
All theories are models and all models are representations of reality. Models are 
used in all aspects of life, both academic and applied. Models take an infinitely complex 
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 (Bertalanffy 1968, 39) 
14
 (Wight 2006, 52) 
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Different accounts of the causes of war rely on models. A Liberal model may look 
like this:  increasing levels of bilateral trade and democracy will lead to regions where the 
threat of international conflict decreases. A Realist model may alternatively go something 
like this:  global anarchy forces countries to focus on changes in relative material power, 
which can upset pacific relations and increase the pressure for war. 
Formalizing a model requires following clearly defined steps. First, all of the 
crucial variables used in the model need to be outlined, typically in a schematic. Next, the 
key relationships between these variables need to be identified. Along with identifying 
the important relationships, it is crucial to establish the direction of the relationship:  for 
example, does increased democracy increase or decrease the pressure for international 
conflict? If our model is sufficiently complex, we need to take into consideration how 
different modules within the broader model interact with one another. With a multi-
layered quantitative model, putting numbers to all of the variables is not sufficient:  one 
has to also be concerned with how the model behaves in different situations. 
Understanding systems is helpful for building both of these models for the 
following reasons. First, when dealing with models that involve a large number of 
variables, systems thinking can act as a tool for organization. Second, when creating 
models where there is interaction between different sub-systems, systems thinking can 
help identify the expected behavior of interaction. Third, when dealing with large 
                                                 
15
 Open Systems are defined as the units that constantly interact with other units in a broader environment. 
Closed systems are defined as a select group of units interacting separate from an outside environment. 
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numbers of variables and complexity, a system approach helps to account for all activity 
within the model. Fourth, system approaches can create a framework in which models 
can be conveyed transparently. 
Just as the first chapter set the foundation for thinking about forecasting, 
modeling and the long-range future of international conflict, this chapter sets the stage for 
the rest of the project by exploring the implications of system thinking on a model of 
international conflict. This chapter proceeds in three steps. First, it outlines previous 
attempts to use systems thinking and the theoretical foundations of the field. Next, it 
presents applied systems thinking, a requisite of actually formalizing our quantitative 
model. Finally, it uses these first two steps to build a modelling framework that can be 
used to plug in the theoretical approaches of IR for the purpose of long-range forecasting 
in a quantitative model by introducing the International Futures system.  
Approaches to Thinking Systematically about Systems:  Three Questions 
"The systems theorist's orientation is to describe and predict complex elements and relationships in the real world...it 
has been easier to specify than to achieve"  
-Arlyn J Melcher16 
 
Saying that the work of science involves the use of systems is redundant. All 
science does systems, just like all science does models. While a focus on system thinking 
may at first appear non-descriptive, this is not the case. While all science uses systems, it 
does so in a wide variety of ways with varying degrees of commitment. 
Generally, systems are "sets of elements standing in interaction" (Bertalanffy 
1968, 38). However, when we typically talk about systems, we are referring to something 
with more distinct characteristics. Systems always have a boundary, and one main 
                                                 
16
 (Melcher 1975, 3) 
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consideration is the demarcation of that boundary. Systems are also comprised of units, 
which constitute the character of the system. The relationship of different units in a 
system is the system structure. One key question in the field of system thinking is the 
relationship between system unit and structure. Each system is embedded within other 
systems, either partially or fully. 
Theories about system thinking have existed since the post WWII era. These 
approaches—most notably General Systems Theory (GST)—attempted to bring a more 
rigorous methodological approach to the treatment of systems to all areas of science. GST 
eventually became hypertrophic (Weltman 1973), overly focusing on the concept, and 
less focused on added value and practical application. 
This section explores the three kinds of questions about systems referred to 
earlier:  1.) What are systems made of? 2.) What are typical system behaviors? 3.) How 
are systems delineated? This theoretical treatment of systems will then bridge to a more 
practical treatment of systems, eventually resulting in the full conceptualization of our 
forecast model. 
System Components and their Interaction 
Simple systems contain a boundary and elements within that boundary that have 
at least one conjoining characteristic. Complex systems increase the number of units 
within the boundary, compare interactions across boundaries, explore the correspondence 
across systems or inspect a system as it changes through time. This section begins with a 
simple understanding of systems, and builds in complexity, working through relevant 
arguments and literatures germane to the topic. 
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Waltz argued that the systems were composed of structures and interacting units 
(Keohane 1986, 70).  This simple elucidation is reminiscent of von Bertalanffy's 
parsimonious definition of systems as "sets of elements standing in interaction" 
(Bertalanffy 1968, 38). Waltz stated that the definition of structure was separate from the 
characteristics of units. The key to understanding structure is to ignore unit interaction 
and instead focus on unit position. This “property of the system” is then built upon to 
argue that there are two main forms of political unit positioning:  hierarchical and 
anarchical, with the former operating at a domestic level and the later at an international 
level. 
Waltz’s understanding of system constitution is helpful, though misleading. It is 
true that, in the most abstract, systems are composed of units. The position that these 
units take vis-à-vis one another represents the structure of a system at any given point in 
time, another of Waltz’s points. However, the approach is misleading because it does not 
focus on the kind of unit or the type of unit interaction, but rather their relative position to 
one another. Unit type and interaction matter because they change the quality and 
character of the system structure. 
This simple approach to understanding systems brings about two system 
components that have come to represent foundational theoretical decisions that must be 
taken at the occurrence of any system analysis:  how much of a system is units and how 
much of a system is structure?  Unit-emphasizing theory is typically referred to as agent-
based analysis, or reductionist analysis. Structure-emphasizing theory is typically referred 
to as holism. Reductionists critique holists because they lack agency. Holists critique 
reductionists because they underemphasize (or entirely negate) structure. However, each 
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theory can build up or down to take both agent and structure into account. This section 
will explore the agent-structure debate in full, but not yet. 
Agent-based accounts that use a strong system method largely developed out of 
the cybernetic tradition (Wiener 1948). Cybernetics is an interdisciplinary approach to 
understanding the composition and character of systems building specifically out of 
mathematics and engineering, though used in other fields. The approach was applied in 
nature, and eventually built out to studies of artificial intelligence and agent-based 
modeling. 
The agent-based modeling trend is most clearly seen within the school of thought 
that has come to be called Complexity Theory, and is most notably rooted within the 
Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico, USA. "Complexity theory involves the study of many 
actors and their interactions...a primary tool of complexity theory is computer simulation" 
(Axelrod 1997, 3). As argued by Phelan, Complexity Theory is neither General System 
Theory nor a series of postmodern "...metaphors or analogies based on resemblance 
thinking" (2001, 132). Instead, it is a, "...search for generative rules," that do not to seize 
the, "...radical holism of systems theory" (Phelan 2001, 130–1). The scientists engaged in 
these pursuits identify complex effects that stem from simple causes and try to map the 
regularities observed. The components of complex systems involve agents, strategy, 
measures of success, copying, population, type, variation, interaction patterns, artifacts, 
which all add up to the term "system" (Axelrod 1999, 4–6). The goal is not to try to 
overcome complexity, but to harness complexity (Axelrod 1999). 
It is harder to pin down one group as a representation of the holist side of this 
debate. Some—like Luhmann—strip any standard understanding of agents out of his 
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theory, instead arguing that the world is comprised of four main kinds of systems:  
mechanical, biological, social and psychic (1995, 2). The standard understanding of 
"agent"—as in a human acting within a system—becomes a combination of a psychic 
system (consciousness, psychology) coupled with an organic system (the body, brain). 
These systems then interact in social, organic and mechanical systems. Thus, if agency is 
understood to be action within a system, as per Archer (1982), for example, then there is 
still agency, as "human systems" still exist. However, this "agency" is not the same kind 
of agency explored within, for example, Complexity Theory.  
Systems analyses highlighted here neither build-up a theory (e.g. agent-based 
modeling) nor build-down a theory (e.g. a fully structural model). These theories involve 
and explore the interaction of different system components. This middle-ground is most 
notably seen in the Agent-Structure debate. 
This debate has spanned academic disciplines and time and is obviously germane 
to a discussion on the composition of systems. This debate, “…concerns how to develop 
an adequate theoretical account which deals simultaneously with men constituting society 
and the social formation of human agents” (Archer 1982, 455). Taken out of an 
anthropomorphic context, the disagreement was about trying to reconcile how units both 
shape and represent structure, and how structure is fully comprised of units, yet shapes 
units. 
The discourse began fruitfully, but without a mechanism to move beyond pedantic 
claims about the cause of system change stemming either from agents or structures, it 
appeared still-born. Empirically, both agents and structures bring about important change 
in any system. A theory that took this into account needed to be developed. 
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In IR, Wendt's well known article brought this issue out into the open (1987). In this 
piece, he argues for the use of Giddens' “structurationist” approach (1984; 1979). In the 
words of Archer:   
“Giddens’ approach hinges on overcoming three dichotomies and it is these 
dualisms which he strips away from a variety of sources, then recombining their 
residues” (1982, 456).  
 
First, Giddens views human action as being deeply embedded within actions in 
society, transcending the dichotomy between voluntarism and determinism. Second, he 
promotes the subject’s knowledgeability in her creation of society, while also keeping in 
mind that the subject is aware that they employ societal processes in this process, thus 
transcending the subject/object dualism. Third, Giddens rejects theories that separate 
static and dynamic treatments of time, thus transcending the synchrony/diachrony 
dualism. Structuration is mainly concerned with, “…amalgamating the two sides of each 
divide” (Archer 1982, 457). 
This approach to solving the agent-structure problem was criticized by Doty, who 
argued that it did not go far enough and that agents were eventually underemphaisized 
and structures overemphasized (1997). Wight, another prolific writer about the agent-
structure problem (2006), responded to Doty, arguing that she was searching for final 
solutions to an issue where none existed (1999). 
Archer pushed this debate further afield by arguing for a “morphogenetic” 
approach that was distinct from the “structurationist” approach by promoting a final end:  
the reification of overall structure (1982; 1995).  
“’Morphogenesis’ is also a process, referring to the complex interchanges that 
produce change in a system’s given form, structure or state…, but it has an end-
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product, structural elaboration, which is quite different from Giddens’s social 
system as merely a Visible pattern” (Archer 1982, 458). 
 
The “morphogenetic” takes the attempted dynamism of the “structurationist” 
approach and gives it a telos. The “structurationist” approach understood the 
structure/agent interaction to be complex, and evolving over time. However, it did not 
identify a clear and concise way in that this interaction could move through time without 
appearing muddled. In other words, the “structurationist” approach understood 
complexity to end with complexity, and not to lead to something concrete. 
Archer reconciled this by providing a clear time frame through which 
agent/structure, or in the language of Archer, action/structure, interact. In T1, structure 
exists independent of action. In T2, structure and Action interact. By T3, this has caused 
structure to become elaborated, which can be understood as the autopoietic moment 
within the system movement. By T4, structure again sits, elaborated, and independent of 
action (Archer 1982, 468). 
In terms of system operation, many have argued that social systems are driven by 
agents, that these individuals are the "action" in Archer's construct. Luhmann, however, 
argues that it is not just individual action that is what drives system operation but rather 
communication. This is how social systems are able to reproduce themselves. 
Communication occurs through three ways:  information, utterance and understanding 
(Seidl, Becker, and Luhmann 2005, 28). This communication must be understood writ 
large; it is the combination of all things that transfer information from one unit in the 
system to another. These communications produce specific understandings which then 
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must be accepted or rejected by another unit in the system. Communication is similar to 
Bourdieu's habitus (1977). 
Interaction across systems is different than interaction within systems. Luhmann 
is again helpful in this regard. Communication that occurs within a system is relatively 
smooth, as everyone is essentially speaking the same language. However, across systems 
communication is difficult.  
“The living system is inaccessible to the psychic system; it must itch, hurt, or in some 
other way attract attention in order to stir another level of system formation—the 
consciousness of the psychic system into operation” (Luhmann 1995, 40).  
 
System Characteristics 
All system analysts identify system characteristics. This language has a certain 
kind of utility but has also contributed to hyperbole. It is important enough that I include 
an analysis of it here, but this project does not focus on generalizable system 
characteristics. I rather am interested in the specific kinds of characteristics that emerge 
from systems at any given point of time and dependent on their structure. 
Some of the important nomenclature associated with General System Theory are, 
"...boundary, feedback, entropy, homeostasis, growth and decay and threshold," 
(Milburn, Negandhi, and Robey 1975, 11) along with, "...negentropy, equilibrium, and 
steady state..." (Wenninger 1975, 23). Complexity theory accounts for change in the 
world with the deployment of eight key concepts: fitness, coevolution, emergence, agent-
based systems, self-organization, punctuated equilibrium, and fitness landscapes 
(Richards 2000; Lewin 1992; Kauffman 2000; Kauffman 1995; Kauffman 1993; Berardi 
53 
 
2009; Axelrod 1999; Axelrod 1997; Clemens 2002, 3). Each of these concepts deserves 
elaboration. 
Table 1:  Systems Characteristics:  General Systems Theory verses Complexity Theory 
System Characteristics:  Definitions and Terms 
General Systems Theory 
Boundary The line of demarcation that separates one system from another. 
Feedback 
Unit dynamic interacts with another unit in a system over time. 
Feedback occurs when, for example, increases in fertility 
increase the population, when then further increases total 
fertility. 
Entropy 
The loss of energy in any organic or mechanistic system as per 
the second law of thermodynamics.  
Negentropy The energy that a system expends to reduce entropy. 
Homeostasis 
How well a system can manipulate constitutive units to remain 
stable. 
Growth 
Increasing the amount of units in a system or the complexity of 
the relationship between units (through, for example, changing 
unit type) 
Decay 
Decreasing the amount of units in a system or the complexity of 
the relationship between units (through, for example, changing 
unit type) 
Threshold 
A place that is a boundary where a system goes from one state 
to another. Previous growth or decay rates change and new rates 
apply. 
Fitness The ability of a system to withstand change in its environment. 
Complexity Theory 
Coevolution 
The observed tendency where one system in close physical 
proximity to another system change in similar ways. The 
change in one system impacts other systems. 
Emergence Lower level complexity resulting in higher level complexity. 
Agent-Based 
Systems 
Systems that are created by the actions of agents, who create 




The units of a system independently and autonomously create 
and stabilize the system in question. 
Punctuated System changes happen when a threshold is passed, and do not 
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Equilibrium progress linearly. 
Autopoiesis The ability of a system to reproduce itself. 
 
The list above gives a taste of how different theories have tried to cut into 
complexity. Some themes appear. First, there is understandable overlap between different 
theories at different points in time:  the General System Theory concept of homeostasis is 
relatively similar to the Complexity Theory concept of fitness; the General System 
Theory concept of threshold is also similar to the Complexity Theory concept of 
punctuated equilibrium. Differences are also noticeable. Complexity Theory is does not 
embrace the radical holism of General Systems Theory, and this leads to an agent-
oriented emphasis (Phelan 2001). Characteristics of systems involve agent-based 
interaction and self-organization which results in emergent properties. General System 
Theory does not address ground-up emergence. 
What is the utility of identifying a series of characteristics that seem to stretch 
across disciplines and time?  First, it gives us something to look for:  if we approach a 
new kind of complex system, we can see if we identify the characteristics and traits in the 
above list. Second, if we identify one of these characteristics in a system, we can use this 
as a point of reference to other systems. Third, some of these concepts are foundational 
and useful:  complex systems involve feedback, have boundaries, sometimes grow and 
sometimes decay. 
This focus on system characteristics may have been part of the reason that 
General System Theory did not survive as an academic discipline, and why, in my 
opinion, Complexity Theory is headed for a similar fate if it tries to be all things to all 
fields. It is odd to imagine that a list of system characteristics will be applicable across 
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systems in a wide range of fields. What these approaches end up being reduced to is a set 
of labels that are arbitrarily slapped on characteristics in situations in which we already 
have perfect useful words. 
A piece by Clemens is a good example (2002). In this, Clemens explores the issue 
of ethnic conflict in east Europe by applying concepts of Complexity Theory. He 
identifies four groupings of countries, and claims that one group in particular has 
developed with more stability for two reasons that stem from Complexity Theory:  it has 
more fitness and it coevolved with Europe. Coevolution is a product of proximity, and 
social science has multiple ways of talking about things that are closer to each other 
impacting each other. The term coevolution adds nothing, and one word that would be a 
suitable substitute is proximity. The term fitness—and Clemens uses democratic 
institutions and open markets as a proxy for this—is argued to be a synonym for stability. 
If fitness means stable, why not use the word stable? 
Complexity Theory has much to offer through the promotion of agent-based 
models, which provide novelty and potential understanding for how large groups of units 
interact and produce interesting results. The work of the Santa Fe Institute is a beacon for 
this kind of productive work. However, as a grab-bag of labels that can be slapped on 
system characteristics to sound sophisticated, it risks becoming irrelevant. 
Trying to identify system characteristics that are applicable across academic disciplines 
may be a waste of time. Certainly, some system characteristics are quite useful—like 
growth and decay—but they are clearly not the sole purview of systems theory, nor are 
all systems always behaving in any of these ways. Systems theory should instead provide 
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a framework for understanding and analyzing trends instead of attempting to create a 
model that all science can be wedged into. 
System Delineation 
Separating one system from its environment can be complicated. System 
delineation can happen in at least three ways:  separating systems based on a measure of 
importance or influence, dividing systems hierarchically based on a metric of abstraction, 
such as into core/periphery or organizing systems based on the functions that they 
perform (Seidl, Becker, and Luhmann 2005, 36). 
World Systems Theory and Hegemonic Stability/Transition Theory are two 
approaches to system delineation that divide states in terms of their relative influence. 
World Systems Theory—most notably proponed by Wallerstein—argues that the 
international system can be divided into core and periphery (and, in the case of some 
theoretical progeny, the semi-periphery) (1979). All important resources flow from the 
periphery to the core. These system components are distinguished not by function, but by 
influence. 
Hegemonic Stability/Transition theory argues that there are qualitatively different 
kinds of states within the international system. When one state holds a preponderance of 
global power, it becomes the hegemon and is able to bring about stability within the 
broader system. This kind of system separation argues that different kinds of seemingly 
like systems can be distinguished based on their importance or influence. 
International relations theory—especially Realist iterations—separates state 
systems based on their relative positions to one another, and not by their function or their 
influence. In other words, they separate systems based on what kind of system they are. 
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States are a certain kind of system that differs from an international system that differs 
from a psychic system. This is the ontological distinction highlighted by Buzan (1995, 
203). 
Waltz accomplished this by identifying the causes of war as emanating either 
from the system, state or individual (1959). The logic underlying this demarcation 
requires that one see different kinds of aggregations of units as representing different 
systems. For example, the international system is an organization of units that was 
particularly anarchic, and thus distinct from the hierarchy of states. Individuals were 
systems organized in altogether different ways, and in many ways (especially in accounts 
that reject classical Realism) fall mostly out of the analysis. 
The system delineation identified by Waltz created a debate within IR theory on 
the different ways in which levels (read:  systems) should be separated. As all state 
systems occupy a similar position vis-à-vis their (shared) environment, they are all 
treated similarly. This may underemphasize important sub-state characteristics that are 
germane for the IR theory (Singer 1961). Additionally, by lumping all "units" in the 
"international system" into one general category, much of the difference between unit 
interaction is missed. This, it is argued, can be overcome by focusing on how different 
states in the international system interact (Buzan 1995). Luhmann also separates systems 
based on their type. He divides the world into four systems:  organic, mechanistic, 
psychic and social (Luhmann 1995). 
The third method for delineating systems is based on what the system does. This 
approach—labeled by sociologists as "functional differentiation"—focuses on the kinds 
of tasks that are charged to different systems. Easton defines political systems as being, 
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“...oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society” (Easton 1965, 50). 
Gilpin, drawing on Kindleberger, identifies the economic system and the political system 
by what they do:  "...economics takes as its province the creation and distribution of 
wealth; politics is the realm of power"(Gilpin 1975, 22).  
Though Luhmann breaks down general systems into four types—identified 
above—he is most interested in social systems. These kinds of system are separated from 
other kinds of systems because their method for reproduction involves communication. 
Within social systems writ large there exist myriad sub-systems, each of which is 
functionally differentiated. 
Social systems are also broken down by type:  society, interaction and 
organization (Seidl, Becker, and Luhmann 2005). Society encompasses all 
communication. Functionally differentiated social systems distinguish one from another 
by their “binary coding” (Seidl, Becker, and Luhmann 2005, 36). For example, the legal 
system is distinguished by communication that is understood as referring to the 
legal/illegal binary; economic systems the payment/non-payment binary, art the 
beautiful/ugly binary, etc. 
The over-lap between different systems then depends on the kind of 
communication that happens at different points through time. For example, in buying a 
house, the legal system will transact the title based on understandings of legality; the 
economic system will be reified through the transaction of payment, etc. As systems are 
functionally differentiated, multiple systems can temporarily exist at the same time. 
The point of system delineation—along with the point of systems theory in general—is to 
take complexity, break it down into manageable chunks, but to lose as little as we 
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imagine possible. If we can take our level of analysis—the globe—and break it down into 
large systems whose logic can apply broadly—across culture, space and hopefully time—
then we are able to say something potentially useful about the whole. 
Moving to an Applied Systems Approach 
Applied system theory deploys core concepts that help to unpack the complexity 
of theoretical systems thinking for their eventual formalization and modeling. This is the 
bridge between the discussion in Chapter 2 and our eventual model output. These applied 
models start being built at around the same time as the introduction of General System 
Theory. They are closely associated with the development of computing power. With the 
ability to calculate much larger series of data than was possible before, researchers could 
formalize problems and tackle differently than previously. Some of the more notable 
system thinkers are Jay Forrester and Donella Meadows (Jay Wright Forrester 1971; 
Meadows, Randers, and Meadows 1992). 
A foundational concept to understand in the study of system dynamics is the 
difference between stocks and flows, concepts that should be familiar to readers of 
Chapter 2. Building on that analysis, systems dynamics modeling help us to formalize 
assumptions in order to formally represent the kinds of variables that we can forecast 
over long time horizons. One basic example of a formalized systems dynamic model is 
demonstrated below. National stocks of population are understood as being directly 
driven by three independent variables. First, there is the flow of new people being added 
to the population. Second, there is the flow of people being removed from the population 
through death. Third, there is either an inflow or an outflow of people who migrate or 




Figure 10:  Simple Demographic System 
 
These simple models can become complicated as feedback loops are added and 
time is taken into consideration. The model below highlights two of the three drivers of 
population growth, with their respective feedback loops. Thus, as more babies are born, 
the population grows. Higher population rates ceteris paribus then lead to higher births in 
the future. On the other side of the equation, when people die, they remove from the total 
population. As the size of the population shrinks, again, ceteris paribus, the amount of 
people who die will shrink as well.  
 
Figure 11:  Dynamic Demographic System 
 
This highlights some of the complexity involved in presenting issues in this 
simple format. In a general sense, yes, the above relationships do hold. However, when 
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time is considered, along with dynamic trends—such as the education level impacting 
when and how many children families have—the picture becomes quicly complicated.  
There is much happening in this simple diagram, and many variables that are not 
yet represented to fully represent a demographic system. The three variables are both 
independent and dependent variables. Depending on levels of births and deaths, 
population levels will eventually equilibrate at a measurable stock. There is much that is 
missing, and a full understanding of population growth would require an analysis of the 
deeper drivers of the proximate drivers of population, along with an understanding of 
how these different systems interact with one another. 
This further and deeper understanding of demographic drivers is one of the things 
that an integrated assessment model like IFs attempts to accomplish. For example, look at 
this slightly more complicated causal diagram, showing the interaction of three systems, 
and building upon the previous analysis of the demographic system. If we start in the 
upper right, we see the positive feedback loop that we identified in the previous image 
between babies born (in this case, we're using the more technical term, the Total Fertility 
Rate, which is a measure of the total amount of children that one women will have in 
their lifetime) and total population. As more babies are born, the population increases, 
leading to more babies being born. 
Now, let's look at the impact of one system on another system. In this instance, 
the size of the population has a direct impact on a variable in the economic system:  the 
size of the labor force. For this example, let's assume that the economy needs more labor, 
though this would not obviously be the case in all countries. Higher labor then leads to 
higher levels of overall output (within the economy, the stocks are labor and capital, and 
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the flow is output, typically measured as GDP). Higher levels of economic output have 
impacts on other systems as well. In this instance, we highlight their impact on the 
Education system, where higher economic output can help fund higher enrollment rates. 
Higher enrollment rates lead to more education, which eventually leads to a decrease in 
fertility rates and an increase in productivity. 
With the arrows indicating the direction of the relationship between each of the 
variables in question, we can see that, as we drawn it, this system is a negative feedback 
loop. If time was taken out of the equation and the relationship between each of our 
parameters was identified, the total population after a number of model iterations would 
decrease. This is the decay feature discussed by General System Theory theorists. 
 




In the figure above, each sub-system is a different System Type. The Economic 
and Education sub-systems are both social systems that rely on the interactions of human 
agents working within Functionally Differentiated tasks. The Demographic System, on 
the other hand, is a natural system—though heavily influenced by social systems—that 
measure the amount of people who enter or leave a population. 
Time Lags are a component of system analysis that helps to parse complex 
systems into more manageable chunks. In the example above, time was not taken into 
consideration, and the impact of population on fertility rates was assumed to happen 
immediately. This is obviously not the case. When fertility rates increase, more babies 
have been born. For this to increase levels of the population, at least 14 years and more 
likely 20 years have to pass. Taking time as an independent variable is crucial for the 
modeling of complex systems. 
The Marginal Need of one variable as a component in the computation of another 
variable also was only tacitly referred to in the example above. In that example, I said 
that we should assume that the economy needs more labor, thus making the positive 
linkage between labor and GDP correct. However, the Marginal Need of GDP for either 
labor or capital will determine whether an increase in labor or capital will have a larger 
input on economic output. If an economic Structure—the relationships and kinds of units 
that comprise an economy—is already heavily endowed with capital, it will likely need 
more labor; an economic system that already has excesses of labor will likely need more 
productive power. 
This leads to another point about trade-offs that can be inferred from the diagram 
above:  because of limited resources, there is often—if not always—a Trade-Off in 
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decision making. Enrollment rates were directly tied to economic output within the 
education sub-system. This connection is typically made through public investment in 
education, which then helps to attract students through improved quality and access to 
education. This government investment—like all investments in global systems—takes 
place amid various other choices. For example, governments must choose to invest in 
either education or the military, among other sectors that require funding. 
Identifying that these kinds of choices exist within the analysis of complex 
systems brings us back to the agent-structure debate. To what degree do agents shape 
structures, and how do structures in turn shape agents?  This is a fundamental aspect of 
understanding complexity in large systems, and further reveals the ability of humans to 
talk about these systems in the future. 
It is difficult or impossible to forecast the impact of an individual on structure—
the next Mugabe, Bush or Thatcher—because these impacts are discrete events. It is 
possible for individuals to change structure and future events, and this may obviously 
have long-term impacts. There are two responses to this:  because these kinds of impacts 
cannot be mapped with current levels of technology—not to mention reasonably foreseen 
future levels of technology—people who use integrated assessment models do not use 
them. Second, it is also argued that the changes brought about by individual personalities 
and leaders are not as impacting on overall structure as some may seem to believe:  the 
Second Iraq War, for example, while making large changes in a very short time, did less 
to alter long-term patterns of development within crucial systems like economics, 
demographics and energy. Much of structure is beyond the reach of single individuals. 
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That said the reach of large groups of people can more substantively shift the 
structure of a system. Actor behavior responds to a wide range of predictable independent 
variables. If the price of energy becomes dearer, individuals use less, and the price is 
driven down. If actors have higher levels of education, they make different decisions 
about fertility, for example. 
Take the structure of savings and consumption in the United States as an example 
of the interaction between agents and structures in a system. In the 1990s and 2000s, 
agents in the US responded to an abundance of cheap credit by reducing savings and 
increasing consumption. Thus, the economic structure—promoted by low interest rates 
and limited regulation—shaped agent behavior. Agent behavior—responding to signals 
from the economic structure—spent widely and saved little. This behavior promoted 
financial speculative bubbles in various sectors, most notably within real estate. When the 
bubble reached a limit, the global economic system was altered. This interaction, well 
documented by Archer, is a fundamental aspect of the study of large systems in complex 
environments. Integrated assessment models do not necessarily track bubbles (though 
they can be useful in identifying them) but they can model large-scale behavior of agents 
on system structure.  
Using Systems Theory as a Foundation for Integrated Analysis 
As argued in Chapter 2, variables where we can reasonably measure both 
continuity and change are those most typically forecast over long time horizons. These 
variables tend to be continuous with well understood stocks and flows. The beginning of 
Chapter 3 presented a framework for thinking about how to construct models that took 
into consideration widely accepted system behavior, both within and across boundaries. 
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This final section of Chapter 3 brings these threads together and presents an integrated 
approach to long-term modeling. 
Integrated analysis is an approach to viewing the world that can be applied to 
empirical or theoretical considerations. It rests on the assumption that everything is 
connected to everything else. Integrated analysis is less interested in proving theories 
“wrong” and more interested in identifying under what conditions theories demonstrate 
utility and integrate these theories into tools (both empirical and theoretical) for analysis. 
The remainder of this chapter explores how integrated approaches can be used to produce 
quantitative models. 
Integrated assessment models are a particular class of models that take into 
consideration key variables from a wide range of systems. This approach does not 
forecast trends in isolation, but endogenized the calculation of the widest range of 
variables and systems possible. The International Futures model—the cornerstone of this 
dissertation project—endogenizes the largest number of variables from across the widest 
range of system of any quantitative model in the world.  
The section that follows highlights standard forecasting techniques (qualitative 
and quantitative, though focusing mostly on the quantitative). It underscores the 
importance of the explicit structuring of stocks and flows in a relationship to produce 
forecasts that can measure both continuity and change in dependent variables. This 
eventually builds to a broader discussion of the importance of integrated assessment 
modeling, the characteristics of IFs and then will point the way to how an integrated 
approach can also be useful in bringing together different strands of IR thought. 
How We Forecast:  a Stylized Introduction 
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Good forecasts of variables that measure both continuity and change require the 
following: a clear dependent variable, and a well defined time horizon, a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches and the ability to factor in variables from a wide 
range of key systems, a characteristic of integrated approaches to modeling. For this 
example, I demonstrate this approach to forecasting using the population of Japan as an 
example. I contrast it with other formal modeling approaches. 
Qualitative approaches—relying on mental models—are the backbone of the 
construction of quantitative models. Mental models form the basis of our assumptions 
about the world. A mental model about the change in Japan's population may go 
something like this:  population is driven by fertility, mortality and migration. Japan's 
migration is very low, its fertility is low, and its mortality is low. One additional driver of 
future population size is the shape of the distribution in the population. Japan has a lot of 
old people, few young people and few people are having children. This will lead to a 
decrease in Japan's overall population sometime in the relatively near future. 
A quantitative approach could start by simply extrapolating the historic trend. 
Extrapolation requires fitting a line to the curve by running a regression with time as the 
independent variable. In the example below the historic data is represented in the green 
line and it stops in 2005. The blue line is the extrapolation, with an r squared of 0.92, 
which is very high. It looks like we have a pretty good model and that the population of 




Figure 13:  Japan Population - Log Extrapolation 
We should not be overly convinced by the results from this method. It is entirely 
a-theoretical. To improve on this forecast we need to combine both theory and 
quantitative methods. To reinforce a point made earlier:  this method doesn’t embrace the 
structural character of population systems and thus can only forecast continuity in a trend 
and not change. I am interested in variables where we can forecast both continuity and 
change over long time horizons. 
First we formalize the assumptions in our mental models. In quantifying this 
population model, I need to understand the mathematical relationships between all key 
variables. For example, what is the current fertility rate of Japan, and how do we expect it 
to change?  What changes fertility rates?  What is the current mortality rate?  What 
changes mortality?  What is the current population structure, and how does this affect 
future fertility?  Once all of these assumptions are established within our quantitative 
model, it becomes possible to create forecasts. 
In order to make this model quantitative, we explore the relevant trends 
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and relative to all countries where there is data. After we have made our model—in this 
case, a demographic model of Japan—we now want to explore the implications from 
variables in other relevant systems. Demographic changes are driven by changes in 
education levels, income and the current structure of the population. For a good, long-
term forecast, we want to take all of these potentially impacting systems into account. 
Let's compare our earlier extrapolation of the history of Japan's population with our 
dynamic forecast of their population. Below, the difference between our a-theoretical 
extrapolation and a dynamic model is a different in population in 2030 of around 15 
million people.  
 
Figure 14:  Japan Population History and Forecast 
After we have our quantitative forecast, it is important to return to a qualitative 
assessment. Quantitative forecasts cannot stand on their own free from theory and 
subjectivity. Quantitative forecasts are born of qualitative assessment and their results are 
then analyzed using qualitative techniques. For our forecast of the population of Japan, 
we may wonder if our quantitative model is producing the results that we would expect. 
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One additional qualitative assessment tool to shape forecasts is the creation of 
different stories called scenarios. Scenarios area tools that forecasters should use to frame 
the uncertainty of any quantitative analysis. The base case is what you would consider to 
be the most likely unfolding of the trend that you are modeling. However, if you just 
present a base case, the results of your model will have done nothing to frame the range 
of uncertainty inherent in any forecast. For example, going back to our forecast of the 
population of Japan, how certain are we that mortality trends continue?  What if there is 
an increase in migration?   
Each of these questions can be explored by changing some variable within our 
quantitative model. If old people suddenly begin to live longer, we can extend our 
population structure and have the oldest die off at a slower rate. If migration increases, 
we can add to that variable on an annual basis, increasing the size of the population.  
Quantitative and qualitative models must be used in conjunction to make good forecasts. 
Qualitative methods provide creativity and flexibility to the analysis; they allow 
forecasters to imagine a wide range of possibilities that likely fall outside of the structure 
of quantitative models. Quantitative methods' strength lies in their transparency of 
assumptions and their ability to account of a large number of variables simultaneously.  
How We Forecast:  a Technical Introduction of Method and International Futures 
Forecasts can be made using a range of technical methods. Meadows and 
Robinson (2002, 26–86) argue that there are four main types of models:  systems 
dynamics, econometrics, input-output and optimization. I add to this a fifth type:  agent 
based models. Meadows and Robinson argue that most applied models are actually 
71 
 
“composite” in that they glean from a variety of approaches and methods. Integrated 
approaches tend to also be of this final, hybrid type. 
Systems dynamics models were described above. They emphasize identifying 
system boundaries, stocks and flows and formalizing the relationships between these 
parameters and variables (Jay W Forrester 1987; Jay Wright Forrester 1971; Richardson 
and Pugh,III 1981; Sterman 2001). Then second approach identified by Meadows and 
Robinson (2002) is econometrics, which takes statistical relationships and represents 
them in formal mathematical equations to represent a system or systems in interaction. 
This method is most widely used—as its name would indicate—within the field of 
economics, and examples (Kennedy 1998; Maddala 2001). The third approach outlined 
by Meadows and Robinson is input-output models the first of which was famously 
constructed by François Quesnay in the mid 18
th
 century (2005). These methods account 
for interactions between sectors of an economy (Batey and Rose 1990; Leontief 1986). 
These accounting approaches eventually were constructed more broadly represent society 
and account for stocks and flows among key actors in an economy (households, firms and 
businesses, for example) and are referred to as social accounting matrices (SAMs) 
(Graham 1988; Pyatt and Round 1979). The fourth approach involves optimization, 
which maximizes (or minimizes) a value when a choice between competing alternatives 
is presented. For example, when comparing the impact from climate change with the 
economic cost of mitigation, the ideal global carbon price can be established (Nordhaus 
and Boyer 2000; Nordhaus 2008). The final approach—not identified by Meadows and 
Robinson (2002) and tied to complexity theory—is agent based modeling (Bonabeau 
2002; Johnson 2002; Gilbert 2002). 
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These different methods are often combined. One example of this is Computable 
General Equilibrium Models (CGEs), which (often) combine econometric, input output 
tables and optimization methods (Dixon and Parmenter 1996; Partridge and Rickman 
1998; Partridge and Rickman 2010; Partridge and Rickman 2010). CGEs calculate 
economic growth endogenously (using econometrics, normally, though they can use 
system dynamics instead) and equilibrate prices between consumers and producers 
(optimization) and keep track of all of the intersectoral flows (input-output tables). This 
class of models is used widely. 
IFs is another combined-type model. It draws on econometrics heavily to establish 
relationships between driving variables. It is conceptualized using systems dynamics 
approaches emphasizing stocks, flows and feed-back loops. It embeds economic 
production in an input output table, and then this in a SAM. It does not explicitly use 
optimization routines (as these are seen as being unrealistic for real-world application) 
but does approximate optimization in some cases when determining price. 
International Futures (IFs) system is the world’s largest global integrated assessment 
model. It has been under development for over 35 years, primarily by Barry B Hughes. It 
is a tool uniquely positioned to produce analysis that is integrated, systemic and cross-
disciplinary. It has not been widely used for integrated analysis from the perspective of 
IR theory. 
The IFs model endogenizes variables from the following systems, represented in 
Figure 16 below:  population, economic, education, health, agriculture, energy, 
infrastructure, domestic governance, international politics, the environment and 
technology. It treats each of these systems for 183 countries interacting globally from 
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2010 to 2100 (with trade flows, FDI, aid and migration). IFs is housed at the Frederick S 
Pardee Center for International Futures at the Josef Korbel School of International 
Studies at the University of Denver in the United States (Hughes, Dickson, and Irfan 
2010; Hughes 1999; Hughes et al. 2009; Hughes et al. 2009; Hughes, Dickson, et al. 
2011; Hughes and Hillebrand 2006). 
The IFs tool has been used for analysis conducted for the National Intelligence 
Council (United States National Intelligence Council 2008), the United Nations 
Development Programme (Hughes, Irfan, et al. 2011), the United Nations Environment 
Programme (United Nations Environment Programme 2007), the European Commission 
(Moyer and Hughes 2012) and various other governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. It is the primary tool of the African Futures Project, a collaboration 
between the Pardee Center and the Institute for Security Studies, a Pan-African think-
tank (Cilliers, Hughes, and Moyer 2011; Eshbaugh et al. 2012; Gehring et al. 2011; 
Eshbaugh et al. 2011). It has also been used as a graduate level and under-graduate level 
pedagogical tool at various universities. 
IFs is designed to allow analysts to accomplish three things:  1) explore 
relationships and longitudinal trends historically in order to 2) get a sense of where these 
trends and relationships seem to be unfolding (base-case analysis) so that 3) we can ask 
“what-if” questions that introduce wild-cards or allow us to ask questions about what 
kinds of global change needs to happen to achieve specific human targets. 
Philosophically, IFs is structured to consider three different spheres of interacting 
systems:  Natural, Social and Individual. These are represented in the Figure below. In 
the inner-most circle, there is individual choice. This choice is both constrained and 
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enabled by society. The middle-circle—that representing society—is constrained and 
enabled by the outer-most circle, representing natural systems.  
 
Figure 15:  Conceptual Structure of IFs 
 
The Figure 16 shows key links between all of the major sub-models represented 
in IFs. While the sub-modules below do not exactly map to the conceptual systems in 
Figure 15, there are overlaps. Agriculture, Energy and the Environment largely represent 
Natural systems. These provide the general foundation for modeling. In other words, 
without understanding the broader constraints and opportunities associated with changing 
stocks of fossil fuels and changing demand for global agricultural output, long-term 
forecasts are limited.  
Next, domestic governance systems represent social systems. Domestic 
governance can be conceptualized as an emergent property of individual action that 
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provides security and overcomes collective action problems. Governments have the 
ability to direct funds at other social systems, such as education, health and infrastructure.  
These broader social goods then begin to move conceptually towards more 
individual systems, such as actual human life (population) and specific individual levels 
of development. Individuals are the units of the social system, just as societies and 
individuals are units of natural systems all standing in complex interaction. 
Certain components in IFs have cross-cutting system impacts, such as technology. 
Technology writ large—the ability to apply knowledge to work more efficiently—is a 
complex variable that spans natural, social and individual systems. Natural systems 
constrain what is physically possible with improvements and change in technologies. 
Societies produce norms and policies that both enable and constrain the application of 
technologies. Individuals are the eventual source of new technologies as well as the direct 
application of technologies to specific ends. 
There are key connections within and across each of these systems for the 
software. For example, energy systems are necessary for economic systems to function, 
and market-based mechanisms regulate the degree to which energy systems enable or 
constrain individual and social choice. Environmental systems operate in similar ways, 
though with different incentive structures. These systems provide the underlying set of 
elements that allow for human life to continue, but are not as frequently regulated by 
market mechanisms (for example as caused by the “tragedy of the commons”) and are 




Figure 16:  Block Diagram of IFs with Key Linkages  
 
Social systems—almost entirely referencing governments in the IFs model—play 
a vital role in allocating resources and consuming goods that are aimed to promote 
security and improve human development that generally fall outside of the purview of 
market interactions. Within IFs, governments earn revenues through taxation and spend it 
in two ways:  either directly transferring money to citizens in the forms of welfare or 
pensions, or by consuming goods and services. In IFs, governments can consume from 
the following categories:  education, health, military, R&D, infrastructure or 
administrative costs. Domestic governance (and the linkages between natural and 
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individual systems) is documented in the fifth Patterns of Potential Human Progress 
(PPHP) series focusing on governance (Hughes, Joshi, et al.). 
Behavior of those operating within social systems—what I’m referring to as 
“individual behavior”—forms the conceptual core of the IFs model. Structurally, the 
model is not agent-based, but philosophically, the individual choice and development 
tends to be the ultimate focus of the project. The core of the model is the nexus between 
the population system and the economic system. The population model is an agent-cohort 
component model that represents both sexes across time for 5 year cohorts. It 
endogenously calculates both birth and death rates and uses UN population division 
variables for an exogenous treatment of migration. The economic model is a quasi-
computable general equilibrium model that “chases” equilibrium, but never actually 
achieves it at any point in time. It represents six capital sectors (manufactures, materials, 
energy, agriculture, services and ICT), female participation in labor and both skilled and 
unskilled labor. It endogenously calculates levels of productivity based on a multi-factor 
representation of human capital, social capital, physical capital and knowledge. 
Three key human development systems stem from the Demographic-Economic 
nexus. They have been written about in the Pardee Center’s Patterns of Potential Human 
Progress (PPHP) series:  Education (Hughes, Dickson, and Irfan 2010), Health (Hughes, 
Dickson, et al. 2011) and Infrastructure (Hughes, Rothman, et al.). Each of these systems 
further endogenized the calculation of changes in economic productivity tied to current 
levels of stocks and constrained by government budgets. Such an expansive integrated 
treatment of productivity exists nowhere else in the world. 
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The final block in the “individual” section of the overall stylized representation of 
the IFs model is technology. Technological change is embedded throughout the IFs 
system in relationships such as continued improvements in energy efficiency, or 
reductions in food loss. It is also measured physically, as a capital stock, a government 
investment category and in physical access measures (mobile phones, broadband, etc). 
Conclusion 
The dependent variable explored in this project is the character of interstate 
interaction as calibrated by the historic occurrence of conflict. This is measured through 
quantified Realist and Liberal accounts that can be forecasted (both with well understood 
stocks and flows). The only way to measure and forecast this dependent variable is 
through an integrated assessment model. IFs is the only model publically available that 
can be used to construct such a forecast. 
Up to this point, this dissertation has cut into the seemingly intractable complexity 
of forecasting interstate relations by first identifying the kinds of dependent variables that 
we can forecast both continuity and change:  those previously quantified with well 
understood stocks and flows. It then dove into the literature on war to talk about the 
specific pieces of literature that could be leveraged in a long-term forecast, arguing that 
we could forecast the “gas” on the rag, but certainly not the spark. The occurrence of 
conflict is the calibration tool for this project. 
Understanding our dependent variable doe not a forecast make. Long-term 
forecasting requires a strong methodological foundation and this chapter explored the 
importance of both conceptual and applied systems thinking. This built to an introduction 
of the tool used for this analysis:  the International Futures model. 
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We are now in a place to evaluate the role of International Relations theory vis-à-
vis this project. IR provides tools for understanding the behavior of states in the 
international system and it has already been quantified in interesting ways. The next 
chapter first explores standard Realist and Liberal accounts of state behavior in the 
international system. It eventually argues for a third way of quantifying behavior that is 










4. International Relations:  Standard and Integrated Approaches to 
Understanding State Behavior 
“Seek simplicity, but distrust it” 
 –Alfred North Whitehead 
 
Introduction 
 Up to this point I have argued that state interaction matters, and that we should be 
interested in quantifying the character of this over long time horizons for the purpose of 
planning (Chapter 1). I then pieced together a broad foundation for doing this, first by 
identifying the kinds of dependent variables that we could talk about reasonably over 
long time horizons, and the specific dependent variable that I was going to use to 
calibrate my model. The forecast model used in this dissertation must have well 
understood stocks and flows, and should relate to broad structural pressures driving state 
behavior (Chapter 2). I also presented a conceptual and applied way of thinking about 
and producing these forecasts (Chapter 3). 
 I now turn to the theoretical substance of my quantified indices:  the field of 
International Relations (IR). I explore standard Liberal and Realist accounts of state 
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behavior and identify how they have been historically operationalized. The two 
substantive theories of IR
17
 have been quantified at the macro level in the following 
ways:  Liberalism is measured as country-level or dyadic interaction in democracy, trade 
or international organizations. Realism is measured as country-level percentage of 
relative material power or dyad-level relative parity in politically relevant pairs. Both 
approaches to measuring state behavior have been criticized. Much more on this in 
Chapter 5. 
My goal is to take these bodies of work and operationalize them in a way that can 
be forecast within the International Futures (IFs) model. This is my orienting activity—
my project’s North Star—and it drives all decisions that I make. To that end, I am 
interested in basing my evaluation of Liberalism and Realism on the ways that they have 
been historically operationalized. I use the quantification done by others as the basis of 
my assessment of the essential characteristics of each theoretical perspective.
18
  
I talk below about Liberalism and Realism throughout this project in general 
terms based on how they have been operationalized by others. This is incredibly 
problematic. Neither substantive theory is one thing; instead, they are rich tapestries that 
form an analytical backbone for asking questions about state behavior in the international 
system. Some of the criticisms that I levy against Realism and Liberalism actually 
originate internally to their respective research bodies. I highlight three criticisms of 
standard quantifications of both Liberalism and Realism: excessive parsimonious, 
                                                 
17
 I use the phrase “substantive theories” here and “standard bearers” elsewhere because Realism and 
Liberalism have clearly stated objectives, well defined methods and a well structured and fairly uniform set 
of conclusions and prescriptions for state behavior. 
18
 I am keenly aware of the problematic nature of talking about the “essence” of any theoretical position of 
perspective. See Wolff and Resnick for a useful critique of my approach (1987). 
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underwhelming treatment of complex networks, and a lack of focus on intersubjective 
norms and cultures. 
While Realism and Liberalism have been criticized, no third theoretical approach 
to IR has emerged with a coherent research agenda that has been quantified at the macro-
level across time. The closest “third way” comes from theories that deploy a 
constructivist framework. These approaches highlight the importance of socialization, 
ideas and cultures as key drivers of behavior that are largely missed by rationalist 
accounts of international relations. 
Constructivist approaches do not have the same clear research agenda as Realism 
or Liberalism. Constructivist methods may agree on ontological frameworks—the “stuff” 
of the world out there—but they do not deploy a unified methods or assumptions. In fact, 
many who use the constructivist method would argue that the failings of Realism and 
Liberalism can be traced to an overreliance on inflexible independent variables. Those 
using the constructivist approach may wish to avoid this rigidity.  
One component that unites criticisms of Realism and Liberalism is that they are 
overly parsimonious and do not actually map to things “out there”. Boiled down, Realism 
is interested in the effects of material resources and Liberalism interdependence. While 
parsimony can be a virtue, it can also lead to problems. If a theory claims that a single 
independent variable drives state behavior, and state behavior does not conform to 
expectations, then the theory must be taken into question and the assumptions expanded 
on. 
A second critical thread related to Realism and Liberalism stems from their lack 
of focus on complex networks. Both substantive theories do take into consideration issues 
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of connected relations between states. Liberalism does this by focusing on networks of 
international organizations, trade and democratic community; Realism considers 
networks in its treatments of alliances and state decisions to band-wagon or balance. 
Neither approach, however, operationalizes these networks in complex ways leading 
some authors to posit that they are empirically wrong.
19
 While this criticism is primarily 
levied at Kantian Liberalism, it also applies to Realism. 
A third critical thread is oriented towards the rationalist position of both Realism 
and Liberalism and takes issue with their lack of treatment of inter-subjective meaning 
making. Both substantive positions treat behavior as rational and oriented towards the 
maximization of an objective “good”. This is problematic for many (mostly 
constructivists) who argue that language, culture and norms are not static things that can 
be responded to universally across time, but instead are fluid, changeable and contingent 
on the iterative interaction between structures and agents. 
While critical perspectives vis-à-vis the standard bearers of IR do have 
similarities their differences should not be masked. They differ on their emphasis on 
structure verses agents, material verses ideational, path-dependent verses pliable, 
knowable verses unknowable, reductionist verses holist, just to name a few. The 
differences of these alternative positions are great, and should never be attempted to be 
brought together in one unified position. 
To that end, I am interested in the standard-bearer, quantified accounts of IR, and 
document them below. However, I am also interested in what they miss, and if there is a 
                                                 
19
 Some strands of Liberalism have been operationalized using dyadic trade as a driver, which brings about 
some nuance, but does not provide an understanding of complex networks. This is odd, as many strands of 




way to improve upon what has already been achieved. There may be a third, account that 
can be shaken out of the cacophony of literature on international relations that uses extant 
data to tell a slightly different story about relationships between states in the international 
systems. 
I use criticism rooted in conceptualizations of Liberalism and Realism drawn 
from standard operationalization to produce an additional measure that I refer to as the 
Cultures of Interaction Index (CoI Index).  The CoI Index is not a third way of doing IR 
theory. In many ways, the CoI Index augments standard Liberal accounts of state 
interaction and refines methods of operationalization that relate to interdependence.  
While I do not make the claim that the CoI Index is an entirely new approach to doing IR, 
I do argue that it is a reasonable attempt to “get at” the operationalization of a measure 
that is responsive to concerns of those who talk about inter-subjective meaning making, 
norms and culture. Dyadic interaction can be non-Liberal but still retain high levels of the 
CoI Index, though there is clearly correlation between the two measures (at an r^2 of 
0.33, see later in this chapter). Historic examples of countries with high CoI Index scores 
but low Liberal scores are found throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and were 
prevalent in the Soviet Bloc. There has also been a historic convergence between the CoI 
Index and operationalized Liberalism. The block diagram below highlights the eventual 
output that this chapter builds towards. It is a simple model where the three 
operationalized indices that I build each contribute to changes in the character of 
interstate relations. In Chapter 5 I statistically evaluate whether the three IR indices can 
be built together to form a better understanding of the behavior of states historically 
85 
 
(using the calibrating dependent variable of the occurrence of international conflict). I 
find that they do, in fact, explain more together than in isolation.  
 
Figure 17:  Overview of Quantified IR Theory and the Character of Interstate Interaction 
IR Standard Bearer 1:  Realism 
"...the world remains what it always has been:  international politics continues to occur in an anarchic, competitive, 
self-help realm. This reality must be confronted, because it cannot be transcended"  
-Christopher Layne20 
 
 “We must remember that power is relative, not absolute”  
-Magnus Organski21 
 
“It becomes clear that the qualities we think of as conferring power—wealth, resources, manpower, arms—may indeed 
bring power, but not unless they are used to influence the behavior of others. They are the instruments of power, and an 
instrument that is not used is worth nothing” 
-Magnus Organski22  
 
Realists identify the causes of state action from the structure of the International 
Political System. While Realism is not a monolith, it is possible to draw on 
                                                 
20
 (Layne 1994, 49) 
21
 (Organski 1958, 305) 
22
  (Organski 1958, 98) 
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commonalities, which is my intention here. I am focused on the ways that it has been 
historically quantified, though I feel it useful to explore the theory conceptually as well.  
The arguments of Realism can be neatly mapped using the logic of Hobbes in 
Leviathan (1914). All humans represent a threat to one another; even the weakest, armed 
with a sword, could vitally wound the strongest in her sleep. Thus, an overarching 
authority is needed to make sure that society does not descend into chaos. For domestic 
systems (hierarchical), the state government fills that void and ensures that wanton 
murder does not go unpunished. In the international system (anarchic), there is no 
equivalent authority:  this ordering principle shapes the character of the units and creates 
a situation where—to draw from Thucydides—the strong will do what they can and the 
weak will suffer what they must (1954). 
The ordering principle of anarchy does not provide any insight as to why there is 
variation in war and peace in the global system (Levy 1998, 142). If anarchy is a 
transhistorical fact and the deeper driver of conflict, then, sans intervening variables, war 
is a transhistorical fact. Thus, to understand the implications of Realism on understanding 
international conflict, we must further explore the variables that help to explain the 
historical variation in conflict and peace. 
As even the weakest state can harm the vital interests of the strongest, and there 
exists no overarching authority to stop them from doing so, state decisions take the form 
of emphasizing material power (distribution of capabilities) to promote survival. As the 
only thing that people listen to in Hobbesian anarchy is force, the relative amount of 
capabilities between countries—the guns, soldiers and people a state has at its control—
drive the type of relationships that states will have with one another.  
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Absolute power gains do not increase the relative security of one nation; if both 
nations gain equally, then neither nation has improved their ability to defend themselves 
from the other. Relative power gains, on the other hand, produce more security for the 
country that is increasing power, as this now places them in a position to more effectively 
fight off rival, now less powerful countries. 
The concept of power that underlies Realist assumptions about the behavior of 
states in the global system is based mainly on material capabilities. This definition is well 
outlined by Dahl in what he refers to as an "intuitive" definition of power:  "A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" 
(1957, 202–3). Others echo the sentiments of this definition:   
"Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something 
they otherwise would not do...Power can also be conceived in terms of control 
over outcomes" (Keohane 1977, 11).  
 
Proximity is important because it indicates the capacity of one state to act on 
another. Since proximity is a straightforward measure
23
, power becomes the contentious 
variable. Drawing on the work of others, Tellis et. al. argue that the measurement of 
power requires understanding that the concept is comprised of three separate parts:  
"...power as 'resources,' as 'strategies,' and as 'outcomes'" (2000, 14). Others have re-
branded this approach, referring to it as the power of being, this power filtered through 
processes and the power of outcomes (Treverton and Jones 2005, ix, 1).  
These three power perspectives build upon one another in their degree of 
complexity. For example, the "power of being" is crude material power:  the amount of 
                                                 
23
 Though do not neglect even the complexity of measuring country proximity. This can be measured as the 
length of border shared, the distance from capitals, the distance from a certain percentage of the population, 
the distance between countries made contingent on missile capabilities, etc. 
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resources available. This material power must be filtered through a process that makes it 
useful. For example, how do we take resources—guns and people—and impart on them 
the skills to be good soldiers?  The final level of power is the ability to control outcomes. 
Due to the complexity of the global system, this outcome-based power is the most elusive 
in this triad to causally pin-down. It is also the type that all states actively seek. 
This conceptualization of material power neglects alternative measures of power. 
Josef Nye argues for smart-power which co-opts states, “…rather than coercing them" 
(1990). Barnett and Duvall's conceptualization goes well beyond material power 
measures, and further complicates conceptualizations of soft and smart-power.  
“In general terms, power is the production, in and through social relations, of 
effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances 
and fate” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 8). 
  
They argue that power is broken down into four types, and that these types can be 
classified based on two variables:  whether the power works through social relations or 
direct agent interaction, and whether the power is constitutive or coercive. Thus, power 
where one actor impacts another actor—compulsory power in their framework—is much 
more closely aligned with realist conceptions of material power. 
Realists refer mostly to hard, material power. Operationalized measures of power 
are treated in Chapter 5, but an introduction may be in order. Measures of power have 
been used in a wide range of academic studies, most notably the Composite Index of 
National Capabilities (CINC), which operationalized power based on total population, 
urban population, income, steel production, energy production, military personnel and 
military expenditure. Kadera and Sorokin argue that the CINC has played a fundamental 
role in the following IR accounts:  expected utility models of war, polarity theories, 
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hegemonic stability theory, long cycle theories and relative power cycle theory (2004). It 
has also been, “…used as a control variable for empirical investigations of many other 
substantive issues…” (Kadera and Sorokin 2004, 212).  
Many observable phenomena fall out of Hobbes’ account of the “state of nature”, 
described above. There is the security dilemma, the seemingly intractable position where 
two states are mired in competition to gain more relative material power, thus 
precipitating even more relative power amassing. The choice states have between 
balancing and band-wagoning:  when should they balance against the leading hegemonic 
power and when should they join forces with an alternative alliance? Next, there is the 
issue of hegemonic power transition, which argues that the “changing of guards” between 
one dominant power and a rising power produces a context in which international conflict 
is very likely. It is not the goal of this project to outline all of the colorful conclusions 
drawn by the full range of Realist scholars. Instead, this section treats some of the main 
Realist themes, debates and variants.  
The security dilemma is a fundamental assumption that falls out of Realist theory.  
 
“The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also 
makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals 
that they recognize as being in their common interest” (Jervis 1978, 167).  
 
As states are keen on their own survival, and the promotion of material power is 
the only way to fruitfully accomplish this in international anarchy. As these structural 
conditions are constant, certain kinds of behavior are likely to emerge. One of these 
behaviors is a potentially intractable position that rival states can find themselves. Some 
argue that this is the foundational problem in international relations (Booth 2008, 1). The 
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block diagram below outlines the causal mechanisms of this phenomenon. This problem 
can be exacerbated or mitigated depending on whether states pursue offensive or 
defensive strategies. 
 
Figure 18:  Security Dilemma as a Systems Diagram 
Both states in this model are concerned with arms buildup in the other state; the 
perception of increased arms in one state is considered a threat by the other. As the 
perception of threat increases, states are encouraged to further build up their own arms to 
promote security. This, again, is perceived as a threat by the other state in the pair dyad. 
This leads to further buildup, and the perpetuation of a vicious cycle.  
Another phenomena that falls out of Realist conceptualizations is balancing.  
Balancing happens when a country proactively counters the rise in capabilities in another 
country with a rise in capabilities of their own to mitigate perceived threat. The balance 
of power—as Vattel puts it through Bull— is a situation where no one state has 
preponderance over the rest (Bull 1977, 97). For Waltz, this behavior is a trans-historic 
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fact (1979). Organisky sums up the main thrust of the balance of power by arguing that, 
when there is a multitude of actors with a range of material power capabilities, each of 
whom is attempting to improve their own relative power position, “…there is a tendency 
for the entire system to be in balance” (1958, 273). When such a situation exists, it is 
claimed that peace will prevail, and that particularly smaller, vulnerable nations will 
retain their independence. 
The reason that states balance is to produce stability within an otherwise chaotic 
international system. Singer and Deutsch define system level stability as,  
"the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no 
single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; 
and that large-scale war does not occur" (1964, 390–1).  
 
According to Little, its first usage was in reference to Italian city-states (2007, 4). 
Writers have identified six different ways that nations may act in order to maintain the 
balance:  through armaments, seizing territory, buffer zones, alliances, intervention and 
the practice of divide and conquer (Organski 1958, 275–7). 
This approach to understanding state behavior in the international system has 
come under much criticism. First, there is a fundamental misunderstanding about what 
actually constitutes balancing. Haas has identified 8 distinct usages of the term (1953). 
Little compares two standard accounts of balancing:  Waltz (1979) and Mearshimer 
(2001) using a treadmill as a metaphor:  in Waltz’s account, the treadmill can slow 
down—the intensity of structural drivers will decrease causing a stable international 
system—when there are only two states running together (a bipolar system), for 
Mearshimer, the treadmill will only slow down when there is one person running (global 
hegemony), for the classical realists, such as Morgenthau, the treadmill only stops when 
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there is a multitude of people running. The later argument of Mearshimer is much less an 
account of “balancing” and much more an attempt to highlight the potential stability 
produced by hegemony, assessed in the next sentence.  
The pre-1945 Europe was quite violent because there were no nuclear weapons 
and there was a multipolar world. The post 45 world was more peaceful because of 
bipolarity.  
“A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number of 
conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is 
easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the 
prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and 
of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely” (Mearsheimer 1990, 14). 
 
Empirically, this account of states balancing in anarchy was explored by a group 
of authors (Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007). These authors found that balancing 
occurred in around 50% of the case studied. In the other 50%, there was no balancing. 
This kind of empirical inconsistency has led some to argue that there are different kinds 
of balancing, and that states sometimes neglect to properly balance. Walt analyzes the 
balance of threat (1985). He argues that balancing doesn’t happen all of the time, as 
previous realist scholars argued, but only happens when one state perceives another state 
to be a threat, which would not occur in all circumstances. For example, if the EU gains 
in material capabilities relative to the US, there will be no counterbalancing, but there 
would be if, for example, Iran acquired a nuclear weapon. Schweller explores under-
balancing, which is the inability or unwillingness of certain states to balance against 
perceived threats (2006). This lack of traditionally defined balancing stems primarily 
from domestic political circumstances. Little furthers this and argues that "reverse 
balancing" sometimes occurs, which represents,  
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"...collaborative policies that are designed to promote stability by reducing the 
level of arms or implementing measures that are designed to inhibit the use of 
weapons” (2007, 172).  
 
Others argues that the concept is inadequately nuances, as more fruitful analysis 
would look at both polarity as well as concentration, which is, “…a function of: (1) the 
number of major powers in the global system; and (2) the relative inequality of 
capabilities among the major powers” (Mansfield 1993, 111).  
The balance of power approach to exploring behavior in the international system 
has been widely criticized (E. B. Haas 1953; Randall L. Schweller 2006; Organski 1958; 
Little 2007). Hegemonic stability, power-transition, long-cycles and Kondratieff waves 
have been put forward as alternatives to this approach. These models are diverse, but all 
focus on change in centralized power in the international system and the behavior of 
others in response to this consolidated material control. Some have argued that this genre 
of theory does not belong in the Realist camp (Thompson 1988, 44) though others 
disagree and claim that it shares the same assumptions as realists, but places a different 
emphasis on the possibility for order in international anarchy (Levy 1998, 148). Because 
of a focus on material power in anarchy, I argue that hegemonic stability, long-cycle 
theory and power transition theory all fit well within a general understanding of realist 
approaches to IR theory. 
Levy argues that the key distinction between Realism isn’t between classical and 
neo, but between theorists who explore balance of power or hegemonic stability (Levy 
1998, 146).  
“Hegemonic theory is a structural theory that incorporates power transition theory 
and hegemonic stability theory and that downplays the importance of anarchy” 




One key demarcation between hegemonic stability and the balance of power is a 
focus on concentration and not polarity. Emphasizing the issue of concentration brings 
about different kinds of questions, and may be empirically more interesting than focuses 
on the issue of polairty (Mansfield 1993). 
The origins of hegemonic stability theory are traced back to Kindleberger, though 
he did not explicitly use the term (1973). Writing about the organization of the 
international political economic system, he argued that a global hegemon was necessary 
to bring about stability, and that this could only happen with one state in control:  “…for 
the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer” 
(Kindleberger 1973, 305). While this leader did not represent global hierarchy, it was 
able to set the rules of the game and incentivize/coerce others to participate.  
International hegemony is defined as, “the leadership of one state over other states 
in the system” (Gilpin 1981, 116). This hegemonic leadership must be taken explicitly, 
and is nothing without direct action. It requires that, “one state is powerful enough to 
maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so” (Keohane 
1977, 44). This state must have consolidated management over material resources, 
specifically, it must be able to control, “…raw materials…sources of capital…markets, 
and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods” (Keohane 1984, 
32). The position of a hegemonic leader must be that of, “…an unrivaled position of 
economic and military superiority among the core states,” who can, “…shape the 
operation of the international system" (Goldstein 1988, 5). 
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Proponents of hegemonic stability theory argue that periods of peace are relate to 
and contingent on there being a global leader.  
“Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an 
international system of relative peace and security. Great Britain and the United 
States created and enforced the rules of a liberal international economic order” 
(Gilpin 1981, 31).  
 
Others have argued that, while hegemonic situations do breed a certain kind of 
cooperation, they are not the only source of it. There can be cooperation in the 
international system in non-hegemonic situations (Keohane 1984, 32). 
Periods of hegemonic peace are not the sole focus of this approach. Assumptions about 
the rise and fall of global hegemons are very germane to the understanding of the future 
of international conflict. This school of thought has been the only approach to IR theory 
that offers explicit and rigorous sets of forecasts about the future of international conflict 
(Thompson 1988, Chapter 12; Organski 1980, Chapter 17; Rasler 1994, Chapter 10; 
Goldstein 1988, Chapter 15). 
Modelski took the initial cut in measuring the concentration of global power in 
the hands of hegemons over time by tracing the amount of total naval power that the great 
power nations possessed from the 1500’s to the end of the 21st century (Modelski 1987; 
Modelski 1988)  The graph of this power concentration, reproduced below, indicated that 
naval material power—a proxy for general material power and global reach—has ebbed 




Figure 19:  Modelski and Global Naval Concentration (1988, 109), Author’s Red Line 
 
“The long cycle of global politics refers to the process of fluctuations in the 
concentration of global reach capabilities which provide one foundation for world 
leadership” (Modelski 1988, 97). 
  
This analysis of global hegemonic control, shown above, outline a series of 
patterns in material power consolidation. If we set the threshold for hegemony at 40% of 
total global naval power, indicated above by the red line, 6 periods of global rule are 
identified: 
 the Portuguese until the last half of the 1500s 
 the Spanish for about 25 years up to 1600 
 the Dutch from the early 1600s to about 1650 
 the UK from the early 1700s through to the end of WWI with a blip in 
the late 1700s up to the end of the Napoleonic wars 




It is argued that this oscillation between concentration and deconcentration does 
not happen by chance; there are underlying sets of forces that help to drive the ebb and 
flow of global power. First, there is the structure of the international system when a 
global hegemon exists. The pyramid outlines the relationship between different kinds of 
states in the international system coupled with their relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with the status quo. The global hegemon is understandably entirely satisfied with the 
situation that it controls. As we move down the pyramid—from countries with more 
global power to those with less global power—dissatisfaction with the system becomes 
more apparent.  
 
Figure 20:  Organski's Hegemonic Control and System Satisfaction (1958, 331) 
Though all nations subsumed within the power of the global hegemon represent 
some level of dissatisfaction with the current global system, this does not indicate that 
conflict will arise. For that to occur, power must be deconsolidated at the top, and a 
challenger nation must rise to try to take the reins of global leadership.  
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“Power transition arguments emphasize the destabilizing and conflictual 
implications of a challenger catching up to a declining leader. As the transition is 
accomplished…war between a rising challenger and a declining leader is most 
probably” (Rasler 1994, 38). 
 
The variation in concentration and deconcentration in material power must be 
accounted for in this argument. It is clearly argued that these oscillations are not random 
nor are they mechanical processes (Goldstein 1988, 6). Instead, the general consensus is 
that there are three stages in the power transition:  first, there is the stage of “potential 
power”, where a nation is pre-industrial and lacks the means to exploit resources for the 
end of power and control. The second stage—the transitional growth in power stage—
involves a move towards industrialization and the harnessing of previously latent power. 
Power maturity is the third stage, and is marked by a stagnation of the radical growth of 
the second stage (Organski 1980, 302–4). Organski argues that the third stage of power 
deconcentration is not the fault of the mature nation, but is rather being driven by other 
developing nations moving through the second stage of power transition. This further 
emphasized the importance of the role of relative power in the face of absolute power 
(Organski 1958, 305). 
Goldstein identifies four potential causes of oscillation in global production which 
leads to down-turns in hegemonic control of material power:  the capital investment 
theory (where long-term investments in, say, infrastructure begin to depreciate), the 
innovation theory (where growth happens around key technological innovations, such as 
the automobile), the capitalist crisis theory (where the long term rate of profit is reduced 
by factors such as imperial overextension) and the war theory (where wars create 
inflationary shocks causing long-term waves in overall production) (1988, 24). Levy 
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chalks the fall of hegemons up to the following: “Differential rates of growth, the costs of 
imperial overextension, and the development of vested domestic interests lead to the rise 
and fall of hegemons” (Levy 1998, 148).  
Rasler and Thompson make the power-transition-leads-to-war argument more 
specific. They argue that it is not just the concentration of one global power relative to all 
others, but the concentration of one global power relative to the next most powerful 
region. Further, they claim that,  
“…the most dangerous structural situation has been a deconcentrating global 
system and a reconcentrating central regional system. Such conjunctures have 
encouraged the outbreak of a series of global wars over the last five hundred 
years” (Rasler 1994, 59). 
 
This argument it outlined in the graph below. The y axis represents the relative 
degree of power concentration in the hands of one global hegemon, or the most powerful 
region. As the line moves down, there is less concentration in the system and power is 
more widely shared. The grey vertical lines represent the occurrence of major, systemic 
war. The occurrence of these conflicts tend to coincide with levels of deconcentrated 
global material power. These conflicts also tend to produce high levels of concentration 




Figure 21:  Rasler and Thompson (1994, 68) 
Hegemonic stability, power transition, long-cycle and Kondratieff waves all tell a 
certain kind of compelling story about nations pursuing power in anarchy, staples of 
realist thought. It is clear that some pattern does emerge within the long-reach of this 
theory, and the arguments for global stability—defined as the absence of systemic wars—
in the presence of a strong global hegemon are compelling. 
While the broad patterns identified by this approach appear compelling, there is 
much that is left out. First, the explanations for the causes of the long-cycle of power 
transitions are not entirely compelling. The list of explanations causing these fluxes is ad 
hoc, and lacks empirical validity. It seems more likely that these scholars have not 
identified the root of changes in the global system, but the fact that changes in the power 
composition of the global system do occur. Separate from etiology, this is in itself 
interesting. The implications of a de-concentrated global system on the likelihood of a 
systemic war are a powerful argument separate from the attempts to divine the cause of 
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the fall of system leaders. This is the value of this approach to understanding the future of 
international conflict. 
IR Standard Bearer 2:  Liberalism 
"We live in an era of interdependence. This vague phrase expresses a poorly understood but widespread 





As with Realism, Liberalism is a substantive research agenda within the field of 
IR. While not a monolith, boiled down to its essence (as historically operationalized at 
the macro level), it emphasizes three types of interdependence that can mitigate the 
corrosive impacts of an international system characterized by anarchy:  through increased 
trade, democratization and membership in regimes of global governance. These three 
theoretical foundations can be traced back to Kant’s Perpetual Peace (Kant 1991). 
Interdependence is the key driving variable in Liberalism and stands in opposition 
to Realist claims that relative material gains are the key driver of behavior in the 
international system. If Realist claims of conflict are indeed the general trend in the 
international system then, “…institutionalized patterns of cooperation are particularly in 
need of explanation” (Keohane 1982, 325). These qualities of cooperation are represented 
by three kinds of interdependencies:  institutional interdependence, material 
interdependence and normative interdependence.  
Institutional interdependence arises from membership in international 
organizations and the signing or ratification of UN treaties. This is the most direct 
measure of embeddedness in regimes of global governance found in the Kantian triad, 
                                                 
24
 (Keohane 1977: 3) 
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and one that I specifically focus on. Kant referred to these kinds of treaties and 
organizations as being fundamental to perpetual peace. In his terms, treaties could lead to 
more binding and comprehensive forms of governance, such as a federation of states 
based on an international constitution. This was not, for Kant, the same as a world 
government (1991, 102). Instead, each state would retain its substantive sovereignty 
(domestic monopoly on the use of force) but their external sovereignty on the use of force 
would be curtailed. This federation would be more binding than a treaty, though treaties 
are likely to be necessary initially for the foundation of this kind of federation. 
Thicker interdependencies between states are likely to arise from material and normative 
interdependencies. Material interference may stem from engagement in trade among 
states. When nations specialize in the production of specific goods and services for which 
they have a relative advantage in production, comparative advantage is produced. Thus, 
more states are taking more specialized products to the global market and are reliant on 
others to import materials previously produced domestically. 
Kant referred obliquely to global trade as being one of the cornerstones of 
perpetual peace. He wrote that the world should embrace universal hospitality where all 
people are free to move from one state to another. This would seem to promote 
movement of labor, but not capital. However, while Kant may not have directly alluded 
to the impact of globalization on security (he was writing at a time when levels of global 
trade were small compared to the modern era) many have attributed this to his body of 




Democratic domestic governance regimes are the source of normative 
interdependence. The argument here is that states that value the same kind of governing 
regime have certain ideational affinities with one another that form a kind of relational 
interdependence. Some have referred to this not only as normative constraint, but also 
structural constraint. I discuss that below, but believe that the normative driver is more 
important for issues surrounding global governance. 
Kant argued that republicanism was a crucial determinant of perpetual peace, as it 
was the only form of government that separated the executive from the legislative branch 
(1991, 101). Kant argued that, because decisions to go to war were made by the 
population as a whole (at least those with the political rights to vote), that they would be 
much less likely to engage in international conflict. Kant's claim is referred to in 
contemporary terms as institutional or structural constraint that makes democracies less 
likely to go to war (the war-proneness of democracies is debated below) (See the former 
for a description of institutional constraint and the later for a general critique Doyle 1983; 
Layne 1994). Other causal claims about the role of democracies and peace are referred to 
as being normative (Maoz and Russett 1993). The normative account claims that bilateral 
democracies will not go to war because they value the same kinds of things (pluralistic 
decision making, transparency, etc). 
I am interested in the enabling effect of the normative driver brought about by 
dyadic democracies for implications for global governance. If two states are democratic, 
there are two implications for global governance:  the first is that bi-lateral democracies 
may be more likely to trust one another as they have embraced similar domestic 
governing structures and thus embed themselves in the same kinds of regimes, 
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institutions and norms. The second is that the institutions that are created and promoted 
by these organizations are likely to be more democratic and pluralistic.  
Kantian Liberalism is most closely associated in academic literature with bilateral 
peace and not global governance. There is much literature on exploring this issue, and I 
use that as a foundation for forecasting this trend as an index. The literature indicates that 
giving equal weight to the impact of democracy, IO embeddedness and levels of trade is 
conceptually sound, and this is the strategy that I pursue later when I build my index of 
Kantian Liberalism. 
By far the largest amount of conceptual and empirical effort exploring Kantian 
Liberalism’s relationship with peace has gone into exploring the implications of the 
democratic peace. While there is not universal consensus (Spiro 1994; Layne 1994; 
Farber and Gowa 1997; Cohen 1994), the overriding empirical evidence points to two 
characteristics that define democratic interaction in the international system:  1)  bilateral 
democracies are less likely (if likely at all) to use violence to solve problems (Bremer 
1993; Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 
1993; Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Russett 1993) but 2) they are also more likely 
to engage in violence with non-democratic states (Rousseau et al. 1996; Hegre et al. 
2001; Eric Gartzke and Weisiger 2010)
25
. 
The implications of high levels of dyadic trade on the occurrence of conflict have 
also been explored, with a range of mixed results. Initial studies show clear pacific links 
between levels of trade and pacific interstate relations (Domke 1988; Mansfield 1994; 
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 See (Rousseau 2005) for an argument that democracies are more pacific with all regime types. Russett 
makes this point repeatedly (see 2003 page 373). 
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Oneal and Ray 1997; Reuveny and Heejoon Kang 1996; Reuveny and Heejoon Kang 
1996). This rush of literature was met with some resistance, either due to concerns over 
methodology (Kim and Rousseau 2005; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) or results 
(Barbieri 2002; Barbieri 1996; Barbieri and Schneider 1999). This series of critiques of 
the relationship between trade and conflict were responded to, and more recent 
approaches have further honed the relationship between bilateral material 
interdependence and the occurrence of conflict. 
Oneal and Russett (1999) argue that the impact of trade as a mitigant of conflict 
can be seen by exploring only politically relevant dyads (those that are contiguous or that 
have a Great Power associated). Gartzke (2007) argues that the strong findings that 
democracies cause peace but the weakness of conceptual accounts of this may be because 
it is actually capitalist dyads that cause peace. Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) have a 
different approach to explaining the relationship between trade and conflict and they 
argue that bilateral trade reduces conflict (because the opportunity costs are too high), but 
that high levels of multilateral trade increase the likelihood that two countries will engage 
in conflict (because other trading partners will take up the slack caused by the lack of 
trade between warring parties). In a broadly sweeping quantitative review of the drivers 
of international conflict, Bennett and Stam find that international trade does have a 
statistically significant and important pacifying impact on dyadic pressures for war 
(Bennett and Stam 2000). 
The third piece of the Kantian puzzle is embeddedness within international 
political norms, regimes and institutions. This driver of Liberalism has received the least 
amount of attention, and evidence on its overall impact on international peace is mixed. 
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Bennett and Stam find no significant relationship between this variable and the 
occurrence of conflict in their sweeping study. Russett and Oneal argue that this is a 
byproduct of exploring the impact of membership in international organizations for all 
dyads in the international system, and not just for politically relevant dyads (2001). When 
politically relevant dyads are selected, membership in international organizations 
becomes a significant pacifying effect. 
More recently, Pevehouse and Russett have argued that international 
organizations have a pacifying impact on bilateral relations when the members of those 
international organizations are democracies (2006). A network effect was explored in a 
piece arguing that traditional empirical measures of IO impacts on the security situation 
were misleading, as they only explored the relationship of two states in one institution, 
and not the broader impacts of multiple states' ability to effect indirect diplomatic and 
normative pressure on other states to conform (Dorussen and Ward 2008). Others argue 
that IOs are not simply one kind of thing, and show through empirical analysis that 
security IOs are better at promoting peace than economic IOs, IOs that are more 
thoroughly established are better at promoting peace, and, in line with the work of 
Pevehouse and Russett, that IOs where there is homogeneity among members also helps 
to promote peace (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004). 
In a series of three articles, Bruce Russet and various colleagues explore the 
relative impact of the three legs of the Kantian tripod on international conflict. While 
methods change slightly, they find some consistency. 
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Table 2:  The Liberal Tripod in IR:  Percentage Reduction in Conflict Contribution from Various Components 
of Liberalism 




and Berbaum 2003) 
(Russett 2001) 
(Russett, Oneal, 
and Davis 1998) 
Impact of Dyadic 
Democracy on 
Conflict 
86% 33% 35% 
Impact of Trade 
on Conflict 
32% 43% 38% 
Impact of IO 
Membership on 
Conflict 
43% 24% 23% 
 
It is not the endeavor of this project to reconcile all of the competing perspective, 
methods, data sets and theories that pertain to the three pillars of Kantian Liberalism vis-
à-vis international conflict. Instead, the above discussion was to promote the idea that 
each of these aspects of Kantain Liberalism are likely important to issues of international 
conflict. Whether a state is liberal seems to matter for peace. It is likely that, if it matters 
for the absence of conflict, it may matter for the presence of cooperation. 
Cultures of Interaction:  Pulling some threads from the cacophony of 
criticism 
Above, I treated Realism and Liberalism in general terms that are relevant to how 
they have been historically quantified. As stylized accounts of behavior in the 
international system, they hold important insights. In Chapter 5 I test whether the 
quantification of these theories explains more in conjunction or isolation. I show 




This section brings together some of the criticisms of both Realism and 
Liberalism and attempts to highlight a third approach to thinking about quantifying IR. 
This approach which I call the Culture of Interaction Index is an attempt to “pull threads” 
from the wide range of critiques of both Realism and Liberalism with the help of a more 
constructivist orientation (Wendt 1999). To be relevant for my project this third approach 
must satisfy the following: 
 be operationalizable on a large-scale from existing measures of state 
behavior with historic series for most dyad years
26
 
 have reasonable historic longitudinal behavior across time 
 contribute to improving and building upon Realist and Liberal accounts 
 attempt to “get at” something that isn’t captured by either the Realist or 
Liberal measures, even if in a very limited and possibly contentious way 
 
Realism and Liberalism (as they have been historically operationalized at the 
macro level) are criticized for various reasons. Here I make the argument and document 
with citations that critical approaches can be broken down into three strands that build 
sequentially. First, the theoretical foundations use univariate drivers (anarchy for 
Realists, interdependence for Liberals) that may be overly simple. Second, and stemming 
from the first, these substantive approaches do not treat complex networks with sufficient 
depth and complexity. Finally, and building on the previous two criticisms, these 
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substantive IR approaches do not treat intersubjective meaning making—such as 
culture—adequately or at all. 
Parsimony can be a useful thing:  the model of state behavior that can explain 
more using less can be considered “better”.27 The real world, however, tends to 
complicate this:  it is exceedingly easy to use fewer independent variables; it can be 
exceedingly hard to know if you have “explained more”.  Explaining a few “…big and 
important things” (Waltz 1986, 329) is nice, but we must be concerned if our explanatory 
power is sufficiently comprehensive to warrant the limited assumptions made (Sørensen 
2009). Snyder says that, ”…it is enough that [a single theory] highlight ‘a small number 
of big and important things’; and that is all that Kenneth Waltz…claims for his theory,” 
(1996, 167) Donnelly persuasively counters: 
Only for peculiar purposes would it be helpful to represent all animals as either 
big or small. Conceptualizing color as either red or blue is not ‘more 
parsimonious’ than the standard red-orange-yellow-green-blue-violet-spectrum 
but a gross distortion. ‘The world’ and our analytical purposes set the limits of 
useful parsimony (2009, 78). 
 
The following pages argue that both Realism and Liberalism have been 
historically operationalized in ways that are overly parsimonious. Both approaches miss 
important things about the international system and the behavior of states. Theories 
should be internally logically consistency and should also conform to real-events, out 
there. If theories miss important things out, in the world, then there are intervening 
variables that they have not considered. 
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 This is referred to as “Occam’s razor” which privileges hypotheses that make fewer assumptions but 
which makes no claim on the output of a model’s performance across time. 
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Realism has been criticized because the world it theorizes does not seem to 
conform to the actual world, out there. As cited previously, Keohane gets at this 
particularly well:  if the world is, as Realists claim, characterized by the security dilemma 
that emphasize the importance of relative power gains, any, “…institutionalized patterns 
of cooperation…” is really of interest (1982, 325). In the international system, patterns of 
cooperation occur. 
The lack of empirical verification has led many Realists to argue for the addition 
of intermediate variables that augment the original and simple claims of Waltz. This has 
led some to conclude that Realism is an approach to doing IR that is on its way out 
(Vasquez 1997). Legro and Moravcsik make it clear: 
The central problem is instead that the theoretical core of the realist approach has 
been undermined by its own defenders—in particular so-called defensive and 
neoclassical realists—who seek to address anomalies by recasting Realism in 
forms that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent and less distinctive to 
Realism (1999, 6) 
 
The authors continue by arguing that new versions of Realism try to take into 
consideration what earlier Realists had tried to argue against, like economic 
interdependence. It would be a boon to Realism if it could be shown that, from 
Machiavelli to Morgenthau the structural pushes and pulls were the same. For example, 
minimalist Realism retains only anarchy and rationality as assumptions, watering down 
the theoretical perspective beyond recognition.  
Realist assumptions about the behavior of states in the international system—as 
originally stated by Waltz—seem to be excessively parsimonious and require constant 
fiddling:  academics take them, add bits, remove bits and attempt to make them more 
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palatable vis-à-vis the actual behavior of states in the international system. Liberalism—
as originally posited by Kant and as operationalized by many, identified previously in this 
chapter—also makes limited assumptions about the world and draws large conclusions. If 
interdependence existed at the same time as conflict, Liberalism is as susceptible to 
criticism as Realism. 
The Democratic Peace thesis—one of the legs of the Kantian tripod—has been 
argued by some to not be a historic constant and thus also suffer from empirical 
verification. Farber and Gowa claim that democratic peace may be more of an artifact of 
Cold War alliances:   
“…we find that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
democracy and war before 1914…Our analysis shows that it is only after 1945 
that the probability of war or serious disputes is significantly lower between 
democratic states than between members of other pairs of states” (1995, 124).  
 
There are various examples of conflict between countries that are arguably 
democratic. Ecuador and Peru have gone to war three times since the middle of the 20th 
century. Israel attacked democratic Lebanon in 1948, but had yet to vote. Many people 
code the German Republic in the run-up to WWI as a democracy or a quasi democracy. 
Finland allied themselves with the fascist powers in WWII from 1941-44 to avoid 
annexation by the USSR, thus pitting them (a democracy) against allied democracies 
(they were also bombed by the UK at one point). The US attacked the Philippines, then a 
developing democracy, though they did not have time to hold elections before their loss 
in 1899. Some code Spain as democratic in 1898, and this would put the Spanish-
American war into question. Hitler was democratically elected, and legally suspended the 
constitution. Various measures of Militarized Interstate Disputes with fatalities occur 
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between states that are very liberal, including Turkey and Cyprus in the 1990s. This is not 
to mention Militarized Interstate Disputes that occur between states without fatalities that 
are extremely liberal, like the Cod Wars of the 1950s and 70s between Iceland and the 
United Kingdom.  
The method for statistically evaluating the claims of democratic peace theorists is 
also contentious. Some have argued that, because democracies represent such a small 
proportion of the membership of the international society for the vast majority of history, 
that their overall share of the sample size is so small as to artificially benefit proponents 
of the Democratic Peace (Mearsheimer 1990, 50). Thus, the reason that so few 
democracies have gone to war is a product of statistical method and coding (Spiro 1994, 
51). Spiro finds that Doyle acknowledges that the war between Peru and Ecuador 
occurred when they were both liberal (1994), but that it, "...came within one to three 
years after the establishment of a liberal regime...before the pacifying effects of 
Liberalism could be deeply ingrained" (Doyle 1983, 213). 
A second assumption of Liberalism is trade can lead to higher levels of 
interdependence that can help promote absolute gains and mitigate the corrosive impact 
of the security dilemma. Some argue that this is not always the case. During the period of 
rapid globalization, Liberalism has done much to promote stability. However, instead of 
being a driver of peace in the early 20th century, it was actually a driver of war (Rowe 
2005). This leads Rowe to state strongly:  "This conclusion that globalization pacifies 
international relations is not just premature, it is wrong" (2005, 408).  
It is not simply that trade connection matters, but the degree to which dyads are 
connected. Barbieri argues that there is a curvilinear relationship between trade 
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integration on a dyadic basis and the occurrence of war. If a country has little to no trade 
integration, there is an increased chance that they will go to war. If they have a very high 
interdependence—whether asymmetrical or symmetrical—this will also increase their 
chance of going to war. If dyadic pairings have a moderate level of trade integration, then 
this will decrease the chance of going to war (1996). Therefore, simply increasing trade 
integration does not reduce the chance of conflict. 
In a separate piece, Barbieri and Schneider find a range of contradicting evidence 
on the relationship between trade and peace concluding the following: 
What are the origins of the contradictory explanations and evidence regarding the 
impact of trade on interstate relations?...To date, no compelling theoretical 
rationale has been offered for why empirical findings differ, other than the fact 
that scholars pursue very different inquiries, with different samples, data, 
measures or modeling techniques  (1999, 399)  
 
The final leg of the Kantian tripod—membership in a “federation” of states—has 
not received as much intellectual attention of late. Membership in international 
organizations and alliances has been statistically examined historically as a driver of 
international conflict and found to have a relationship (identified earlier in this chapter). 
Criticisms of this third leg typically come in the form of criticisms of global governance 
regimes. 
A second type of criticism levied at the most parsimonious versions of Liberalism 
and Realism is that they do not sufficiently consider networks of states as key driving 
variables of state behavior. This criticism is, in a way, an extension of the criticism of the 
approaches for being overly parsimonious. In many ways, much of the thrust of IR in the 
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1980’s was oriented towards making both Realism and Liberalism more sophisticated, 
nuanced and empirically verifiable.  
Looking at the drivers of either power or interdependence is not sufficient for a 
full picture of behavior within the international system. There are more complex forms of 
interdependence that can arise that cannot be explained by the standard versions of 
Liberalism and Realism. The ways in which states interact—their histories, their policies 
and their perception of one another—are all crucial driving variables of behavior of states 
in the international system. This second criticism does not yet embrace the next move 
towards culture and inter-subjective meaning making. It is an even more basic criticism 
of the main drivers of standard Liberalism and Realism. 
Keohane and Nye provide an alternative to the three-legged version of Kantian 
Liberalism by promoting “complex interdependence” (1977). Three factors give rise to 
complex interdependence: linkage strategies; agenda setting; transnational and 
transgovernmental relations. These go beyond the standard, traditionally operationalized 
set of Liberal measures. 
Snyder provides an improvement on Realist approaches to understanding state 
behavior by adding “process variables” (1996). Snyder’s goal is to increase the ability of 
neo-realism to explain things, while not doing too much damage to the parsimony 
promoted by Waltz. He does this by first parsing out “structural modifiers” which are 
systems in the international system that change the direct impact of structure on state 
behavior. These are the kinds of things that Nye is interested in his criticism of Realism 
by pointing to non-power incentives and the, “…ability to communicate and cooperate” 
(Snyder 1996, 168). 
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Eventually Snyder latches onto the important kind of intervening variable that can 
push forward the underlying logic of Realism without sacrificing excessive parsimony:   
“Relations or relationships are not behavior itself, but the situational context of 
behavior…Relationships lie between structure and interaction; they are the 
conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behavior” (Snyder 
1996, 172).  
 
Relationships can be added to the structural realist account to make it more 
nuanced. Relationships also can provide the framework for analyzing “structural change”, 
a common critique of Realist theory.  
These are process variables. Process variables include alignments, conflicts, 
capabilities and interdependence. Interaction Arenas can also form process or relationship 
variables. Interaction can take place through preparedness, diplomacy and action (Snyder 
1996). 
For a third example of standard rationalist criticisms of Liberalism and Realism, 
see Schweller’s Balance of Threat (Randall L. Schweller 2006). This account of Realism 
takes the logic of balance of power but does not apply it to all dyads. It is not solely the 
raw-power of the relationship (or relationships, as per broader alliances) that define the 
state behavior but the character of the relationship. If the relationship is characterized by 
animosity, then balancing behavior can occur. These modifications by Schweller are 
meant to improve, and not refute, Waltzian versions of IR (Schweller 1997). 
The third kind of criticism that I highlight in this section is an extension of the 
first two:  standard Realism and Liberalism do not sufficiently consider the role of norms, 
values and cultures in the behavior of states in the international system. Constructivism is 
an approach to doing IR that does not have the same substantive focus as either 
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Liberalism or Realism, in fact, it has many foci. It cannot be boiled down to univariate 
explanations. “Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of 
normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, 
and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures” (Reus-Smit 
2009, 209). Earlier approaches to understanding behavior in the international system did 
flirt with the importance of the ideational structure of the international system. In many 
ways, this is a key component (if not a foundation) of Liberal accounts of behavior in the 
international system. However, the ideational components of Liberalism (and their child-
theories, such as “complex interdependence” outlined above) made altogether different 
assumptions about actor behavior, typically being rationalist. 
The notion that the world is a social construction appears obvious, at face. 
However, standard rationalist accounts of the field tend to gloss of this seemingly 
fundamental component of the human experience. The field of constructivism represents 
a partial (if not full) rejection of the rationalist project and instead an emphasis on the 
importance of the way that language is used and understood to shape action and behavior 
within the international system. 
Constructivism gradually emerged as a separate method in the mid 1990s (though 
it has been a philosophic argument that has existed for much time before that) as an 
alternative pole in IR that emphasized the socially constructed character of relations in 
the international system. These authors intended to take rationalist accounts of IR and to 
show that they were actually only getting at a small piece of the actual puzzle in 
explaining how states behave. 
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Wendt writes prolifically in this vein. His Social Theory of International Politics 
is the closest to a decisive text deploying this method. There, Wendt argues for a socially 
constructed assessment of behavior in the international system, specifically around the 
role of anarchy. According to this account, anarchy is not a thing out there that is the 
fundamental deeper driver of behavior in the international system but is something that 
states react to (as identified most clearly in his “Anarchy is what states make of it” piece). 
Wendt puts forward three “cultures of anarchy” that are meant to operate within 
the space that rationalists have typically identified as being one of the deep drivers of 
behavior in the international system. Cultures of anarchy are socially constructed spaces 
where states follow certain logics. For example, Wendt argues that we are currently 
experiencing a global Lockean culture of anarchy, which is characterized by rivalry. This 
rivalry is much different from the Hobbesian anarchy that had characterized state 
relations from the Peace of Westphalia until probably some-time after WWII (the Cold 
War?). Hobbesian anarchy is characterized by enmity. Wendt goes on to argue that there 
could be pockets of Kantian anarchy (characterized by cooperation) forming, and that the 
whole system is eventually moving in that direction. 
Wendt also adds a second axis to his tripartite division between cultures of 
anarchy:  the degree to which a specifically socially constructed space is internalized by 
different actors in the system. If the international system is structured according to a 
Kantian logic of anarchy, but this social construction is very thin, then the system will 
exhibit very different characteristics from a system where the Kantian anarchy is deeply 
embedded as the driving logic of behavior of states in the international system.  
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While Wendt’s formulation of cultures of anarchy takes place at the level of 
analysis of the international system, they can be broken down to the level of bi-lateral 
relations. My approach to understanding the quality of relationships within the 
international system relies on evaluating the socially constructed character of 
relationships between states at a bi-lateral level. I am not concerned with how these 
bilateral relationships build to the level of the international system (at least not at this 
stage of my research) but instead on the possible kinds of relationships that can exist 
between states. 
In terms of international conflict, the constructivist account is concerned with the 
role of language in the formation and shaping of behavior:  if the international system is 
shaped by Kantian anarchy, then the likelihood of conflict will be different relative to 
various structural drivers than if the international system is shaped by Hobbesian 
anarchy. 
Constructivist approaches tend to not emphasize rationalist, utility maximizing 
behavior in actors. Instead, they tend to be interested in the type of culture that dominates 
the system at a given point in time. Wendt most famously identified different types of 
international “cultures” that can guide behavior of states at any given time (Wendt 1992; 
1999). States can be guided by a culture of Hobbesian (characterized by enmity), 
Lockean (characterized by rivalry) or Kantian (characterized by cooperation) anarchies. 
Each of these “cultures of anarchy” can be internalized to differing degrees. 
While much of Wendt’s criticism was levied at Realist accounts of international 
anarchy (as compared with domestic hierarchy) being the key deeper driver of state 
behavior, Wendt’s approach also works as a criticism of standard Liberal accounts of 
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deep drivers of behavior. Interdependence, just like anarchy, can involve different 
cultures that cause states to react very differently. Certainly interdependence leading up 
to WWI was treated differently than it is today. That is a product of both a structural and 
a cultural change in the international system. 
IR Theory and Forecasting:  Stocks and Flows 
 In Chapter 2 I argued that stocks and flows were important in conceptualizing and 
operationalizing dependent variables where continuity and change can be reasonably 
forecast over long time horizons. In that section the stocks and flows discussion was used 
to highlight underlying characteristics of variables that are forecast, such as GDP or 
population. The important stocks in these variables were capital and people, for example. 
These stocks and their related flows are the cornerstone of quantitative forecasts of 
Realism and Liberalism, but the conceptual framework of stocks and flows can also apply 
to the theoretical positions of the three perspectives that I have explored in this chapter. 
Realism and Liberalism are neither stocks nor flows:  they are substantive 
theoretical positions within the field of IR. The quantitative measures of Realism and 
Liberalism that I use as forecast indices rely on the modeling of their stocks and flows 
(discussed previously). This, however, is separate from thinking about how both 
substantive approaches interact with states using this same system framework.  
Culture operates in international relations like a stock. It exists between pairs of 
states and helps to dictate how these states respond to external and internal shocks. This 
notion is clearly demonstrated in the literature on Enduring International Rivalries (Diehl 
and Goertz, 2000).  Here, specific pairs of states have interactions characterized by stocks 
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of conflictual culture. As with all stocks, it is difficult to move or change this 
intersubjectively held meaning rapidly, and some states (India and Pakistan, for example) 
find themselves embedded in poor relations for extended periods of time with little 
recourse for change. 
The stock of culture operating in a dyad changes for various reasons, and it is not 
the job of this dissertation to fully evaluate that. It may be that both Realism and 
Liberalism impact the stock of culture and push it either towards more cooperation or 
more conflict. It may also be the case that the stock of culture mediates the way that 
Liberalism and Realism impact state interaction. Because each of the three perspectives 
that I have developed in this chapter are shown to explain more in conjunction than 
isolation (see Chapter 5) there are likely dynamics at play among states that can be 
further explored in later research projects. 
Conclusion 
 The way in which Realism and Liberalism were described in this chapter was 
oriented towards a simple understanding of the core of these theoretical traditions. As I 
have used standard operationalization as my orienting point, and would argue that I am 
invested in treating these perspectives seriously.The third approach that I attempt to draw 
out from criticisms of both Liberalism and Realism is not a panacea nor do I believe that 
it represents a third substantive research agenda within the field. Instead it is an ambitious 
attempt to improve upon the historic operationalization of IR measures with sensitivity 
towards constructivist understandings of intersubjective meaning making, norms and 
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cultures. I take this sensitivity—along with a limited understanding of the impact of this 








5. Building the Model and Historical Performance 






In this chapter I first create historic measures of both Liberal and Realist indices. 
Quantifying these indices lets us tell stories about the behavior of dyads in the 
international system. For example, some pairs of states experience high levels of relative 
material pressure (both states have about the same amount of guns, money and soldiers 
and are also in physical proximity or one member is a Great Power) but they may have 
more cordial relations because they tend to have very high levels of bilateral Liberalism. 
By measuring this over time, we can trace how the relationships between states have 
improved or deteriorated. 
As argued in Chapter 4, traditional measures of both Realism and Liberalism have 
been criticized for being overly parsimonious, not treating complex interaction well and 
ignoring intersubjective norms, cultures and values. I present a third approach for 
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measuring the behavior of states in the international system that I refer to as the Cultures 
of Interaction Index (CoI Index). This index is comprised of sub-indices that attempt to 
capture some aspect of a culture of complex state interdependence that is not apparent in 
either traditionally opearationalized measures of Liberalism or Realism. The limited goal 
of the CoI Index is to build upon previous IR measures, specifically by treating 
interdependencies—the core of Liberalism—in more depth. I leave the Liberal index as it 
has historically been operationalized
29
 and attempt to add to this by producing a dyadic-
first calculation of interaction between states that may capture some Constructivist 
notions of shared norms, cultures and language.  The exact treatment of the CoI Index is 
outlined in more depth, below. 
Together, it is hoped that these three indices together tell a more colorful story 
about international dyadic interaction. 
Operationalizing complex theories with competing accounts is no trivial matter, 
and I make no claim to have the definitive quantification of IR. While quantification 
forces the theorist to make choices that exclude competing accounts, understanding the 
operationalization at a dyad-year may be particularly confusing. This takes us back to our 
discussion of levels of analysis in Chapter 2 where I was laying out the ground-work of 
identifying my dependent variable. The table below outlines the general 
operationalization of each index, drawing distinctions especially between the Liberal 
Index and the Cultures of Interaction Index. 
                                                 
29
 I do not treat trade dyadically in the Liberal Index measure, as we do not have the capacity to forecast 
dyadic trade.  I also augment the historic measure by including UN treaties as a component of international 
political system embeddedness. 
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The Realist and Liberal measures that I create here have been used by other 
authors for quantitative analysis (see, for example Bennett and Stam 2000; and 
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Pevehouse and Russett 2006). The CoI Index, however, is created from the ground up, 
and is not entirely the same as other macro-level, global measures of state behavior in the 
international system.  In some ways it builds upon previous measures, in other ways it 
attempts to break new ground. 
Uniqueness does not necessarily correlate with utility. I therefore conduct a 
statistical test to explore whether the addition of the CoI Index in a combined IR Index 
can more accurately predict the occurrence of historic conflict than either Liberalism or 
Realism in isolation. If the CoI Index can be shown to add explanatory power to my 
index measures of Liberalism and Realism, then I argue that it should be considered to be 
an achievement in the field of quantifying IR theory. The CoI Index attempts to tell the 
story on a macro level across all country-dyad-years from 1960 that builds upon Realism 
and Liberalism as well as attempting to leverage aspects of criticism levied against these 
standard-bearers of IR. It attempts to break down the parsimony by treating cooperation 
in more complicated ways and hopefully pointing to a component of the culture of 
interaction between dyads. This approach endeavors to “get at” the same thing that 
Wendt identifies in his Cultures of Anarchy at a dyadic level and not a system level, 
while fully understanding that achieving a macro-level measure of cultural characteristics 
between two states is likely impossible. 
This chapter outlines how the historic data were processed into a measure of 
dyadic threat of conflict and how this historic measure performs relative to the actual 
occurrence of historic conflict. While I do not expect a one-to-one relationship between 
the index and the actual occurrence of conflict (as noted in previous sections, the threat of 
international conflict is not the same as the actual occurrence of conflict), I do expect to 
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see correlation. Also, this section will test one of the broader hypotheses of this project:  
do multiple IR Indices aggregated together identify conflict more accurately than more 
singularly focused approaches to measuring IR, such as Realism or Liberalism in 
isolation? 
I proceed by first identifying how each sub-component was constructed, how the 
three indices were aggregated and then moves on to compare this with historic data. This 
analysis forms the backbone of later chapters that forecasts these relationships over time.  
Building the Realist Index 
For Realists, relative material power is the deep driver of the behavior of states. 
As outlined in Chapter 4, this stems from parsimonious assumptions about the “anarchic” 
structure of the international system. Beyond this sweeping conceptual consensus, there 
is less agreement on the operationalization of this school of thought. 
In a general sense, the amount of Realist “pressure” across all pairs of states in the 
international system is the same, as they all operate in a milieu structured by anarchy and 
characterized by extreme uncertainty about future survival. If any state can be killed, all 
states operate from a basis of constant fear. Hobbes emphasizes this when describing 
human behavior in the state of nature. Even the weak can kill the strong when in, 
“…confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself” (1914).  
The variable that becomes instrumental—as described in detail in Chapter 3—is 
the relative distribution of material power. As the unit of analysis is dyad-year, this 
project is invested in measuring the amount of Realist pressure—as quantified by relative 
material power—on the every pair of countries where data is available. 
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I consider a dyad to be under Realist pressure if the distribution of material power 
is a salient component of decision-making in bilateral relations. We know that it is not 
true that all dyads experience the same amount of Realist pressure. Eritrea and Ethiopia 
make fundamental decisions about domestic investment and external alliances based—in 
large part—on the material resource distribution across borders. A range of enduring 
rivalries are under similar pressures. Ethiopia and Indonesia, however, do not make 
similar calculations when they interact in international groups and organizations.  
Dyads experiencing Realist pressure—often referred to as “politically relevant 
dyads”—are those that are physically proximate and/or contain one member that is a 
Great Power (Lemke and Reed 2001). In these special relationships the relative 
distribution of material resources—and particularly how that distribution between the pair 
of countries is changing—is one of the components of diplomatic decision-making. 
According to this measure—outlined in this section—countries with material 
power parity have high levels of Realist pressure, assuming that they are either physically 
proximate or one of the members is a Great Power. At first blush, this index most closely 
aligns within the Realist theory of power transition (Organski 1980). Power transition 
theory argues that the greatest degree of pressure on any dyadic relationship in the 
international system occurs when relative material power between the pair of states is 
most equal. This—as argued by Bennett and Stam (2000)—stands in sharp contrast to 
balance of power theory, which argues that power equivalence between countries is more 
likely to lead to pacific relations (Little 2007).  
Both approaches’ theoretical claims have been empirically validated. Bennett and 
Stam test the relative contribution of different IR theories to the actual occurrence of 
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conflict. These authors find that, when politically relevant dyads are used to create a 
model that predicts the occurrence of war, both balance of power and power transition 
have explanatory significance. The bi-polar balance of power after WWII is one of the 
leading drivers of peace in this model. Power transition theory—with politically relevant 




The dyadic Realist Index measures the degree to which relative material power 
considerations play a role in actual international relations. This is true for both balance of 
power theory and power transition theory, though with different ends. Power transition 
theory clearly makes the claim that the relative distribution of power factors into state 
decision making. The balance of power thesis also argues that the relative distribution of 
material power between a pair of states plays a paramount role in decision-making:   both 
states must either build arms or alliances in order to maintain the balance, and thus 
preserve the peace. Thus, whether power transition theory or balance of power theory is 
empirically relevant the degree to which two politically relevant dyads share similar 
levels of material power is an important determinant of whether power plays an 
instrumental role in political decision-making, ceteris paribus. 
The most widely used operationalization of relative material power in academia 
has been the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) produced by the 
Correlates of War (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, John 1972; Singer 1988). The measure 
includes the relative country-level distribution of the following in the international 
                                                 
30
 Though power transition theory does not always positively contribute to the occurrence of conflict and is 
not a very impacting driver of either conflict or peace. 
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system for a given year:  military expenditures, military personnel, steel production, 
energy consumption, urban population and total population (Singer and Stuckey, John 
1972; Singer 1988).  
The distribution for this variable across time for select Great Powers is shown in 
the line-graph below. The story that this graph tells are largely the great-power political 
history of the past two centuries. At the beginning of the 19
th
 century, the UK was the 
dominant country vis-à-vis material power with over 30% of the world’s resources. This 
situation of unilateral dominance gradually eroded and the US passed all other Great 
Powers at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. The US remained the world’s leading power 
until the early 1970s when it was passed by the Former Soviet Union. The US again 
vaulted to the position of Great Power in the international system at the end of the Cold 
War but was again passed by China before the 21
st
 century began.  
 
Figure 22:  Historic Material Power CINC (v4.0) - Select Countries; Y-Axis Percent Material Power (Singer, 
Bremer, and Stuckey, John 1972) 
This operationalization of material power seems to be more relevant for a world 
characterized by state interaction of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, not the later stages 
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of the Cold War and the 21
st
 century. The index has been criticized for not adequately 
treating new membership in the international system (Kadera and Sorokin 2004) and 
generally overstating the relative power of the USSR and China (Chan 2005; Chan 2008; 
Tessman and Chan 2004).  
Three of the six drivers of CINC are particularly problematic in a globalized 
world. Power projection now is very different from a world characterized by the great 
and capital-intensive wars that dominated the first 150 years of this measure. The 
inclusion of the size of urban populations is not a directly important determinate of 
power. Large urban populations may drive economic growth, which is widely argued to 
be a measure of national power, but the size of Manhattan—ceteris paribus—has a 
negligible impact on the ability of the United States to project influence. 
Second, energy consumption is not an appropriate measure of global power for 
the 21
st
 century. While energy consumption can be a good measure of overall economic 
output (as each unit of GDP requires a unit of energy to produce) it penalizes a country’s 
level of power the greater their energy efficiency. Energy consumption may be included 
because it is a proxy for GDP and historic energy efficiency improvements were less 
dramatic. If GDP is the reason that energy consumption is included in the measure, it is 
still puzzling, as data on gross country output is available stretching back to the 
beginning of the 19
th
 century (Maddison 2007). 
Finally, the inclusion of domestic steel production clearly damages the current 
utility of the CINC measure. The fact that the US currently produces very little steel is an 
indication of the power of the US, not the weakness of the US. Steel production is 
relatively labor intensive. As labor is cheaper elsewhere, and the technology is relatively 
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dispersed, the US produces little steel. A possible counter argument to this claim could be 
that steel production is required for any large-scale military endeavor and that the lack of 
production in the US indicates that this country is relatively less prepared for a military 
engagement. In a world characterized by globalization and technologically very advanced 
tools of war, the outsourcing of any component of a weapon is potentially harmful to 
security and not just steel. This issue was explored in depth by Brooks (2005).  
A second historically opearationalized measure of material power is derived 
entirely from the size of naval power as one clear way that great-powers can project their 
influence. Modelski and Thompson draw a range of conclusions from the line-graph, 
below (1988 see Chapter 4 for a treatment of these conclusions; Rasler 1994 the line 
graph below is from this source, which took the original work from Modelski and added 
periods of Great Wars). The graph measures the percentage of naval power controlled by 
the hegemon at any given point in time and indicates the occurrence of great wars. The 




Figure 23:  Great War and Deconcentration in Naval Power (Rasler 1994, 68) 
This approach seems to “get at” something that occurs in the international 
community:  wars appear to occur when concentration of naval power is relatively low. 
However, it is a small sample size (5 wars) and there is much variation in naval 
concentration where wars do not take place (the lowest point of naval concentration does 
not, in fact, correlate with war). 
Alternative measures of relative national material power exist that are designed 
with the future in mind. The Strategic Assessment Group (SAG) created an alternative 
measure that uses, “…gross domestic product...,population, defense spending, and a less 
precise factor that includes innovation in technology" (Treverton and Jones 2005, 3)
31
.  
This series is operationalized within the IFs system and will represent the core of the 
forecast Realist Index (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). While the index is forecast 
                                                 
31
 This measure is not widely documented and the original creators of the index are not widely known.  The 
following individuals should be attributed with credit:  Paul Herman, Evan Hillebrand with Barry Hughes. 
The SAG was an organization within the CIA that has been more recently replaced by the Office of 
Transnational Issues (see below). 
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within IFs an historic longitudinal database of this measure of national power did not 
exist before this project. 
A fourth measure has been developed out of the Office of Transnational Issues 
that is called the Global Power Index (GPI). It includes the following components:   ICT 
Capital, R&D Spending, Governance Quality, Working Age Population Quality 
Adjusted, Foreign Aid, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, Energy Imports-Exports, GDP, 
Military Spending and Nuclear Weapons (Treverton 2011).  It is meant to capture a more 
varied account of power in the international system by including non-traditional 
measures. 
Measuring relative national power is fraught with problems, and is an imprecise 
science. The fundamental problem with measures of power is that they have no 
dependent variable with which to compare and create a model of interacting independent 
variables. The “ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not have done” is 
not easily operationalized. Thus, power tends to be intuited. For example, when one of 
the original creators of the SAG measure of political power was asked about the different 
weightings assigned, s/he indicated that they used intuition and provided the example of 
the weight on the population component:  if it was adjusted too high, Bangladesh become 
“too powerful”.32 
Material power is also temporally contextual (not to mention contextual in many 
other less macro ways as well). It thus becomes increasingly difficult to operationalize a 
measure that spans a long time horizon. As my analysis of the CINC index demonstrated, 
the types of variables useful for assessment in the 19th century are different from those 
                                                 
32
 This quote is taken from the author’s personal experience in a Chatham House Rule workshop. 
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used during the Cold War and will be different from those that are useful in the long-term 
future.  
In light of the discussion above, I created my own historic measure of relative 
power based on the work of the Strategic Assessment Group.  The three other measures 
do not conform to my needs:  the CINC measure does not conform to the current and 
future nature of power; naval hegemony is difficult to measure and is only useful for 
analysis involving great powers; the Global Power Index brings together both material 
and ideational drivers of power, something I prefer to separate for this project.  The SAG 
measure was created to focus on material power and was created specifically with the IFs 
forecast system in mind. 
The SAG relative national capabilities index takes country values relative to 
global totals for four variables:  military spending, GDP at purchasing power parity, GDP 
multiplied by GDP per capita at purchasing power parity and population.  The relative 
weight of each sub-index is identified in the bar graph below. GDP and population data 
were taken from the World Bank and the IFs system (Hughes 2004; World Bank. 
International Economics Dept. Development Data Group 2011). Military spending data 
was taken from the equivalent sub-measure produced for the CINC power index (Kadera 




Figure 24:  Relative Contribution of Sub-Measures of Relative National Material Capabilities 
Data was gathered for each of the 183 countries in IFs.
33
 For each year, country 
values were compared as percentages of the total for that given year. Thus, if a country 
had a population that was 1 billion and the total population was 5 billion, they would 
have 20% of the global population. These annual percentage values were calculated for 
each of the values in the previous paragraph. Weights were applied to these four values 
taken from the SAG assessment. The equation for calculation national level material 
power is shown below. 
                
                          
                      
        
                                  
                              
     
  
                
            
        
                   
               
       
The US has by far the largest GDP in this time period at both market exchange 
rates and purchasing power parity. For military spending, the US and Former Soviet 
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 Again, see Appendix 1 for those countries 
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Union have similar and increasing levels of spending up to the end of the Cold War, then 
growth in US spending flattens, and Soviet spending falls significantly.  US military 
spending then increases significantly in the late 1990s and through the beginning of the 
21
st
 century.  The term that captures a synthesis of technology and size is operationalized 
by multiplying GDP at market exchange rates with GDP per capita at purchasing power 
parity. The overall size of GDP at market exchange rates indicates how much can be 
purchased by a country on international markets. The size of GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity is a standard measure of human development in a country 
(though far from perfect).  Historically, the US and Japan have dominated this measure 
with 16% and 22% of global GDP * GDP per capita at purchasing power parity at the 
turn of the century.  The top five in 2000 are all large advanced economies:  Japan, 
United States, Germany, United Kingdom and France.  China has the largest global 
population—a measure of the total amount of people at its disposal—with 20%. This is 
followed by India (17%), the USA (4.6%), Indonesia (3.4%) and Brazil (2.8%). 
The figure below shows the distribution of relative power for China, India, Russia 
and the US. In 1960 the US held nearly 27% of the world’s material power. This declined 
to below 20% by the mid to late 1970s and has remained near this level until the 
beginning of the 21
st
 Century. China and India, on the other hand, have seen their relative 
material power slowly and steadily increase across time from 7% and 5%, respectively, to 
10% and 6%.  Russian power starts above 10% of global power and remains there until 
the end of the Cold War, when military spending was constricted considerably.  Russian 
power may intuitively seem low to readers, but remember that this measure does not 
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consider nuclear weapons (one main driver of Cold War power measures) and it is just 
measuring Russian power, not the full Former Soviet Union. 
 
Figure 25:  Relative Material Power Historic Measure - Author Creation from Various Sources using Herman-
Hillebrand Method (Treverton 2011; Treverton and Jones 2005) 
This project is invested in exploring relationships between states.  The country-
year data that I created above is not sufficient for this exploration.  Thus, I take country-
year data and transform it into dyad-year data.  Conceptually, I am interested in a 
measure that can tell me the degree to which material power considerations play into 
policy making decisions. Operationally, I create an algorithm that first identifies whether 
the pair of countries is politically relevant and secondly how much proximity there is in 
the distribution of power across the dyad.  Formally, the algorithm is displayed below. 
IF 
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The index is then inverted and standardized.
34
  This brings the valence of the 
Realist Index in line with the Liberal and Cultures of Interaction indices.  In those 
measures, absolutely higher values indicate an improved character of relations between 
states.  We also want high values to indicate more passive relations for the Realist Index 
so combination is not problematic. 
If country-year measures of relative material power are problematic—for the 
reasons mentioned above—dyadic measures of historic material power meant to represent 
actual pressure on a relationship are even more complicated. These macro-level-level-
measures-turned-dyadic miss much nuance, especially potential Realist pressures that 
would change a relationship’s dynamics over the short run.  
The distribution of the Realist Index, across all dyad-years, is shown the vertical 
histogram, below. Higher values indicate lower levels of Realist Index pressure on the 
relationship. In other words, theoretically we would expect these relationships to be less 
concerned with relative material power build-up, ceteris paribus.  
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 Standardizing is a process of making different data-sets comparable by subtracting each individual value 
in the data set by the mean of the entire data set and dividing by the standard deviation for the entire data 
set. The output of standardization can be understood as the number of standard deviations above and below 





Figure 26:  Histogram Measuring Distribution of Dyadic Realist Index. Y Axis is number of Standard 
Deviations Above or Below Mean 
This distribution is radically different from the Liberal Index shown later in this 
chapter. Here, the majority of dyad years—85.3% of all dyad years—lie at the top of the 
distribution (with a standardized value of 0.198), indicating that there is no Realist 
Pressure in operation and that the dyad is not politically relevant. More concretely, this 
indicates that the large majority of country pairs do not actively consider relative material 





 The very long, thin tail that falls below the distribution reflects the wide range 
of Realist Pressures that can exist between dyads that are territorially contiguous or that 
have one Great Power in the dyad.  
The Dyadic Realist Index measures relationships longitudinally. Any value below 
0.198 represents a politically relevant dyad, which means that relative material power is 
more likely to figure into the decision making process as compared with other dyads. As 
the vertical histogram above indicates, values can range from 0.198 to as low as -11. 
The line-graph below shows three Dyadic Realist Index scores across time. The 
blue line Dyadic Realist Index score is for Russia and the USA, which begins at around -
4.5 and becomes more negative (indicating an increase in pressure) out towards the end 
of the Cold War.  Reductions in military spending help to reduce pressure between the 
two countries through the 1990s. The red line in this graph shows the Realist pressure 
between North and South Korea over time. It argues that the material pressure between 
these states has declined over time, mainly due to the massive growth in South Korea and 
the inability for North Korea to catch up. The green line is the power distribution between 
Iran and Iraq, with a notable increase in pressure during the 1980s and a decline after 
Gulf War I.   
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 They may consider material power in their extended diplomatic engagement, but this dissertation does 
not map extended alliance networks.  See the Conclusion for a treatment of research next-steps, which 




Figure 27:  Dyadic Realist Index:  Selected Dyads 
Dyad specific longitudinal trends reflect political relevance and relative material 
power distribution. Dyad measures can be aggregated and averaged to reflect broader 
group Realist Pressure across time as well. For example, all of the dyadic relationships 
for one country can be averaged. This provides a quantitative measure of the total amount 
of Realist Pressure for a given country or group. 
Creating group averages for Realist Pressure across this historic time horizon 
shows a general and sustained move towards less overall pressure; this would indicate 
that—overall—relative material power is becoming a less important component of dyadic 
decision-making. However, grouped longitudinal trends can be misleading. The number 
of dyadic observations per year increases across this entire time horizon (from around 
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increase in dyads reduces the overall average Realist Pressure measure, as the addition of 
new states brings relatively more dyads that lack political relevance.  
The line-graph below only includes states in the Realist Index that existed in 
1960. This shows a more plausible Realist account of the distribution of pressure across 
time. According to Realist accounts, without global hierarchy there will always be dyads 
in the international system that are forced to use the logic of relative material power gains 
to make decisions. The longitudinal distribution of this pressure should be random, with 
increases in pressure as the global distribution of power becomes more egalitarian and 
decreases in pressure as the distribution of power becomes more asymmetrical. This line-
graph confirms the Realist assumption that relative material power considerations have 
played a consistent role in state decision-making across this time horizon. Instead of 
pressure dissipating across the time horizon, the index below shows a gradual decline up 
to the end of the Cold War and then an increase in pressure for this grouping of states.  
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It is the hypothesis of this chapter that the sub-components of IR theory explain 
more in conjunction than they do in isolation. The Dyadic Realist Index—while “getting 
at” some behavior in the international system—does not explain all dyadic behavior 
between states. The line-graph below provides an example of this, and is a bridge towards 
the next section that builds the Dyadic Liberal Index. Here we see three dyadic 
relationships—between Belgium and the Netherlands, Japan and the USA, and France 
and the UK—where relative material power calculi should be at the forefront of their 
decision-making.
36
 Instead, these three dyads all experience pacific relations that can 
hardly be characterized by relative material power considerations. There are clearly other 
explanatory variables at play that must be evaluated, and we turn to these in the following 
sections. 
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 Though it may be interesting to note that there have been historic tensions between the US and Japan 




Figure 29:   Dyadic Realist Index Select Passive Dyads 
Building the Liberal Index 
The Dyadic Liberal Index measures the degree to which two countries share 
traditional values that are thought to impact interdependence and is influenced from the 
writing of Immanual Kant (1991). Kant wrote about three key components of a lasting 
and perpetual peace:  trade, democracy and a commitment to international organizations. 
The measures of Liberalism have been widely operationalized at a national level (Russett, 
Oneal, and Davis 1998), though I make some important conceptual improvements on the 
treatment of embeddedness in international political organizations. I repeat this country-
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Conceptually, the Dyadic Liberal Index used in this project measures the degree 
to which two countries are driven by interdependencies at a global level.  This is not how 
Liberalism is always treated conceptually, and even operationally.  I treat Liberalism in 
this way because I want to forecast it in IFs to 2050.  We do not have the capability to 
forecast dyadic levels of trade on a global basis—the variable that is most frequently 
operationalized on the basis of dyads in studies of Liberalism—but we can forecast trade 
between one country and the rest of the world. This constraint, along with the fact that 
Liberalism has been operationalized along these lines previously, points to my logic of 
choice. The dyadic operationalization of the Liberal Index is a measure of states’ global 
involvement in systems that are meant to foster interdependence and promote a lasting 
peace. They are not dyadic measures of policy alignment, diplomatic connection or the 
degree to which the two countries in question enjoy positive relations. 
An additional concern may arise that I am also changing the historic 
operationalization of Liberalism by including a measure of treaty signings and 
ratifications to the measure of international organizations.  Typical measures only include 
global membership in IGOs and do not treat treaty membership.  I have added treaty 
membership for two reasons.  First, it is a new data set that I am bringing to the field that 
has conceptual consistency with the third leg of the Kantian tripod.  Second, this is a 
choice made in the interest of creating a long-term forecast.  We cannot forecast events 
like the signing of a treaty or the admission to an IGO of a given country.  Instead of 
relying on these events that appear to be discrete at our level of analysis, aggregating 
across measures produces an overall index that can be more easily forecast. 
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I begin—as I did with the Dyadic Realist Index—by constructing the Dyadic 
Liberal Index at a country-level. This requires building three, equally weighted parts:  
democracy, trade and embeddedness in international political organizations. I then take 
this country-year index and turn it into a dyad-year index by adding up the total 
Liberalism for the dyad-year and dividing by the total possible Liberalism for the most 
liberal dyad-year in my sample. This creates an index. To remain consistent with my 
operationalization of the Dyadic Realist Index, I standardize this index. This process is 
explained below and the behavior of each sub-measure is explored.  The equation below 
is the underlying logic of the index.  Variables with sub-script “threshold” are the upper 
or lower limits across the entire historic data set for the outlier country. 
                               = ( (                   /                                         + ( ( ( 
                 +                 )  /                )  + (                  +                  ) )  /  
                                   ) +                            /                        ) / ( 
(                               * 2 ) /                              ) ) / (                         / 
                        ) )                         ) / 
                                                                  ) /                               
Historically, the sub-components of the Liberal Index grew rapidly, and mostly 
after the end of the Cold War. Global exports as a percentage of GDP have experienced 
accelerated growth since 1965. They increased from about 10% in 1965 to about 20% by 
the mid 1990’s. Since then levels have increased to nearly 30% of total GDP. Global 
democracy (as measured by Polity) actually declined from the 1960s to the late 1970s and 
then experienced a rebound to levels seen in the early 1960s. The end of the Cold War 
caused democracy levels to spike—over a 55% increase—from 1989 to 2010. 
Embeddedness in International Political systems—the measure identified as being 
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comprised of UN Treaties and IO memberships across time—has grown rapidly and 
consistently across time, especially after 1989. The sections below elaborate on this, but 
focus much of their attention on the measure of embeddedness in the international 
political system, a relatively unfamiliar measure. The historic behavior of trade and 
democracy have been thoroughly documented (Huntington 1984; Kindleberger 1975). 
Embeddedness in International Political Systems 
The first component of the index was a measure of commitment to the 
international system through membership in international organizations and UN treaties. 
These are the same values used in the creation of the Cultures of Interaction Index, 
described below, but operationalized differently. Instead of being measured initially on a 
bilateral basis, these were measured single country commitments to treaties and 
international organizations in the international system. In other words, instead of 
measuring how many treaties and international organizations a pair of countries shared 
membership in, this measure explored the total number of international organizations and 
treaties that a country participated in.  
The international organization data was taken from the Correlates of War project 
(Correlates of War Project 2008; Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). The 
country-year number of memberships in international organizations was summed. An 
index was then created using the highest total value of international organization 
membership as the upper threshold (1) and the lowest number as the lowest threshold. 
The second component of this measure was the total number of UN treaties that a country 
had signed or ratified across time (United Nations 2011). If a country signed a treaty this 
was scored as a 1. If they ratified a treaty, this was scored as a 2. The total number for 
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each country-year were added up and an index was created with the upper value scored as 
a 1 and the lowest value scored as a 0 with all other values scaled within that range. 
These two sub-indices (the IGO membership and the UN Treaty data) were then 
averaged. The historic performance of this measure is shown in the line-graph below. 
 
Figure 30:  Average Country-Level Embeddedness in International Organizations and UN Treaties Across 
Time. The Y Axis is a composite score that equally weights membership in IOs and UN Treaties, and doubly 
weights ratified treaties over signed treaties. 
Data on longitudinal country membership in international organizations is kept by 
two organizations.
37
  The first, and perhaps most well known, is the data gathering work 
of the Correlates of War Project. Originally this data was organized by Wallace and 
Singer (1970). Current versions of this series are managed by Pevehouse, Nordstrom and 
Warnke (2004). This group has collected data on an annual basis from 1815-2000. 
The Center for Systemic Peace collects a data series in membership in conventional 
intergovernmental organizations on a 5 year interval from 1952-1997 (M. G. Marshall, 
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 The Union of International Associations is also a database for IGOs, INGOs and other civil society 
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Marshall, and Young 1999). These data sets are plotted against each other in the graph 
below for the average number of memberships per country in the international system for 
the full breadth of data available. Both of these data sources are comprehensive in their 
country coverage, but the Correlates of War data has a more extensive temporal 
coverage. Both measures also seem to be getting at the same thing, as they have similar 
trajectories and slopes. 
 
Figure 31:  Average Number of IO Memberships per Country – History (M. G. Marshall, Marshall, and Young 
1999; Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004) 
    Overall, membership in international organizations has increased throughout 
the 20
th
 century. There are notable exceptions to this. Two periods of stagnation in the 
increase in membership occur around World War I and II. The next two periods of 
negative growth or stagnant growth occur when state membership in the international 
system increased relatively rapidly as the institution of colonialism fell in the late 1950s, 
and again at the end of the Cold War. Adding new states to the international system that 
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The figure below shows membership in international organizations for the 
Correlates of War database by UN population regions. Again, the trend demonstrates 
strong and consistent growth across time. Notably, rich Western countries have higher 
levels of embeddedness within international organizations throughout this time horizon, 
with Asian, African and Latin American countries generally having less overall 
embeddedness. Again, similar trends identified above can be seen in more detail, most 




Figure 32:  Membership in IOs for UN Regions (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004) 
Membership in international organizations has long been the measure of choice in 
exploring country embeddedness in international political systems
38
. UN treaties have 
been generally overlooked. The database on UN treaties is freely available online 
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 See a wide range of studies for this, including but not limited to:  (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 
2004; Dorussen and Ward 2008; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003; Russett, 
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(http://treaties.un.org/Home.aspx) and identifies the dates when countries either signed or 
ratified treaties held by the Secretary General (United Nations 2011). The information is 
not in an easily accessible form for macro-level analysis. 
For this project, the UN Treaty information provided online was converted into an 
accessible database. The countries where data was pulled were the 183 included in the 
IFs system (See Appendix 1 for a list of these countries). Data was coded in two ways. 
First, if a country signed or ratified a UN treaty in a given year, they were given a coding 
of 1. These were then added up for each year from the end of WWII to 2010. Second, if a 
country signed a treaty in a given year this was coded as 1, and if they ratified a treaty, 
this was coded as 2. This second coding is used to forecast the index of IO 
embeddedness. While it is arbitrary to claim that a ratified UN treaty is worth twice as 
much as a signed UN treaty, there clearly should be a difference in weight between the 
two acts. The global distribution of UN Treaty signatories is shown below. Two things 
become apparent. First, there are two kinds of growth patterns. The slope of the global 
average membership in UN treaties after WWII indicates that the global average score 
was increasing at a fairly steady rate of around 220 points per year (that represents a 
combination of signing and ratifying treaties, and could represent 110 ratified treaties, 
220 signed treaties or a combination therein). After the end of the Cold War, the rate of 
increase in signing and ratifying UN treaties increased substantially. Here, the average 
global score increases by over 800 points per year. This is due to a large number of new 




Figure 33:  Composite Measure of Embeddedness in UN Treaties (United Nations 2011 with author 
manipulation) 
The UN data was also broken down by category. The categories are identified in 
Appendix 2. For the graph below, UN Treaties were divided into Domestic Security, 
Economic, Environmental, Human Rights and Military. The global average score 
indicates that Economic, Human Rights and Environmental treaties have grown at 
increasing rates increase about the end of the cold war. Military related treaties remain 























Figure 34:  United Nations Treaties for Selected Categories (United Nations 2011 with author manipulation) 
Democracy 
The next component of the liberal index was a measure of governance inclusion 
taken from the Polity database project (M. G. Marshall and Jaggers 2009). The values of 
this data measured democracy across time on an 11 point scale (0-10, with higher values 
representing more democracy). This was re-scaled so that scores of 10 were given a value 
of 1, and scores of 0 were given a value of 0 with all other values scaled within this 
range. 
Historic change in democracy levels has produced three “waves”, an idea 
popularized by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1984). The first wave occurred after 
WWI. The second after WWII and the de-colonial process. The third occurred at the end 
of the Cold War. These transitions are represented in the line-graph below. The data on 







Figure 35:  Polity Project Democracy Measure – History (M. G. Marshall and Jaggers 2009) 
Data clearly indicate that global average democracy levels have experienced three 
clear transitions
39
. However, broken down into UN population divisions, this shift has 
been far from even. North America and Oceana remain fairly consistently high (with the 
later experiencing a decline in the post-colonial period). Levels of democracy follow the 
three waves of Huntington in Europe, but the pattern is less clear in other regions. Latin 
America grows democratically in the post-colonial period, but even more strongly as the 
Cold War comes to an end. Asia grows right around the end of WWII and only rebounds 
at the end of the Cold War. Finally, African democracy remains relatively low, growing 
not in the de-colonial period, but up to the level of Asia by the end of the Cold War. 
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Figure 36:  Average Democracy for UN Population Groupings – History (M. G. Marshall and Jaggers 2009) 
Vis-à-vis governance inclusion, the overall historic trend has been up. This seems 
to be likely to continue, as countries with large democratic deficits
40
 have experienced 
democratic transitions since the beginning of 2011 with the Arab Spring and the 
prospects for a more inclusive governance regime emerging appears strong. 
Trade 
The third element is a measure of a country level commitment to trade. This was 
taken as an equal weighting of a country’s total trade levels and their imports and exports 
as a percentage of GDP. Both absolute trade levels and trade levels relative to GDP were 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (2011).  Absolute 
trade levels were taken and an index from 0-1 was created using the lowest and highest 
values available across time in the dataset. The relative trade levels were taken by first 
adding up total exports and imports and dividing them by GDP (at market exchange 
rates). Total trade as a percentage of GDP was then taken and an index was created using 
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 A measure of the relationship between actual levels of democracy and expected levels, based on a basket 
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the highest and lowest values across the entire time horizon (from 1960 to 2001
41
). These 
absolute and relative trade values were then averaged. 
As the line-graph below demonstrates, global exports as a percentage of GDP 
have increased at a fairly consistent rate across time. Starting in the 1960s with just over 
12% of GDP being attributed to exports, the quantity of goods and services crossing 
borders had increased by nearly 2.5 times before the impact of the Great Recession was 
felt. This increase in trade has been attributed to many factors 
 
Figure 37:   Global Exports as a Percentage of GDP – History 
The three components of the liberal index were taken and averaged. If there were 
nulls in any of the sub-components then the remaining components were averaged (so, if 
a country was missing data on democracy but had data on trade and international 
organizations/treaties, the latter two components were averaged). 
Dyadic Liberal Index 
                                                 
41
 There is dyadic data for trade and democracies beyond 2001 but I choose not to use it. There was not data 
for IO membership after 2001, and this is a key component of both the Liberal Index and the CoI Index. 
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The Dyadic Liberal Index was created by taking the country-level Liberal Index 
score for each pair of countries across time for each given year and finding the upper and 
lower bounds. The pair of countries that were the most liberal in this index measure was 
Germany and the Netherlands in 2001 (with a  standardized score of 3.9). The least 
liberal pair of countries was North Korea and Tanzania in 1961 (with a standardized 
score of -1.7). These two values were then used to scale all results from 0-1. This index 
was then standardized to reflect the distribution of the values in the same way that the 
Dyadic Realist Index was created.  The logic of the creation of the Dyadic Liberal Index 
is shown below. 
IF 
                               >                              
THEN 
                                                                   / 
                              
ELSE 
                                                                    / 
                             
 
Below is the vertical histogram of the Dyadic Liberal Index for all dyad-years. It 
demonstrates two peaks, one above the mean and one below the mean. This indicates 
that—between 1960 and 2001—the lion’s share of dyads in the international system are 
either slightly liberal (as this peak occurs just north of the distribution mean) or fairly 
non-liberal (as this peak happens at a full standard deviation below the mean). The shape 
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of the historgram for the Dyadic Liberal Index has shifted across time. Historically the 
two peaks were more pronounced (representing the two major alliances during the Cold 
War) to a distribution in 2001 that is much more bell-shaped. The distribution of the 
Dyadic Liberal Index is much more “normal” than the Dyadic Realist Index. 
 
Figure 38:  Histogram Measuring Distribution of Dyadic Liberal Index. Y Axis is number of Standard 
Deviations Above or Below Mean for the Full Time Horizon 
The two peaks in the Dyadic Liberal Index can be used to further draw 
distinctions between Liberalism and the CoI Index (described below). The Cold War 
distribution for the Dyadic Liberal Index shows peaks that are much more pronounced 
than the histogram shown above (much greater above and below the mean relative to at 
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the mean). The peak with lower absolute values is populated dyads in the Soviet Bloc 
(very low Liberal scores, but very high CoI Index scores). Countries in the higher peak 
were Western Democracies with equally high CoI Index scores and very Liberal. See the 
cross sectional graph below plotting Liberalism and CoI Index scores for further 
explanation of the difference between Liberal and CoI Indices. 
The line-graph below shows dyadic Liberalism scores for selected countries 
across time. The scale on the left is the number of standard deviations above or below the 
mean for the entire sample size of data
42
. The data in this graph indicate that, in the mid-
1960’s the US and China were approximately as liberal as the average of all dyads over 
this entire time period. This is largely due to the Liberalism of the US and not the 
Liberalism of China
43
. This dyad grows relatively steadily across time, eventually 
becoming fairly liberal (more liberal than the world average, as will be demonstrated 
below). The bottom dyad in the line-graph below is North Korea and Burma, two of the 
most illiberal states in the international system. 
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 After each of the three sub-indices were created on 0-1 scales they were averaged into a single index. The 
mean and standard deviation for that index (for the years 1960-2001) for all available dyads were taken. 
Each individual dyadic index score was then subtracted from the mean and divided by the standard 
deviation. 
43
 A shortcoming of this approach is that it does not treat relationships that are mixed regime types as 
effectively as it could. For example, dyads that are mixed (like the US and China in 1965 with the former 
very liberal and the later very illiberal) could be coded as having very low dyadic levels of Liberalism. It is 
an empirical question as to whether these mixed dyads should be treated differently and in subsequent work 




Figure 39:  Liberal Index for Selected Dyads. Y-Axis is Number of Standard Deviations above or below the 
Mean for the entire distribution of data from 1965-2001 
Taking the global average of all standardized dyads across time tells a familiar 
story about increasing levels of trade, democracy and membership in international 
organizations. Measuring “up” from standardized dyads, the world was fairly illiberal 
from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s. This was caused by a relative decline in global 
average democracy for that period coupled with moderate growth in trade and strong 
growth in embeddedness in international political organizations. However, after these 
liberal doldrums, global dyadic average Liberalism grew rapidly. First, this was driven by 
increases in trade and embeddedness in international political systems and then the rapid 





Figure 40:  Liberal Index for World Average. Y-Axis is Number of Standard Deviations above or below the 
Mean for the entire distribution of data from 1965-2001 
The line graph below measures the average Dyadic Liberal Index score for World 
Bank income groups. This measure was taken by looking at the average Dyadic Liberal 
Index score for all dyads that share membership in the groups below. First, the 
distribution across time correlates to levels of income, with High Income countries 
having higher average Dyadic Liberal Index scores than Upper Middle Income countries, 
followed by Lower Middle Income countries and Low Income countries.  Next, levels of 
Average Dyadic Liberal Index scores increase across time for all income groups. The 
steadiest increase occurs in both High and Upper-Middle Income groupings. Low and 
Low-Middle Income groupings stagnate for much of the time horizon, growing only 
through the 80s and 90s. Interestingly, in absolute terms, neither Low Income or Low-
Middle Income groupings achieve absolute average liberal levels achieved by the High 





















































































































Figure 41:  Dyadic Liberal Index:  World Bank Income Group Average Scores44 
Selected dyads that have a history of rivalry display a similar explanatory problem 
to the Dyadic Realist Index. In the line-graph below are three dyads:  India and Pakistan, 
North and South Korea, and Iran and Iraq. Each dyad below experienced protracted 
military engagements across these time periods that result in fatalities (as measured by 
the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset) (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004).  
 
Figure 42:  Dyadic Liberal Index Select Dyads 
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Though their levels of bilateral conflict were similar, their levels of bilateral 
Liberalism were not. The next section of this chapter will present the construction of the 
third IR index deployed in this analysis. The final section will create a statistical model 
that will evaluate the relative explanatory power of each index in isolation and as an 
aggregate measure on the historic occurrence of international conflict. 
Building the Cultures of Interaction Index 
The Cultures of Interaction Index (CoI Index) is an attempt to get at something 
that is neither fully Realist nor fully Liberal.  It draws on both Liberal and Realist 
standard operationalization approaches, using the dyadic focus that Realism uses 
frequently and Liberalism uses occasionally, as well as many variables frequently used 
by Liberalism. However, the output is not exactly Liberal and is certainly not Realist:  
many fairly illiberal dyads can have very high CoI Index scores, like former Soviet Bloc 
countries and many countries in the Middle East.   
This index attempts to gauge the character of bilateral state interaction on a scale 
ranging from friendly to antagonistic. It rests on the assumption that, if two states are 
actively aligning foreign policy, treaty signing, international organization membership 
and trade flows, that they are creating a culture of interaction that promotes cooperation. 
It takes Wendt’s Cultures of Anarchy (which is conceptualized at the international system 
level) and tries to gets at a similarly socially constructed behavior between states at the 
dyadic level. In this sense the CoI Index can be said to range from a Kantian culture of 
interaction, through a Lockean culture and towards a Hobbesian culture (from friendly 




I argued in Chapter 4 that standard operationalization of both Liberalism and 
Realism are vulnerable to three types of criticism:  excessive parsimony, poor treatment 
of complex interdependence and a lack of emphasis on cultures/intersubjective meaning 
making.  The CoI Index does not actually solve any of these criticisms in an absolute 
sense.  Instead it attempts to “pull threads” from these criticisms of IR and build a dyadic 
measure that is more nuanced than either the Liberal or Realist Indices have been 
historically operationalized. 
One component of the increased nuance of the CoI Index relative to either 
Liberalism or Realism is that it begins from the dyadic level. While some Liberal indices 
have used dyadic trade as a sub-component but not in each sub-measure, the CoI Index 
starts by measuring the treaties, organizations and trade relationships from the ground up. 
Both Realist and Liberal indices started with country-year indices which are not dyad 
specific. Beginning with dyads as the level and unit of analysis changes the focus of the 
index. Here, countries can have great bilateral relationships while having very poor 
bilateral levels of Liberalism and/or Realism. This complex interdependence will have an 
impact on the intersubjective meaning-making at the dyadic level, in other words, the 
culture. It considers complex interdependencies:  standard Liberal measures consider a 
country’s affinity with global norms, not country-specific norms. The CoI Index 
measures a series of dyadic interdependencies that are contextual. It also is geared 
towards thinking about culture:  the variables chosen for the CoI are all operationalized 
on a dyadic basis and are all oriented towards measuring complex interdependencies 
between a pair of states.  
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I create the CoI Index by manipulating five sub-indices. These are outlined in the 
table below. For all of the data manipulation the countries included are the 183 that are 
modeled within the International Futures system. 
Table 4:  Defining the CoI Index 
 






Measured Total Number of Shared IGOs 






Measured Total Number of Shared Treaty 
Signatories Between Dyad Year Weighing 














Actual Trade Minus Expected (Gravity Model) 
 
The logic of the calculation of the CoI Index for two countries is shown in the 
equation below.  Each variable with the sub-text “threshold” is the highest level that any 
of the dyadic measures reach in the base-year.  For the historic data, that is 2001. 
                                  = ( (                                /                               
) + ( (                                                )/                                               ) + ( 
                         /                          ) + ( (                        – 
                         )                                     ) + (                               /  
                             ) ) /                                  
The first sub-index of the CoI Index is taken from the Correlates of War 
Intergovernmental Organization Database (Correlates of War Project 2008; Pevehouse, 
Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). This data series measures whether 213 states are 
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members of 495 different international organizations (again, the full number of countries 
is parsed down to the IFs list of 183). The data stretches as far back as 1815 (Bavaria was 
a member of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine in that year, for 
example) through 1965 in five year intervals. From 1965 forward, the data is annual until 
2000.  
We expect states interests to align when they are members of similar international 
governmental organization networks. This is not to say that shared IGO membership 
indicates that two states have a fully converged set of interests, just that this is one 
measure of state initiated activity that is oriented towards an alignment of interests in an 
international space. 
This data was then taken on a bilateral basis. This approach explores these 
relationships in great granularity by country-pair for each year. I am interested in 
measuring the number of IGOs that every two pairs of countries in the world share 
membership in for every year. For example, pairs of countries in Western and Northern 
Europe tend to be members of very many of the same international organizations. I 
assume that their international diplomatic policy choices are more aligned than countries 
that have relatively fewer diplomatic connections of this type. The line-graph below 
averages the standardized shared number of IGO memberships for each dyad pair within 




Figure 43:  Culture of Interaction Index Selected Regions 
The second sub-index used to create the CoI Index was taken from the United 
Nations Multilateral Treaties Database (United Nations 2011). This database records all 
multilateral treaties that are deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations. 
The database identifies the treaty name, countries who have committed themselves to the 
treaty and the degree to which they are committed demarcated by those who signed the 
treaties and those who ratified them
45
.  
The individual UN treaty scores for countries were then added up. Scores were 
weighted differently for treaty signatory as compared to ratification. Ratification was 
                                                 
45
 Previous to this project this data did not exist in an easily manipulatable form (ie., in list form, for 
example). The data is freely available to those who query the author. 
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deemed to be twice as important as signing a treaty
46
. The line graph below identifies the 
average global distribution for countries signing/ratifying multilateral treaties kept with 
the United Nations Secretary General. The pattern is clearly up across time, with an even 
greater increase in the rate of growth at the end of the Cold War. Here, many new Eastern 
European countries deeply embedded themselves in international treaties. 
Again, this data was taken at the level of dyadic relationships. The figure below 
identifies select countries and their bilateral UN treaty alignment across time. Finland and 
the Netherlands have a historically strong bilateral alignment of UN treaty signings (they 
have the highest 2010 values, and are consistently high across the total time horizon).  
 
Figure 44:  Selected Dyadic Embeddedness in Treaties (Author Compilation) 
The third sub-index used to create the CoI Index is the level of Diplomatic 
Connection between pairs of countries across time. This series is also produced by the 
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 It is important to note that this is an imperfect weighting. If countries are democratic and the ratification 
of international treaties has to pass through a system of congress or parliament then it is important to note 
that it is much more difficult to ratify than sign treaties. This general constraint does not exist for 
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Correlates of War project (Bayer 2006). This series measures—at a dyadic level—the 
diplomatic interaction of all states in the international system across levels of 
commitment. The data is available from 1817 to 2005, generally in intervals of three or 
five years.  
Diplomatic connection between countries indicates an interest in formalizing 
relations. Typically, the most powerful states in the international system have both 
diplomatic connections abroad and many connections at home as well. For example, in 
2001 164 countries had embassies in the US and the US had embassies in 162 countries. 
In the same year, 125 countries had embassies in China while China had embassies in 
152 countries. In contrast, 12 countries established embassies in Chad, and Chad 
established only 18 abroad (Europa Publications Limited 2001). 
This variable performs tends to reflect both wealth (identified in the paragraph 
above) and political machinations. The line graph below identifies relationships between 
selected countries. The blue line represents India and Pakistan, which have experienced 
tumultuous relations across time, with the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 clearly souring 
relations. The green line—representing Argentina and the UK—also identifies trends in 
the relations between states. Up to 1970 the relationship was not fully reciprocal until the 
1970s; a product of income and distance. After the relationship increased to full bilateral 
embassies, the Falklands War caused a reduction in diplomatic exchange. The third line 
represents the exchange between the US and Vietnam. Before the early 1980s there was 
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no bilateral embassies between the countries. The establishment of embassies was one 




Figure 45:  Diplomatic Exchange Index - Correlates of War (Bayer 2006) 
I take this value and create an index from 0-1, with values of 1 indicating full, 
bilateral embassy exchanges and values of 0 representing no exchange. 
The fourth sub-index that is used to create the CoI Index is diplomatic alliances. 
This measure is equally weighted between the presence of a bilateral alliance and the 
broader strength of that alliance. The data is, again, taken from the Correlates of War 
project (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). This measure is relatively straight-forward 
conceptually and as an applied sub-index to the CoI Index. Conceptually, if countries are 
allies then they are less likely to go to war with one another. 
The final sub-index to the CoI Index is a measure of actual trade versus expected 
trade on a bilateral basis. This measure is a proxy for the quality of state relationships 
                                                 
47
 The measure before 1975 for Vietnam was only for North Vietnam and the US. Next, the values for this 
data are interpolated between five year series for presentation and data smoothness. 
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across time that has received some attention in the literature on conflict (Keshk, Pollins, 
and Reuveny 2004), but not in the way that it is used in this project. This measure 
identifies which partners countries are trading with more than their level of GDP and 
their proximity would indicate. This is not the same measure as was used in the Liberal 
Index. Countries with very high levels of Liberalism can have low levels of expected-to-
actual trade values. 
For this project a gravity model was constructed where the output variable was 
bilateral measures of trade and the independent variables were overall levels of country 
income, physical distance and the year. The gravity model has been widely deployed for 
econometric analysis across time (Anderson 1979; Mátyás 1998; Mátyás 1997). The 
construction of the model for this project used data on geodesic distance from the Centre 
d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales, a leading French data source for 
issues on trade and international economics. The distance data used is called distw, which 
calculates distance between countries weighted for the proximity of people, not territory. 
In other words, if two countries are touching territorially but have actual population 
centers at great distances (think about the US and Russia, for example) this measure will 
characterize the dyad as being more distant than their territorial proximity would suggest 
(Mayer and Zignago 2006). For data on national income, Gross Domestic Product at 
Market Exchange was used from the International Futures system, which itself draws on 
a variety of sources (Hughes 2007). Trade flow information was again taken from the 
Correlates of War project, which measures bilateral trade flows across time (Barbieri, 
Keshk, and Pollins 2009). 
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The actual regression was created using logs of bilateral GDP and trade flows to 
represent diminishing marginal returns to increases in flow size. The actual model output 
(with three independent variables) produced an r-squared of 0.65 with significant t ratios 
and p values for everything (at the level of 99%). See Appendix 3 for full model results.  
The equation used is the following: 
Expected Bilateral Trade = -39.43 + 1.69 + (Sum of Log GDP for Two Countries) + 
0.000385 * (Inverted Weighted Distance) + (0.0129 * Year) 
Using this formula I created an expected trade value for all dyads across time. I 
compared this with the actual value of bilateral trade between countries, subtracting the 
later from the former. Some examples of the performance of the gravity model are shown 
in the three line-graphs below.  
The first example is from the bilateral relationship between the US and Vietnam 
over time, beginning in the first year of available data, 1976. This shows an initially very 
low level of actual trade to expected, a reflection of the history of conflict and distrust 
between the countries. The relationship between these countries improves dramatically 
throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, eventually indicating that Vietnam and the 
US are trading at higher levels than expected
48
. 
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Figure 46:  Actual Verses Expected Bilateral Trade - US and Vietnam 
The second example comes from the trade relationship between Argentina and the 
United Kingdom. Early data shows that the pair of countries experienced fairly strong 
trade relationships, higher than would be expected based solely on their physical 
proximity and the size of their economy. The Falklands War brings about a dramatic 
reduction in the size of trade relative to expected values. This relative souring of the 
relationship between the two countries extends throughout the early 1990s and eventually 


























































































Figure 47: Actual Verses Expected Bilateral Trade - Argentina and UK 
The final example of the performance of this index is between two countries that 
have had historically strong relationships stemming from colonialism. The relative size of 
the economies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Belgium and their physical 
proximity would indicate that their levels of bilateral trade would be relatively quite low, 
but their political proximity and the strong economic ties that extended post colonialism 
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Figure 48:  Actual Verses Expected Bilateral Trade - DRC and Belgium 
The scores of actual trade to relative trade are subtracted and turned into a 0-1 
index.  
The five sub-indices are standardized to identify the relative distance of each 
country around the mean distribution of the sub-index. In other words, the standardization 
process allows for the internal comparison of sub-indices across sub-indices, as well as 
providing a score that is not bound by upper and lower limits. The standardized sub-
indices were then averaged into a Cultures of Interaction standardized output. 
The number of observations for the CoI Index from 1960 to 200 is 457,960. The 
distribution of the standardized score (see the vertical histogram, below) show a handful 
of relationships that fall more than 2 standard deviations above the mean (8,058 
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Figure 49:   Histogram Measuring Distribution of Dyadic Cultures of Interaction Index. Y Axis is number of 
Standard Deviations Above or Below Mean 
 
Evaluation of Indices 
I have argued that an integrated analysis can be conceptually parsimonious (but 
not excessively) while including impacts from a range of theoretical and applied systems. 
I have argued in Chapter 3 that IR theory might benefit from an approach that 
understands Realism and Liberalism to be mutually beneficial theoretical tools that 
should be used in conjunction to evaluate state behavior in the international system. I 
have also made the claim that criticism of standard-bearer approaches to IR point to a 
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third type of approach that embraces nuance, complex interdependence and culture. I 
introduced the actual measure of that above. 
In this section I am interested in evaluating how these IR indices behave when 
modeled with the historic occurrence of international conflict. I test whether the three 
approaches to IR that I have constructed above have more explanatory power in isolation, 
or as an aggregate index. If I can show that the three operationalized theories have utility 
as an aggregate index then I can justify using a combined quantitative measure of Realist, 
Liberal and the CoI Index to tell stories about international relations historically as well 
as forecast this measure to 2050. I choose conflict as my independent variable because it 
represents the ultimate deterioration of dyadic relations. Two states can experience a 
deterioration of relations that falls short of conflict, but conflict represents one extreme 
stage of state behavior that we can measure.  
One claim of this project is that there is a distinction between the CoI Index and 
the Liberal Index score. They both contain some of the same variables, so we would 
expect correlation. In fact, the CoI Index builds upon Liberalism and should be seen as a 
complimentary measure. Conceptually and operationally, however, the measures are 
distinct. As was argued before, the Liberal Index operationalized dyadically represented 
the level of interdependence of the pair of states at the global level.
49
   The CoI, instead, 
is a dyad specific measure. It measures dyadic policy alignment. Two countries can score 
very high on the Dyadic Liberal Index and very low on the CoI Index.  
                                                 
49
 I operationalized Liberalism globally for two main reasons:  it is normally treated as such, and I needed a 
measure that I could forecast over a long time horizon within IFs and dyadic trade is not treated in IFs. 
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The cross-sectional plot below shows the relationship between the CoI Index and 
the Liberalism Index for all dyad years. Each dyad-year is represented by a black dot. 
The shaded red areas indicate the largest concentration of dyad-years within the 
distribution. First, it is clear that there is some relationship, but that it is not a one-to-one 
interaction between the two measures. If you fit a line to this distribution, it produces an 
r-squared measure of 0.33, indicating that 33 percent of the variation in the y axis around 
the regression line is being explained by the x axis.  
Many dyad-years fall either above or below the regression line. Many Soviet 
states were very il-Liberal but also had fairly high CoI scores, a pattern shared by 
authoritarian regimes from South America in the 1970s. Dyad-years that more recently 
experienced high levels of Culture of Interaction but low levels of Liberalism were North 
African. There are examples of countries at the other end of the spectrum that experience 
high levels of dyadic Liberalism but low CoI Index scores. These dyad-years tend to be 
less powerful states who are at a distance (Luxemburg and Mongolia in 1999, for 
example, dyad years where one member is newly democratic (Estonia and Norway in 
1991), dyad-years where one state is newly independent (Denmark and The Gambia in 




Figure 50:  Cross-Sectional Plot of Cultures of Interaction Index and Liberal Index Dyadic Score Results - Red 
Indicates High Density 
The cross-sectional plot below identifies the relationship between the CoI Index 
and the Realist Index. It demonstrates a weak relationship, in general (with an r-square of 
0.10 with a linear fit). Dyad years at the bottom right—with very high CoI Index scores, 
but much Realist pressure—are mainly Western European medium to large states. These 
include the UK and France, Norway and Denmark and France and Italy (all for various 
years). Dyad years at the bottom left are mainly from earlier in the time horizon and 
include relatively materially poor states with poor relations. These include Oman and 
Somalia, Mali and Burkina Faso and Chad and Niger. At the top-right of this cross 
sectional plot—countries with very high CoI Index scores yet very little realist pressure. 
These dyad years include states mainly in Western Europe that are either territorially not 
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contiguous, or that have large discrepancies in relative power, such as Luxemburg and all 
other Western European states, for example. At the top-left of this cross sectional plot lie 
the overwhelming majority of dyad years in our distribution. Again, the density of dyads 
in the distribution is highlighted by the red shading. Most dyad years experience no 
realist pressure (identified above in the distribution analysis of the historic index) and 
thus clump at the top of this cross-sectional plot.  
 
Figure 51:  Cross- Sectional Plot of Cultures of Interaction Index and Realist Index Dyadic Results - Red 
Indicates Higher Density 
The relationship between the Realist Index and the Liberal Index is even weaker 
than the relationship between the CoI Index and the Realist Index. A linear regression 
between the two indices shows a linear curve to with an r-square of 0.01. While the 
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strength of relationship is much worse, an exploration of the particular dyad-years in each 
of the four quadrants shows similar patterns to the relationship between the CoI Index 
and the Realist Index, discussed above. This should not be surprising, as the overall 
distribution of the results is dominated by the very large number of dyad years that are 
scored as having no pressure by not being politically relevant. 
 
Figure 52:  Cross Sectional Plot of Realist and Liberal Index Dyadic Results - Red Indicates Higher Density 
There are many ways that these three indices could be brought together into one 
synthetic representation of the threat of dyadic interactions in the international system:  
one variable could drive weights for other variables algorithmically, for example. For the 
purposes of this project, it was determined that the simplest synthesis of these three 
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indices would be the most straightforward for analysis. For the synthetic index, the CoI, 
Realist and Liberal indices were aggregated.  I also compare the Realist and Liberal 
Indices in an aggregated index with the historic occurrence of conflict. This is to build a 
case for my forecast approach, discussed in the next chapter, where the CoI cannot be 
endogenized within IFs.   
The purpose of the analysis that follows is not to create a model of the occurrence 
of international conflict with the most robust statistical fit. This kind of work has been 
done by others, starting with Wright (1964) and extending through the Correlates of War 
project (Singer 1972; Singer and Small 1994; Wallace and Singer 1970).  More recently 
Bennett and Stam (2004) have produced a comprehensive statistical analysis of the 
relationship between the occurrence of war and driver variables mentioned earlier in this 
project.  
The purpose of this dissertation is not to replicate this work. The occurrence of 
conflict is a difficult thing to measure statistically for a variety of problems (King and 
Zeng 2001).  This is true of both domestic and international conflict.  In the field of 
domestic conflict, this has produced two kinds of measures, one that is probabilistic and 
the other that is an index.  The probabilistic measure captures the best statistical 
relationship with the historic occurrence of conflict (just like the authors did in the 
previous paragraph).  This is useful, but insufficient for a full quantitative analysis of 
conflict. 
Conflict happens for a wide variety of reasons and probabilistic measures provide 
much emphasis to historic drivers. An example may prove useful. One recent attempt to 
predict the occurrence of domestic conflict using a probabilistic measure was produced 
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by Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr (2012) and used measures that have evolved from work 
done on the State Fragility Task Force (Esty et al. 2007; Goldstone et al. 2010).  The 
results of this study widely miss the mark when it comes to the actual occurrence of the 
Arab Spring.  The Peace and Conflict 2012 report measures the “risk of future instability 
between 2010 and 2012” to be “low” for the following countries:  Bahrain, Egypt, Lybia, 
Syria and Tunisia.  However, far from having a low risk of future instability, each of 
these countries experienced large-scale domestic conflict in this time period. 
This is not to say that probabilistic measures are not useful for anlaysis.  On the 
contrary, they are an important step in furthering our understanding of the drivers of 
conflict, be they domestic or international.  However, they are not a panacea, and index 
measures—conceptually sound and statistically relevant—can provide additional insight 
into how likely conflict is moving across time. 
One central hypothesis of this project is that a synthesized model of international 
relations will have a more meaningful relationship with the actual occurrence of conflict 
than any of the three key theories of international relations explored. To test this I have to 
explore my five international relations models (Realism, Liberalism, CoI, Realism + 
Liberalism + CoI, Realism + Liberalism) with the historic occurrence of conflict. This 
section of the dissertation performs that evaluation. It concludes that, yes, the integrated 
model of international relations theories performs better than any of the models in 
isolation. 
To test this I take two measures of international conflict and subject my five 
indices to a logistic regression analysis. I measure the occurrence of conflict in two 
related datasets. The first is the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset produced by 
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the Correlates of War. This dataset measures whenever a militarized conflict between two 
states occurred and whether a fatality occurred. MIDs can be of a very low threshold, and 
can involve seeming “accidents” and other miscommunications between pairs of states in 
the international system. MIDs were defined in Chapter 1 and include conflicts, “…that 
range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war” (Jones, Bremer, 
and Singer 1996, 163). The other measure used for this analysis is the Correlates of War 
account of actual interstate war. The threshold of this conflict is much higher (1,000 
battle field deaths), and involves the deployment of actual troops, full military operations 
and the declaration of war (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). 
Logistic regressions are useful for measuring nominal dependent variable data 
with a probability that it will occur based on an independent variable value. These 
methods are suitable for analyzing variables with characteristics similar to the occurrence 
of historic conflict (as it can be represented as a binary). The distribution of the 
independent and dependent variables in my sample make many statistical samples 
problematic. See the figure below for a visual representation of the problem:  the vast 
majority (over 99.5%) of observations have a dependent variable with a value of “0” 
(representing no conflict). The incredibly small number of independent variables can 
skew my results and vastly under-estimate the occurrence the prediction of a “1” (King 
and Zeng 2001). 
This is not a problem for my analysis because the end of this hypothesis testing is 
not the creation of a model with the best statistical fit to the historic occurrence of 
conflict. As argued in Chapter 2, this has been done by others (Bennett and Stam 2004). 
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Instead, I am interested in comparing the relative strength of the different indices related 
to the historic occurrence of conflict.  
Logistic regressions model independent variables against a binary dependent 
variable. This is done by fitting the data with a sigmoid-curve (more commonly referred 
to as an “s-curve”). It is superior to linear regressions when dealing with binary output 
variables that are not normally distributed (though this is still problematic, see King and 
Zeng 2000 as noted above). The logistic regression equation is demonstrated below. 
             
 
   
         
The cross sectional plot below shows the distribution of the aggregate measure of 
the character of bilateral relations in the international system along the x axis and the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of a fatal conflict dyad year along the y axis. A logistic 
regression was used to test the goodness of fit of the aggregate index measure and 




Figure 53:  Y Axis is Fatal Dyadic Conflicts (1 for yes, 0 for no). X Axis is the Aggregate Index Score Measured 
in Standard Deviations Around the Mean 
The results of a logistic regression are reported as Chi-Square values. Higher 
values indicate that the model fit is stronger than lower values. The five models that I test 
are the following:  the first three models are simply the Dyadic Realist, Liberal or 
Cultures of Interaction Indices separately regressed against one measure of conflict. The 
fourth model (referred below to as “Integrated”) is a simple aggregation of the three 
indices. The fifth model integrates Realist and Liberal indices to explore the additional 
contribution of the CoI Index and the lay the foundation for my forecast. Each model 
includes only one independent variable and one dependent variable. 
I tested a range of relationships between independent dependent variables. I 
altered independent variables by shifting the sample size from politically relevant dyads 
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to the full data series. I changed dependent variables by including two measures of 
international conflict:  MIDs and the sample taken using the higher 1,000 battle field 
deaths threshold. See Appendix 4 for the full series of results for these tests. In general, 
the full integrated model (aggregating the Dyadic Realist Index, Dyadic Liberal Index 
and the CoI Index) performed more strongly than any of the three IR measures in 
isolation. The bar graph below shows the chi square results from runs of the model using 
only politically relevant dyads (those with a Great Power or territorial contiguity) as the 
filter for the independent variable and dyad years with with 1,000 or more battle field 
deaths. The results indicate that, for politically relevant dyads, the aggregate index 
(simply adding up the Dyadic Realist, Liberal and CoI Indices) produce a better 
explanatory model than any of the approaches in isolation.  
 
Figure 54:  Logistic Regression Results:  Politically Relevant Dyads and MIDs 
The test results shown in Appendix 4 manipulate the independent data in the 


























Results from Logistic Regression for MIDs 
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 Full Variables, 457k Rows:  This is the full set of dyad year variables from 1960-
2001. 
 Full Variables with Realist Pressure 67k Rows:  These include only dyad years 
that are politically relevant (where the dyad is territorially contiguous and/or 
includes one Great Power). 
Each index (Realist, Liberal, CoI, Integrated with Realism and Liberalism and Full 
Integrated) is then regressed against two dependent variables (the low or high battle field 
death threshold). Out of these comparative studies, the integrated measure proved to be 
the most explanatory in all but one situation. The Dyadic Realist Index was of greater 
explanatory power when the lower battle field death threshold was used for all data points 
(457,000 rows). This confirms a well established fact in the quantitative study of conflict:  
politically relevant dyads (especially territorially contiguous) are the most likely to 
engage in conflict.  
Overall, however, the integrated measure did a better job in predicting the historic 
occurrence of conflict vis-à-vis the IR indices in isolation or Realism and Liberalism 
combined. This quantitative test of historic data shows that an integrated approach can be 
more effective. It provides credibility for my theoretical framework and my forecasting 















6.   The Base Case of International Futures (IFs) 
Introduction 
Kantian Liberalism, Cultures of Interaction and Realism form the backbone of 
this forecast analysis. The previous chapter argued that each theoretical framework was 
one piece in a larger puzzle, and that emphasizing any approach in exclusion of any other 
would not tell as full a story about the future of international relations in the international 
system to 2050. I provided quantitative support for using an aggregate measure of IR 
theory. 
This section takes these indices and explores their behaviour in the Base Case of 
IFs. The Base Case is a scenario that extends political and technological trends and 
decisions made over the last 20 years out to 2050. No large-scale technological break-
through is included in this scenario (such as artificial intelligence, or cost effective carbon 
capture and sequestration). There are also no catastrophic events explicitly modeled (such 
as a massive change in natural constants) beyond those already included within historic 
data series that get transferred through to model structure.  
In many ways the Base Case of IFs paints a positive picture of development over 
the next 40 years. Economic growth continues, education is expanded and health 
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measures all improve. The grand challenges of transitioning away from fossil fuel 
dependence and towards renewable energy are met with little disruption to the global 
economy. Climate change impacts are generally small. Base Case behavior and 
assumptions are outline in Appendix 5, reprinted from a Human Development Report 
Research Paper (Hughes, Irfan, et al. 2011, 13–14). 
This chapter begins by assessing the Base Case behavior of the Realist Dyadic 
Index.  This index is measured in the same way as the Realist Index used in Chapter 5 
and draws on the work of Herman and Hillebrand (Treverton 2011).  Power transitions 
become an important piece of this analysis, and I conclude that relative material power 
pressures will remain a salient concern of many states over the next 40 years. 
Next, I explore Kantian Liberalism’s three components, spending more time 
documenting the treatment of Government Embeddedness in International Organizations, 
as this is a new addition to the IFs model. This section concludes that the world is—on 
whole—becoming more liberal and that this historically has been an important theoretical 
and empirical contributor to the mitigation of international conflict.  
Third, this section explains how the Base Case treats the Cultures of Interaction 
Index. The CoI Index is a granular measure of dyadic alignment in the international 
system. As such, it cannot be endogenized within the IFs model. Instead of treating this 
as an internally calculated variable in IFs, I initialize data in 2010 using 2001 values, and 
keep them constant across time.  This variable becomes the major conceptual uncertainty 
in this forecast and orients my further policy recommendations. Where states experience 
a deterioration of dyadic relations, the CoI index can mitigate this.  States with the 
potential for deterioration should explicitly improve the sub-measures that go into the CoI 
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Index (align foreign policy, sign treaties and attempt to build a culture internal to the 
dyad that promotes cooperation). 
The global average score for each of the three indices, along with the overall sum 
of these scores, is shown below. This highlights this chapter’s general conclusion:  the 
world is becoming less conflictual based on the combination of Kantian Liberal, 
Complex Liberal and Realist Indices, across time. While the Realist Index score remains 
relatively stagnant—indicating that overall Realist pressures are likely to persist—various 
forms of interdependence are on the rise. I conclude that, relying on Base Case 
assumptions, the future for conflict in the international system is increasingly a thing of 
the past. 
 
Figure 55:  World Average Scores for IR Measures: Y-Axis Standard Deviations Around 2010 Mean 
 
While, on the aggregate, dyadic relationships in the international system are 






IR Indices - World Average 
 
Year 
2013 2017 2021 2025 2029 2033 2037 2041 2045 2049 
Integrated IR Index Liberal Index Realist Index CoI Index 
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constrained resources and shifting relative power distributions. Future conflicts look 
likely to arise in specific dyads discussed below.  The concluding section of this chapter 
identifies specific vulnerable groupings.  
A Reminder on Measurements and Aggregations 
The measurement of index scores in this chapter and their aggregation may 
confuse some.  Most generally, readers are encouraged to remember that higher scores 
indicate more pacific dyadic state relationships.  Lower scores—for any index or sub-
index—identify more tense dyadic relations based on drivers from the specific index in 
question.  This general rule is augmented below in the table which highlights the specific 
meaning of higher or lower scores for each index.  
First, the output of each index is the number of standard deviations that the dyad 
scores for the index above or below the mean value for 2010 for the entire distribution of 
all dyads. The higher the score in any given index highlights the Higher scores indicate 
more standard deviations above the mean—and thus a better overall quality of dyadic 
interaction—but means specific things to each sub-index. See the table below for an 
overview of how different measures are treated and what higher or lower values 
conceptually indicate. 
Table 5:  Note on Measurement and Indices 
 
High Numbers Indicate Low Numbers Indicate 
Kantian 
Liberalism 
Global norms of 
interdependence play 
strongly into dyadic 
decision-making 
Global norms of 
interdependence do not play 





Dyad partners share high 
levels of bilateral affinity 
in foreign policy choices 
Dyad partners share low levels 
of bilateral affinity in policy 




The dyadic distribution of 
resources figures little 
into dyadic decision-
making 
The dyadic distribution of 
material resources is important 




There is less overall 
threat in this dyad. 
Relations are more likely 
to be cooperative than 
conflictual. 
There is a higher level of threat 
in this dyad. These states are 
more likely to be conflictual 
than cooperative 
  
Aggregating dyad scores can be tricky, and done in various ways. The first way to 
calculate a group average score is internal to that group. In other words, take the score for 
each dyad within the group and average that score. The second way is across groups 
without over-lap. For this, I take the average Dyadic Liberal Index score for each pair of 
states where one member of the dyad is a member of one group and another member of 
the dyad is a member of the other group. An example of this is the average Dyadic 
Liberal Index between the BRICs and OECD groups. The third way to measure average 
Dyadic Liberal Index scores is to take the score of each dyad with the rest of the world. 
Each section below uses various aggregation methods with dyadic scores and is explicit 
about the approach used in each case.  
Realism in IFs 
The previous chapter measured and explored a Dyadic Realist Index that was 
based solely on relative material power distribution. Relative material power is the 
cornerstone of Realism. I argued that—whether you were a proponent of Power 
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Transition Theory of Balance of Power—that higher levels of material parity require a 
dyad to pay more attention to that variable across time. I begin this section by exploring 
the forecasted Dyadic Realist Index for relative material power. 
It is the contention of this project that it is impossible to actually operationalize 
Realist measures of power on a macro-level scale across time because of one primary 
reason:  there is no agreed upon dependent variable that can be operationalized. If power 
is the ability of A to get B to do what B would have otherwise not done, how could that 
be measured? 
IR Realism:  Relative Material Power 
The relative material power index used for this analysis was describe by 
Treverton and Jones (2005). The index is comprised of four sub-measures, identified, 
with their relative weightings, below. The weightings in the index were developed 
through a qualitative process by Hillebrand and Herman that remains publically 
unavailable. The measure is identical to the historic measure used in the previous chapter. 
The largest contributor to the relative material power measure in the forecast is 
GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Purchasing Power Parity is used in lieu of 
Market Exchange Rates (MER) because, when poor countries mobilize for conflict, the 
resources that they are drawing on are largely domestic and not international. Using MER 
would undervalue these domestic assets. The next largest contribution is overall military 
spending, representing just less than 30% of the index. The fourth component is the 
overall size of the population. Population size is important and is typically a component 
of relative material power measures. It is most useful as a proxy for the relative number 
of humans that can be brought to bear in a conflict. For example, if Singapore and 
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Indonesia went to war—assuming that the other sub-components of the realist measure 
were equal—the size of Indonesia would make them a relatively stronger contender. The 
final measure is GDP multiplied by GDP per capita at PPP. This is a tacit representation 
of the technology possessed by a country. Countries and regions with high levels of 
technology tend to be those with high levels of GDP accompanied with high levels of per 
capita GDP. Large levels of GDP allow these nations to marshal resources for the 
development of R&D. High levels of per capita GDP indicate a work force with high 
levels of development. 
The base-case forecast of the relative material power distribution for all countries 
in the world is shown below. The vast majority of countries—180 out of 183—
individually have less than 5% of global material power. Only 17 countries have more 
than 1% of relative material power, representing less than 10% of all countries 
represented in IFs. The line-graph below demonstrates the widely discussed transition 
between great powers that is forecasted to occur in the coming decades. The top line is a 
measurement of the relative power of the United States. In 2012, this index measures US 
material power at 24% of the global total. The next line is China, whose relative material 
power is measured at 13%. The relative power of the US declines and China rises, with 
the two crossing in the decade of the 2030s. The third line—India—nearly catches up to 




Figure 56:  Relative Material Power Base Case:  All Countries in IFs 
The relative power transition that occurs in the line graph above reflects the sub-
components of the realist index. GDP at PPP is currently largest in the US, measuring 
about 12 trillion dollars (in 2000 US dollars), with China and India trailing with 
economies of 8 trillion USD and 3 trillion USD, respectively. In the base-case, this 
changes dramatically. Over the total time horizon, the US economy grows at an average 
1.7% annually, with China growing at 3.7% and India growing at a staggering 5%. This 
causes China’s economy to pass the US at purchasing power parity in 10 years. India’s 
economy is larger than the US by the end of this time horizon. In terms of population, 
China and India have populations that are far larger than the population of the US:  India 
is 3.8 times the size of the US and China is 4.4 times larger. The population of China is 
forecast to plateau in the middle of the time horizon. This is due largely to increasing 
education, economic growth, and the impact of the one-child policy of the 1970s. India’s 
population is forecast to continue growing to 2050, passing China in the early 2030s. The 
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US population is forecast to also continue growing through this time horizon, increasing 
to just over 400 million by 2050. In terms of per capita GDP at PPP, the US has the 
strong advantage, and this is expected to remain across the entire time horizon. US GDP 
per capita is nearly 40,000 per year (in 2000 dollars) and is forecast to grow to nearly 
60,000 per year by 2050. China and India both have much lower levels in 2010—just 
over 6,000 USD and under 3,000 USD respectively. These are forecast to grow 
substantially, China increasing over four times its current value and India five times. The 
final component of the power index is military spending. Currently, the US spends more 
money on the military than the next 17 countries combined (nearly 415 billion USD in 
2000 dollars). This is forecast to transition dramatically over the next 40 years as the 
green line in the line-graph below. By 2020, the US will spend more than the next 6 
countries combined. By 2050, China will spend more than the US on the military. This 
indicates both the rise of China and her military spending but also the relative increase in 
equality of government military spending.
50
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 The GINI coefficient for government military spending in IFs is the following:  2010 = .76; 2020 = .69; 




Figure 57:  US and China Military Spending with US Distribution of Global Spending:  2000 US Dollard at 
MER 
The time horizon begins with nine countries above the base-case threshold for 
identifying a great power: 2 percent of total relative global material power. These are, in 
order from most power to least, the US, China, India, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, 
France, Brazil and Russia. By the end of the time horizon, the number of great powers is 
reduced from nine to five. The remaining powers are, in order, China, USA, India, Brazil 
and Japan. The distribution of power in the international system is currently largely in the 
hands of the US, with China and India growing rapidly. Membership in this group 
remains the same. The next most powerful countries—those that have considerable 
material resources but are not in the same class as China, India and the US—are whittled 
down across time by growth in both the top three Great Powers, and the rest of the world. 
This is indicated in the line graph below. Currently, the top three have nearly 45 percent 
of the world’s material power, increasing over time to nearly 50 percent. The rest of the 
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The second-tier Great Powers, however, see their relative material resources decline from 
less than 20 percent of the world’s power to just over 10 percent. 
 
Figure 58:  Relative Material Power for Great Powers, Second Tier Powers and Rest of World 
Twenty three countries out of 183 double their relative material power across the 
time horizon. The greatest relative improvement occurs in Turkmenistan and Angola, 
which see their power increase by a factor of more than 3.5 times. Of the 23 countries 
that double their power, 17 are African. At the other extreme, six countries experience 
their power cut in half. They are all European with the greatest reduction in power 
occurring in Montenegro, Italy and Greece. 
The Dyadic Realist Index forecast was measured in the same way as the historic 
measure. In the first year all dyads were first separated into either politically relevant 
dyads or non-politically relevant dyads. This was done by an algorithm that considered 
two things:  first, whether there was a great power in the dyad (measured as having 2 
percent of global material power) and secondly whether the dyad was territorially 
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percentage of the less endowed member of the dyad was divided by the more endowed 
member. 
Higher Dyadic Realist Index scores indicate that relative material power 
distribution is less of a decisive issue in decision making between a pair of states. 
Incrementally lower absolute values of the Dyadic Realist Index indicate that relative 
material power distribution increases in importance in decision-making across the dyad-
year, ceteris paribus. The absolute value of the Dyadic Realist Index measures the 
number of standard deviations above or below the mean for the total dyad-year 
distribution in 2010. 
Globally, the average of all Dyadic Realist Index scores measuring material 
power proximity increases in absolute terms, indicating a decline in the degree to which 
questions of relative power distribution are an important piece of decision making, ceteris 
paribus. This is because the number of states classified as Great Powers reduces, and this 
lowers the total amount of relative material power pressure in the system. In the base-
case of IFs, four countries begin the time horizon as great powers (having more than 2 
percent of global material power) but end the time horizon as non-great powers:  France, 
Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom. By 2050 the base-case of IFs shows five great 
powers:  China, with 20 percent of material power, the US with 15 percent, India with 14 
percent, Brazil with 3 percent and Japan with 2 percent. 
By removing the four falling Great Powers, the Average Dyadic Realist Index 
demonstrates a slight decline in the absolute value. Lower absolute values indicate an 
increase in overall, global realist pressure. In the Base Case, this is forecast to be 
relatively small, changing by only 0.001 standard deviations. The forecast is consistent 
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with Realist claims of the continued relevance of material power distribution in decision 
making and is also consistent with historic trends in average Dyadic Realist Index scores 
remaining relatively static across time. 
 
Figure 59:  Dyadic Realist Index for Relative Material Power - No Falling Great Powers 
Moving from the global average of all Dyadic Realist Index scores to average 
country-year scores tells a story first about Great Powers and non-Great Powers. To take 
country-year scores, I averaged each dyad-year score for each of the 183 countries 
modeled in IFs. This measure indicates the degree that—in general and across time—a 
country makes foreign policy decisions that consider relative material power distribution, 
ceteris paribus.  
The average score for all non-Great Powers (not including the four that fall below 
the Great Power threshold in the time horizon) is 0.156, well above the mean, indicating 
that relative matieral power figures into only a limited amount of foreign policy 
decisions. The average for Great Powers across the time horizon (including the four that 
fall) is -2.09, two standard deviations below the mean, indicating that power distribution 
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modeling strategy—informed by IR theory—which argued that Great Powers would need 
to consider the material distribution between themselves and all countries in the 
international system while countries who were below the Great Power threshold would 
only need to be concerned with the power distribution between themselves and their 
neighbors. 
The average Dyadic Realist Index scores Across time, this pressure dissipates for 
the four countries that fall out of the Great Power category:  Russia, France, United 
Kingdom and Germany. Across time, four former Great Powers become non-Great-
Powers. This should decrease the amount of time focused on making decisions around the 
role of the distribution of material resources in the international system ceteris paribus. In 
modeling terms, these four countries experience the largest abslute increase in their 
average Dyadic Realist Index scores, indicating that they experience a very large 
reduction in the degree that material power plays into their foreign policy, ceteris 
paribus. 
Removing Great Powers from the analysis, the majority of countries experience 
little or no change in their average Dyadic Realist Index scores across the time horizon. 
The line-graph below takes the absolute change in the Dyadic Realist Index from 2010 to 
2050 for each country and sorts them by most increase to most decrease, moving from 
left to right. It shows that the majority of states in the international system—92 out of 
183—will see the importance of relative material power remain within 0.005 standard 




Figure 60:  Absolute Standard Deviation Change by Country - No Great Powers 
At the extremes, there are two groups:  those who are forecast to see the 
importance of relative material power decrese and those who are forecast to see it 
increase. The five countries that experience the greatest absolute increase in the index 
score—signaling a declining importance for relative material power in foreign policy—
are (in order from greatest absolute increase) Zambia, Jamaica, Oman, Portugal and 
Zimbabwe. However, the greatest improvement is only 0.13 standard deviations. The 
countreis with the greatest absolute decline in their average Realist Index scores are 
(again, in order) Turkmenistan, Iran, Ghana, Algeria and Nigeria. The greatest change 
here is a -0.25 standard deviation decline in the score. 
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The non-Great Powers with the lowest average Dyadic Realist Index scores that 
indicate that their decisionmaking is largely oriented towards relative material power 
considerations are Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Libya. The five countries with 
the highest scores are Cape Verde, Grenada, Maldives, Micronesia and Samoa. 
Moving from average country-year scores to dyad scores provides an additional level of 
granularity. Of the total number of dyads in the sample—over 33,000—only 8 experience 
a deteoriation in dyadic material power that is over one standard deviation. These are the 
following dyads, ranked from most deterioration to least.  
Table 6:  Dyads with Material Power Deterioration 
Dyads with Deterioration in 
Realist Relative Material 
Power Measure of Greater 







Saudi Arabia Japan 
Pakistan Japan 
The greatest transition occurs between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is 
currently nearly four times as powerful as Turkmenistan. However, Turkmenistan is 
forecasted to fully make up that difference in relative material power and be nearly at 
material power parity with Turkmenistan over the coming decades. 
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Liberalism in IFs 
The world is becoming more liberal, in the Kantian sense. Global trade is 
increasing, levels of democracy continue to rise and international organizations and 
treaties are an increasingly relevant way to solve collective action problems and 
disagreements in the international system. This kind of interdependence—not 
characterized by bilateral interdependence but rather dependence to the international 
system as a whole—is radically shifting how states behave. 
The section explores the construction and behavior of the Dyadic Liberal Index, 
comprised of measures of trade, democracy and embeddedness in international 
organizations. I begin by documenting the structure of the international organization 
embeddedness (GOVEMBED) model within IFs. The construction and behavior of this 
variable is focused on more thoroughly than other variables that make up the Dyadic 
Liberal Index because it is new to the IFs system and it requires documentation. Next, I 
highlight the general structure and behavior of both democracy and trade in IFs.  
This section ends by identifying the construction and behavior of the base-case Dyadic 
Liberal Index from 2010 to 2050 in IFs. It concludes that, if base-case assumptions are 
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upheld, that the majority of dyadic relationships will improve their levels of Kantian 
Liberalism. While some dyads remain highly illiberal and even become less liberal across 
time, they represent a small handful—less than 5%—of all dyads in the international 
system. I also conclude that, while IFs forecasts great improvement in levels of dyadic 
Liberalism across time, that great discrepancies across regions will remain even over the 
next four decades. 
IR Liberalism:  International Organization Embeddedness in IFs 
 Prior to this dissertation, two of these legs of the Kantian tripod were forecasted 
within the IFs system:  democracy and trade. One contribution of this project is a forecast 
of country embeddedness in international political systems. Thus, this section will treat 
the later variable in much more depth, as the former two variables have been discussed 
elsewhere (Hughes, Joshi, et al.; Hughes, Hossain, and Irfan 2007). 
Throughout this project I have referred to the third leg of the Liberal tripod as 
“embeddedness” in international political systems. In Perpetual Peace Kant identified 
belonging to a “federation of states” as being an important driver of pacific relations 
(Kant 1991). The third leg has been measured by looking at membership in IOs 
(Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998). “Embeddedness” in 
international organizations is meant to signal the degree to which a country has 
committed itself to overcoming collective action problems (among other international 
issues) through the world of international organizations and agreements.  
I measure country-level embeddedness in international political institutions by exploring 
two kinds of data that are conceptually related. The first is membership in international 
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organizations. The second is country commitment to UN treaties through signing or 
ratification. 
There is a relationship between both the IO and UN measures, though it is far 
from linear. The cross-sectional plot below highlights this, and places the measure of UN 
treaties on the x axis and the IO membership on the y axis. It separates countries into 
their UN Population categories and fits a second degree polynomial curve to this 
relationship. The r^2 value is .55. This shows that North American, Latin American and 
African countries are more likely to join IOs than sign UN treaties relative to the fit of the 
curve. The opposite is true for European, Asian and Oceanic countries. 
 
Figure 61:  Cross-Sectional Relationship Between UN Treaty Scores and IO Membership 
To forecast IO embeddedness, this project creates an index that combines impacts 
from both IO and UN Treaty scores. In the process of creating this index I was unable to 
find guidance as to how to relatively weight IO membership to UN treaty 
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average number of IO memberships should be weighted about as much as the total UN 
treaty score. UN treaty scores were generally five times larger than IO embeddedness 
scores for countries in the most recent years with the largest overall embeddedness. Thus, 
and fairly arbitrarily, signing 5 UN treaties or signing one and ratifying two signals the 
same level of embeddedness in international political organizations as being a member of 
one international organization. 
The overall index—referred hitherto as embeddedness in international political 
organizations—is graphed below. The historic pattern is similar to the growth pattern of 
both IO membership and UN Treaty scores, both graphed above. Again, we see the 
global average score increase at the end of the Cold War which is an impact that stems 
from the UN Treaty data, and not the IO membership data. 
 
Figure 62:  Global Average Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems 
There are no quantitative forecasts of embeddedness in international political 
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following section outlines the initial logic for forecasting this variable, some results and 
then limitations. This forecast is a work-in-progress, and welcomes constructive and 
creative criticism. The model that I constructed to forecast this variable included three 
key drivers at this initial stage in the process, and should likely be augmented with an 
algorithmic treatment of great powers at a later stage.  
To forecast this variable I began with a conceptual account of why countries 
embed themselves in international organizations and sign UN treaties. Neo-Liberal 
Institutionalists have long claimed that such behavior is designed to change the cost of 
decision-making in the international system to help overcome collective action problems 
and signal trust-worthiness in anarchy. Following this logic, we should expect that 
countries that are more willing to embed themselves in international organizations have 
some resources that they would like to preserve and the means to preserve these 
resources. With this in mind, I went about building a statistical model. 
I explored numerous relationships between variables that I felt had conceptual salience 
for the forecast of embeddedness in international political institutions. I found the 
strongest statistical and conceptual model to include the following drivers:  income per 
capita at purchasing power parity, government expenses as a percentage of GDP and a 
measure of relative material power
51
. I will explore each of these variables in turn, and 
then will turn to the combined model. 
The cross-sectional plot below maps the relationship between GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity and the measure of country embeddedness in international 
                                                 
51
 Relative material power is an index constructed in IFs that measures levels of income, population size, 
technological competence and governance effectiveness. 
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political institutions. The relationship not insignificant (with an r^2 of 0.26) and an 
upward sloping curve. Here, we expect countries with higher incomes to embed 
themselves more in international political institutions. 
 
Figure 63:  Cross-Sectional Relationship Between GDP Per Capita at PPP and Country-Level Embeddedness in 
International Political Systems 
High income indicates that countires are likely to have the resources to invest in 
embedding themselves in internatioanl organizations (it takes resources to staff IOs and 
enforce laws that stem from UN ratification, for example). However, having material 
resources alone doesn't necessarily indicate that the country in question is willing to 
spend these on international organizations. For a measure of country willingness to invest 
in bureaucratic solutions to problems, I plotted government expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP against my measure of embeddedness in international organizations. That scatter-
plot is below. The r^2 is 0.22, and the curve is upward sloping. This indicates that, as the 
porportion of the GDP that comes from governmental expenses increases, we would 
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Figure 64:  Cross-Sectional Relationship between Government Expense as a Percentage of GDP and Country-
Level Embeddedness in International Political Systems 
The third variable in this model is realtive material power, which is a measure of 
income, population, technology and governance quality that is placed on a relative scale 
of 0-100. The scatter plot below plots this with international political embeddedness. The 
r^2 is very low (0.065), but the variable has a very significant contribution to the 
multivariate model. The scatter-plot below highlights the upward sloping curve, and 
indicates that, as countries have more material power, they are increasingly willing to 
embed themselves in international political institutions. There may be a separate set of 
relationships for Great Powers, tentatively identified in the graph below as the US, Japan, 

































 Congo, Democratic Republic of





























































 Pakistan  P nama







 Romania Russian Federation
 Rwanda
 Senegal
























 Yemen, Republic of






10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55





























Figure 65:  Cross-Sectional Relationship between Relative Material power and Country Embeddedness in 
International Political Systems 
 The adjusted r^2 is .59, which is reasonable, and t and p values are all within the 
range of significance. The specific data series used for this model are also identified in 
Appendix 8—along with all statistical scores, which are significant. The equation used to 
forecast this variable is the following: 
 
International Political Embeddedness = 57.1 + (.00192 * GDP per capita at PPP) + 
(1.443 * Government Expenses / GDP) + (18.378 * Relative Material Power) 
 
Analyzing the results of this… The initial forecast of this variable indicates that 
the overall trend in embeddedness in international organizations is likely to continue to 
grow across time. The line graph below highlights this by identifying the history and 
forecast of embeddedness in these international political organizations for key UN 
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America and Asia will surpass this value sometime in the 2020s. Africa will nearly reach 
this value by the end of the time horizon. 
 
Figure 66:  History and Forecast of Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems for UN 
Population Groupings 
 The distribution of IO embeddedness across time highlights that, even with the 
relatively optimistic IFs forecast, that some central African countries will have the same 
overall commitment to IOs in 2050 that places in Europe had achieved by the 1960s. A 
series of maps by decade can be found in Appendix 5 that highlight these transitions 
across time. The legends in the map are fixed, so values and colors are comparable 
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Figure 67:  Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems - 1960 
 All countries on this map fall into the lowest three categories of IO 
embeddedness, representing scores of 0-50, 50-100 or 100-150. Only four countries 
achieve the 100-150 score range:  Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Countries with higher levels of embeddedness are mostly in Europe as well as North and 
South America. There are a handful of countries in Asia, and only two in Africa with 
scores that are higher than the 0-50 range (Egypt and Ghana). 
 The distribution changes dramatically over the next 40 years. See the map below 




Figure 68:  Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems - 2000 
 Here we see four categories of country embeddedness in IOs, ranging from scores 
of 250-200, 200-150, 150-100, 100-50 and 50-0. In the highest score range, we find many 
Western and Northern European countries. Moving to the next rage finds some Eastern 
European countries and Russia. A large number of countries are found in the third and 
forth categories. The third category—the same level of embeddedness as Britain, France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands experienced in 1960—we find China, India, the US and 
most of South and Central America. There are also pockets of this level of embeddedness 
in Western Africa. For the next level—scores between 100-50; the same level of the US 
in 1960—we find much of the Middle East, Central Asia, Central Africa, Southern Africa 
and pockets of South East Asia and Eastern Africa. There are only two fully sovereign 
nations in 2000 that had levels of commitment that were in the lowest range:  North 
Korea and Sierra Leon (Taiwan and Western Sahara appear as white in the map above, 
but lack full sovereignty). 
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 Shifting our attention to the forecast for 2050, a much fuller picture emerges of 
country embeddedness in international organizations. See the map below. 
 
Figure 69:  Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems - 2050 
 Here we see the vast majority of members of the international system having 
levels of embeddedness that are higher than what we have seen for any member in the 
year 2000. The embeddedness scores from 2000 to 2050 are forecasted to growth 
substantially, with average scores in Europe targeted to be nearly 600, and almost 900 in 
North America. While wide-ranging growth in embeddedness in international 
organizations is forecasted in this scenario, there are still pockets of very low levels of 
embeddedness and commitment to IOs. Much of Central and Western Africa are 
forecasted to have levels of embeddedness that score between 100-150, the same 
category that we found France, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1960. Other 
notable low-scoring countries are Burma, Nepal, North Korea and Tajikistan. At the very 
low end, the model created for this project forecasts that Somalia, Eriteria and East Timor 
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have levels of embeddedness in 2050 that are the same as India, Poland, Turkey, Ghana 
and the US in 1960. 
 This approach to forecasting IO embeddedness is obviously not without its 
problems. One key issue is the treatment of countries with very high levels of relative 
material power (defined earlier in this paper). China, Japan, India and the USA are 
currently the four countries with the largest relative material power resources. 
Historically, these four countries were reticent to join IOs. Because our forecast has these 
four countries continuing with relatively strong economic growth, there is very strong 
growth in embeddedness. The line graph below highlights this problem. 
 
Figure 70:  Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems - Key Great Powers 
 It is very likely that countries with very high levels of relative material power will 
feel less of a need to project their interests through these international organizations. 
Instead, they are likely less interested in binding themselves to international bureaucracy 






















the historic data on Russian embeddedness in international organizations. Prior to 
opening their economy to increased market pressures and eventually moving away from 
state based mechanisms of distributing surplus value, the USSR had relatively low levels 
of embeddedness in these international organizations. This is particularly seen in the data 
on UN embeddedness, shown below. 
 
Figure 71:  UN Treaty Embeddedness - Russian Transition at End of Cold War 
 In the line graph above, Belgium represents one of the most committed countries 
to signing and ratifying UN treaties across time. The US, as a great power, it is argued, 
may feel less obligation to projecting interest through such institutions, and has lower 
absolute levels of embeddedness in these treaties across time. Russia experiences a 
transition as they move through the process of opening the country to outside influence in 
the middle of the 1980s. This graph could be interpreted as Russian acknowledgement 
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that they would have to further rely on international institutions to work for change in the 
international system. 
 IR Liberalism:  Democracy in IFs 
 The current treatment of governance within the IFs model focuses on a path 
dependent treatment of the diffusion of pluralistic governance regimes driven by levels of 
income and levels of educational attainment. The forecast variable is the Polity score that 
has been tailored to range from 0 (autocratic) to 20 (democratic).  
Forecasting levels of democracy is not simple. A cross sectional relationship 
between Polity's Democracy measure and GDP per capita at PPP yields an r^2 of 0.20. 
While many countries with high incomes are also democratic, exceptions exist 
(Singapore, Kuwait, among others). On the other end, there are many countries with high 
levels of democracy but with very low levels of income (India, Mongolia and Paraguay, 
for example). 
The total number of years of education that a person has in a country is also 
related to levels of democracy. This relationship is slightly more robust with an r^2 of 
0.29. While most countries with the very highest levels of education are democratic 
(Sweden, Australia, Germany, Canada all score 10) there are some outliers (South Korea 
scores an 8). There is much more variation among countries with low levels of education 
and democracy, with countries like Mali and Burundi having very low education but 
scoring a 7 on the democracy scale, and other poorly educated countries like Rwanda and 
Sudan scoring 1 and 0 respectively. 
Combining GDP per capita at PPP with the average number of years a person has 




Figure 72:  Global Democracy - History and Forecast 
IR Liberalism:  Trade in IFs 
To understand the IFs forecast of trade it is important to understand—at least in 
general terms—the economic model structure. Productivity is endogenized in a Cobb-
Douglas production function with insights from Solow (1956) and Romer (1990) where 
improvements to labor interacting with capital derive from three sources:  human capital 
development, social capital development and physical capital development. The IFs 
economic model is a 6 sector model (manufacturing, services, materials, agriculture, 
energy and ICT) which are all initially aggregations of GTAP data (Hertel 1997) whose 
relative shares shift dynamically based on levels of development. These sectors interact 
with actors in a market, where firms, governments and households (skilled and unskilled) 
buy and sell goods and prices "chase" equilibrium. This interaction is enveloped within a 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) structure (Leontief 1966).  
Trade levels are forecasted using a pooled approach in contrast to a bilateral 
approach. This pooled approach works by determining both import and export potential 
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determined. These two are normalized using something. Armington elasticities are also 
important in identifying and determining longer term patterns of trade (1969). 
 
Figure 73:  Global Exports as a Percentage of GDP - History and Forecast 
To forecast the impact of trade on Kantian Liberalism, I use a measure of imports 
and exports of goods and services divided by country GDP. This is used in previous 
approaches to evaluate the impact of Kantian Liberalism (Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 
2003; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Russett 2001). Historically, the distribution of this 
has grown from less than 5% of GDP in 1960 to nearly 70% in the early 21st century. 
IR Liberalism:  Dyadic Kantian Liberal Index 
As argued above, Kantian Liberalism has been on the march historically, and we 
forecast this to continue across time. In the base year, 13 percent of all dyads scored one 
standard deviation below the mean for the Dyadic Kantian Index indicating that they 
were very illiberal pairs of states. By 2025, only 2.5 percent of all dyads scored one 
standard deviation below the mean. By 2050, only 32 out of 16,653 dyads—a mere 
0.2%—scored as being less than one standard deviation below the mean. The line-graph 
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Figure 74:  Dyadic Kantian Liberalism - Illiberal Dyads for Selected Years 
Aggregating dyadic scores by only averaging dyads that are internal to the 
group—the line-graph below shows strong growth across time and for World Bank 
regions. The High Income group begins with the highest level of average dyadic 
Liberalism (averaging over one standard deviation above the mean) and continues to 
grow, though with a decreasing rate, to 2050. The next two most liberal groups cluster 
together generally across the time horizon and are made up of Europe and Central Asia 
along with Latin America and Caribbean. The four groups that cluster at the bottom—
averaging around 0.5 standard deviations below the mean—are East Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, MENA and South Asia. These groups remain in the bottom four throughout the 
time-horizon, though growth patterns change. MENA moves from the bottom of the 
liberal index to the top, spurned largely from forecasts for strong economic growth and 
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value at the end of the second highest group (Europe and Central Asia) barely achieves 
the 2010 value for High Income Economies. 
 
Figure 75:  Dyadic Liberal Index:  World Bank Regions 
The dyads that remain illiberal in 2050—defined here as being more than one 
standard deviation below the mean in 2010—include the following. Of all of these dyads, 
only two are politically relevant:  Eritrea and Yemen, and Eritrea and Sudan. 
Table 8:  Most Illiberal Dyads in 2050 
Most Illiberal States in 2050:  
Organized from Most to Least 
Eritrea Myanmar 
Korea North Myanmar 
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Korea North Mauritania 
Eritrea Sudan 
 
Cultures of Interaction Index 
The Cultures of Interaction Index (CoI Index) is a measure that builds upon 
standard Kantian Liberal accounts of interdependence—focusing on trade, democracy 
and global IO memberships—to include variables calculated on a dyad-first basis. It 
measures affinity between states by measuring levels of trade relative to expected values, 




The IFs system is not able to forecast the CoI Index. This is conceptually because 
changes in the dyadic measure tend to reflect (apparently) discrete policy choices at this 
macro, long-term level of analysis instead of other underlying factors, such as income or 
development.  This is obviously an underwhelming component of this project.  However 
the creation of the CoI has put in place the foundation for the eventual forecast of 
variables that “get at” more complex interdependence and possible cultural influences in 
dyadic interaction.  See the Conclusion for more on the next-steps in this extended 
project. 
Because this variable currently cannot be forecast, it remains one major 
uncertainty moving forward. To treat this uncertainty, the Base Case of IFs takes the 
initial value of the CoI Index for countries in 2001 (the most recent data point available) 
and uses it as a constant throughout the forecast time horizon.   
I experimented with extrapolating growth rates from the last 10 years of data from 
the CoI Index, but this produced results that were unreasonable:  some countries with 
very high CoI scores saw slight declines in these last 10 years.  These slight declines in 
growth made widely understood “good” relationships to appear to deteriorate (for 
example, the Netherlands and USA experience a massive deterioration in relations over 
the next four decades using this approach). 
The CoI Index thus becomes the main scenario handle in this analysis, used 
conceptually.  In the remaining section of this dissertation I explore output from the 
model that tends demonstrates that some relationships are forecast to improve while 
others are forecast to deteriorate.  A policy-oriented conclusion is that, to avoid 
deterioration to the point of conflict, leaders should focus on aligning foreign policy 
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along the lines of the sub-components of the CoI Index.  Immediately below is the line 




Figure 76:  CoI Index for World Bank Regions 
The average country CoI with the rest of the world has a strong relationship (0.54 
r^2) with the natural log of the historic relative material power measure (the main 
component of the Realist Index score.  This indicates that countries that have higher 
levels of material power also have both the resources and incentive to project that abroad.  
The cross-sectional plot demonstrates this, below. 
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CoI Index Forecast - World Bank Regions 
 
Year 
2013 2017 2021 2025 2029 2033 2037 2041 2045 2049 
East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and Caribbean 





Figure 77:  Average CoI Score for Countries and World verses Natural Log of Relative Material Power 
This relationship produces an expected value for the overall culture that a country 
fosters within the IR space. Countries that produce much higher scores relative to what 
we expect can be thought of as “punching above their weight”. The table below 
highlights the 10 countries that punch most “above their weight” and those that most 
poorly perform in their average CoI score compared with what we would expect based on 
their relative material power.
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Table 9:  Which Countries Punch Above their Weight? 
CoI verses Material Power:  Who Punches Above their 
Weight? 
Top 10 Countries Worst 10 Countries 
Belgium Korea North 
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 The regression used to calculate expected values was taken from the following equation:   
Expected CoI Average Index Score = (0.0064*(LN Relative Historic Power^2)+(0.1833* LN Relative Historic Power) 
+ 0.9071 
The following countries that lack full internationally recognized sovereignty were excluded from this 
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If I did treat the CoI with extrapolate growth rates, negative rates would apply to 
1,324 dyads. This represents less than 8% of the total dyads in the distribution and 
indicates that this percentage of dyads experienced deterioration in their CoI score 
between 1991 and 2001. Samples from dyads that experience negative growth highlight 
the limits of a pure extrapolative method over more than sixteen thousand samples. Many 
of the dyads that drop had very high CoI scores and showed stagnation across the last 
decade of the 20
th
 century, and a very slight decline.  This decline over a 40 year time 
horizon—even if slight—produces large negative scores that are implausible, and skews 
forecast results.   
Integrating IR Theory:   
 I argued in Chapter 4 that an integrated approach to doing international relations 
analysis should provide more insight in explaining behavior in the international system 
than using any theory in isolation. In Chapter 5 I used logistic regressions and large-n 
data analysis to show that adding up indices representing Realism, Liberalism and 
Cultures of Interaction produced a better statistical fit to the historic occurrence of 
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international conflict than either of these indices alone, thus giving credence to my claims 
in Chapter 4.  This final section of Chapter 6 shows the final output of this analysis. 
 The Integrated IR Index score represents endogenously forecast values for the 
Liberal Index and the Realist Index from 2010 to 2050.  It is also initialized with 2001 
values of the CoI Index, which are kept constant across time.  Changes in the index 
reflect changes in Realism and Liberalism within the dyad.  The entire analysis hinges on 
the following interaction:  is interdependence and culture a more powerful driver of the 
character of bilateral relations than pressure stemming from material resources over the 
next 40 years? Which dyads are most likely to see a downward pressure on the quality of 
their relationship, and how much of an increase in the CoI Index would be needed to off-
set this? 
 Overall, the integrated IR index grows over time. Regional scores for the 
Integrated IR Index also increase steadily across time.  This is shown in the line graph 
below using World Bank regional grouping scores (the average score of each dyad within 
the grouping with the rest of the world).
54
 This is not un-expected behavior, as these 
average scores do not measure political relevance. As Realist pressure remains generally 
stagnant at this level of analysis, the growth in Liberalism helps to drive this forward.  
Macro-level analysis of this measure belies the possible occurrence of conflict at lower 
levels of analysis. 
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 The line graph below shows three time periods and the change in dyadic IR 
scores. Each point represents a dyad-year score for 2010, 2025 and 2050 sorted from 
most conflictual (to the left) to most convivial (to the right). The overall trend in 
international relations is a shift to more cooperative relations, though challenges persist. 
The dyads on the far left of the plot—those with the most conflictual relations—continue 
to have very low scores, some nearly five standard deviations below the world average 
score in 2010 out to 2050. Thus, even though the majority of dyads improve the character 
of their relations over time, there will still be a handful that—even driven by a generally 
rosy scenario like the Base Case in IFs—are likely to experience structural pressure on 
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Figure 79:  Full Distribution of Integrated IR Theories, 2010, 2025 and 2050 
 Individual country scores show some states to have generally more strained 
overall relations than others. The table below shows the dyads with the lowest scores for 
2010, 2025 and 2050 for the Integrated IR index that are politically relevant ranked from 
lowest IR Index score at the top. The pairs of states on this list tend to be illiberal, have 
poor cultures of interaction and share much material power parity. Moving across time, 
many of the usual suspects remain with very poor relations. These results are less 
insightful for policy prescription, but further validation that the approach to modeling is 
successful. 
Table 10:  Dyads with Lowest Overall IR Index Score for 2010, 2025 and 2050 
Lowest Integrated IR Scores for Politically Relevant Dyads in Select Years 
2010 2025 2050 
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 Other states have overall Integrated IR scores that are extremely high.  These 
states tend to be small and deeply embedded in international political systems through 
trade and membership in international organizations (and increasingly through 
improvements in domestic decision-making inclusion).  These states, like Luxembourg, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, also have few enemies, and generally have very low Realist 
pressure scores. The table below shows the top 5 dyads for each time period as well.  
Again, these results are less relevant for policy prescription, but an additional validation 
of the model performance across time. 
Table 11:  Dyads with Highest Overall IR Index Score for 2010, 2025 and 2050 
Highest Integrated IR Index Dyads - Select Years 
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2010 2025 2050 
Netherlands Luxembourg Singapore Hong Kong Singapore Hong Kong 
Luxembourg Hungary Netherlands Luxembourg Luxembourg Hong Kong 
Luxembourg Finland Luxembourg Hong Kong Netherlands Luxembourg 
Slovak Rep Luxembourg Singapore Luxembourg Singapore Luxembourg 
Luxembourg Italy Luxembourg Hungary Russia Luxembourg 
 
 Across the full time horizon not one state experiences a deterioration in their 
average Integrated IR index score with all other countries between 2010 and 2050.  This 
is caused by the massive increase in Liberalism which offsets any build-up in negative 
pressure from Realism. However, average country-level Integrated IR scores can be 
misleading. In many cases one country only experiences deterioration in Realist pressure 
with only one other country and an improvement in Liberalism more generally with many 
other politically non-relevant dyads. Because of the mitigating impact of averaging across 
all dyads, it is useful to also identify those dyads that do experience an overall 
deterioration in their Integrated IR Index scores between 2010 and 2050.  These pairs of 
states are those where improvements in interdependence do not off-set the deterioration 
of impacts from Realist pressure. 
 The table below shows the politically relevant dyads with an overall deterioration 
in their Integrated IR scores between 2010 and 2050 along with the dyad scores for sub-
indices for 2050. The list is small, and is made up of a range of Great Power dyads and 
non-Great Power dyads.  The greatest deterioration comes between Japan and Nigeria, 
who see their dyadic score drop 0.85 standard deviations in the 40 year time horizon.  
This is due to the relative decline in Japanese material power and the rise in Nigeria.  
Japan begins the time horizon with just less than 5% of the world's material resources and 
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ends with 2.3%.  Nigeria begins in 2010 with only 0.8% of material power and grows to 
just under 2%.  This shift places both countries on the threshold of Great Power status 
(with Japan almost losing it, and Nigeria almost gaining it).  This, coupled with slow 
improvements in Liberalism in Nigeria, produce a deteriorated dyadic IR score. The 
second largest reduction in the IR score is between the US and India, which sees an 
overall drop in their Integrated IR score of 0.66 standard deviations from 2010 to 2050.  
This is due to the dramatic convergence between the countries in their Realist index 
score, and their already relatively high levels of Liberalism. Below I discuss this dyad in 
more detail.  Other dyads on this list experience increases in relative material parity with 
already high levels of global interdependence (Algeria - Italy and Algeria - Spain), or 
increases in power parity with low levels of Liberalism (Mauritania - Algeria, Nigeria - 
Brazil).  The reductions in these dyads assume that CoI Index scores remain the same in 
2010.  Each of these reductions can be ameliorated through an improvement in the CoI in 
a dyad. 












2050 2050 2050 2050 
2010-
2050 
Nigeria Brazil 1.7575 -4.301 0.759 -1.7845 -0.143 
USA India 1.7849 -4.961 0.798 -2.3781 -0.664 
Spain Algeria 1.909 -3.783 1.337 -0.537 -0.165 
Italy Algeria 1.8993 -3.375 1.314 -0.1617 -0.112 
Nigeria Japan 1.6563 -4.494 0.867 -1.9707 -0.85 




 The evaluative techniques used above help to highlight the relative quality of the 
model used (results are largely intuitive) as well as some important stylized facts (overall, 
relations are getting better but a handful remain highly problematic. This is useful, but 
only scratches the surface of the utility of a tool like the one created in this dissertation 
project. Each of these indices can be explored for any dyad under any scenario (say, 
greater BRICs growth, or faster reductions in fertility rates, for example). A full ranging 
analysis would involve nearly an infinite number of uncertainties to model. Instead of 
going down this path, the remainder of this chapter assessed various dyads and regions to 
explore the implications for conflict over the next 40 years. 
 The three countries of the emerging global high table—China, India and the US—
each have dyadic interactions that pose challenges across this time horizon.  The line 
graph below explores this interaction for the US and China using the three sub-indices 
created in this project along with the composite index.  The CoI Index score is stable 
across time and fixed at the 2010 global mean for this measure.  The Liberal Index score 
begins well below the global mean in 2010, then achieves this by 2030 and advances 
beyond this to the end of the time horizon.  The Realist Index score is quite low, and 
declines to the middle of the time horizon and then begins to increase, as this is when 
China passes the US and becomes the global material power leader.  The Integrated 
Index—the measure that performed better than any of the sub-measures combined in my 
statistical analysis in Chapter 5—shows a relatively flat trend across time. There is a 




Figure 80:  Forecast for China - US for Sub Indices and Overall Index 
 This lack of massive decline in the Integrated Index between the US and China 
may seem to be a good thing.  Note the overall score in the graph above and compare it 
with Figure 79 showing the distribution of all dyads across the time horizon.  A score 
ranging between -5 and -3.5 is very low, in fact, and indicates a relationship that could 
quickly enter into a vicious cycle resulting in heightened tension between the states.  This 
may or may not lead to conflict across time. The policy recommendation for this 
relationship is to conscientiously work at increasing the culture of interaction between the 
two states. 
 A similar story can be told by looking at the line graph relationship between 
China and India.  here we see a similar level of CoI between the dyads across time, a 
similar Liberal Index increase in the first half of the time horizon but a more stagnant 
Realist Index score.  This leads to an Integrated Index score that is absolutely very low 
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slightly increases across time. The policy recommendation for this dyad is to also find 
ways to increase and improve the culture of interaction in order to avoid a protracted 
conflict. 
 
Figure 81:  Forecast for China - India for Sub Indices and Overall Index 
The simple insight is that, in dyads where there are high levels of Realist pressure, 
both Liberalism and CoI play an instrumental part in improving the overall relationship. 
Two states that have high level of Realist pressure but more convivial relations are the 
US and Japan.  Their relationship is shown in the line graph below.  Here, there is a much 
higher CoI Index score that brings the overall Integrated IR index score up to a range that 
is much closer to the global mean across time, and more likely to produce a relationship 
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Figure 82:  Forecast for Japan - US for Sub Indices and Overall Index 
While the China - US and China - India score is dangerously low (and remains 
fairly low across the time horizon), the India - US score experiences a deterioration 
across the forecast horizon (as noted above in Table 12).  This reduction does not occur 
immediately, but takes place after the first third of the time horizon as India's material 
power is forecast to grow considerably.  The line-graph below demonstrates this 
dynamic.  The policy take-away for this relationship is that, while the dyad enjoys a high 
CoI Index score in the base year and a rising Liberal Index score across the time horizon, 
care must be taken to further bring policies in line and orchestrate a culture of interaction 
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Figure 83:  Forecast for India - US for Sub Indices and Overall Index 
The previous analysis explored the three major players at the global High Table 
over the next forty years.  It argued that much work remained to be done to bring policies 
in line in order to avoid a potential conflict (be that a direct conflict, or a proxy conflict 
ala the Cold War).  The two dyads most in danger were the China - India and China - US 
with the India - US dyad also remaining vulnerable to a future conflict if the culture of 
interaction was not improved. 
 This analysis now moves to regional dynamics by exploring regional dynamics 
related to the Integrated IR Index.  The first is the Middle-East.  The line-graph below 
shows the relationships between Iran and selected Middle-East countries.  It shows a 
similar pattern of growth seen in many areas, indicating that there is the prospect for 
improved relations across time, though problems are likely to persist.  The lowest score in 
this graph is in the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a well-understood 
dynamic in regional power dynamics, though this does increase considerably in the first 
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a reflection of close ties (through Hezbollah, for example) that only grows more strongly 
across time.  Iran and Iraq have strained relations, but these are forecast to improve with 
time as well. 
 
Figure 84:  Integrated IR Index for Iran - Selected Countries 
Another obvious country to evaluate using this approach is Israel and her 
relationship with the broader Middle-East.  The line-graph below does this for selected 
countries.  It shows that Israel has very poor relations with Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, 
though it shows improved relations with Iran and Iraq, both because Israel and these 
countries are not considered to be politically relevant dyads due to their lack of contiguity 
and Great Power status.  This is a short-coming of this approach to analysis, and is slated 
to be improved with follow-up work.  See the Conclusion for more information.  For 
Israel's long-term perspective, the very low relations with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon are 
particularly concerning.  While Liberalism increases in these dyads, it is barely enough to 
offset very low CoI Index scores and changing Realism. While policy prescription in this 
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finding more areas of alignment (certainly around the issue of Palestine) should continue 
to be at the heart of foreign policy. 
 
Figure 85:  Integrated IR Index for Israel - Select Countries 
 Central Asia experiences a rapid power transition between Turkmenistan and her 
neighbors (identified in the section on the Base Case of Realism, above).  This leads to 
some Integrated IR Index scores that reduce in the Base Case.  The line-graph below 
documents key relationships for Kazakhstan—the current material power leader in the 
region—and select neighbors. Even with strong growth in Liberalism through gas exports 
in Turkmenistan, this relationship drops in the middle of the time horizon, though it does 
not drop to the nadir of the relationship between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This is 





Figure 86:  Integrated IR Index for Kazakhstan - Selected Countries 
 Moving to South Asia, India has relations with its neighbors that are generally 
strained.  The initial condition for the Integrated IR Index shows India to have generally 
poor relations with China and Myanmar, and slightly better relations with many of its 
other neighbors.  That said, these improved relations are still generally at absolutely poor 
levels (generally below one standard deviation below the mean, except for Sri Lanka).  
Surprisingly, the relationship between India and Pakistan is shown to be of higher quality 
than many would expect (still, more than 1.5 standard deviations below the mean).  This 
is largely due to their CoI Index starting point, which reflects concerted efforts on the 




Figure 88:  Integrated IR Index for India - Selected Countries 
Moving further South East, the line-graph below tracks the relationship between 
Indonesia and some of her neighbors.  The two countries with the lowest relations by the 
Integrated IR Index approach are Australia and Vietnam.  Both are considered to be 
politically relevant and have similar (though not as much) relative power as Indonesia.  
Also, both have experienced strained relations.  Australia and Indonesia have had conflict 
surrounding terrorism (the Bali bombing, for example) and domestic policy decisions (the 
treatment of succession by East Timor). The strongest relationship is with Singapore due 
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Figure 89:  Integrated IR Index for Indonesia - Selected Countries 
China's relations with neighbors are generally poor due to low levels of 
Liberalism and CoI scores.  The line-graph below shows this.  It demonstrates that 
relations generally improve, except for the US early in the time horizon and India late in 
the time horizon.  Even by 2050, though, none of the dyads in the graph below reach the 
global mean in 2010 (though Russia comes close).
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Traveling across the Pacific to South America, Brazil generally has better 
relations with her neighbors than many of the countries explored above.  The line-graph 
above shows Brazil with fairly deteriorated relationships with both Colombia and 
Venezuela, but these are both less than two standard deviations below the mean (see 
China above for a comparison) and increase rapidly.  Other key partnership in that 
neighborhood also experience extended growth. 
 
Figure 91:  Integrated IR Indices for Brazil - Selected Countries 
 Moving again across the ocean to the East, Nigeria enjoys positive relations with 
the other great powers of Africa (Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa) but more deteriorated 
relationships with their immediate neighbors. That said, the absolute value of the lowest 
score (1.5 standard deviations below the mean in 2010 for Cameroon) is the quality of 
relationship expected between China and Vietnam in 40 years (see Figure 89). The 
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bubble demonstrated in the line-graph below is the impact of peak oil on Nigerian 
Liberalism (major declines in overall exports), though relations still do not fall to the 
level of 2010. 
 
Figure 92:  Integrated IR Index for Nigeria - Select Countries 
Conclusion 
 This chapter represents the culmination of the work of this project in building a 
model that forecasts IR theory to 2050. The final section—producing analysis of dyadic 
behavior, regional behavior and Great Power behavior—has demonstrated some of the 
capabilities of this tool. While demonstrating capabilities, it has just scratched the surface 
in terms of their exhaustion.  Further analysis on the IR indices needs to be done taking 
into consideration scenarios around the Base Case of IFs, further and more nuanced 
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7.  Extending the Analysis:  Analyzing Structural Change Related to 
Dyadic Conflict to 2050 
Introduction 
 Modeling IR theory provides a starting-point for thinking systematically about 
how dyadic relations are forecast to change across time. However, exploring Realist, 
Liberal and cultural drivers also likely misses important structural shifts and pressures 
within the international system. This chapter moves beyond a singular focus on IR and 
considers other drivers of change in dyadic relations across time. 
 The Base Case forecast described in Chapter 6 is generally positive:  even with 
the stock of cultural interaction remaining at 2010 values, interdependence from 
Liberalism continues to grow and outstrips negative pressures from Realism. However, 
this positive development could be derailed by shifts in resource availability and other 
structural transitions in the international system. The deeper drivers of the character of 
state behavior explored in this chapter are the following:  dwindling global production of 
fossil fuel, changes in fresh water resource availability and the impact of state fragility. 
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 Conceptually, the Deep Drivers of state behavior operate directly on the IR 
indices explored in Chapter 6 as well as directly on the character of dyadic interaction 
first introduced in Chapter 1. The diagram below illustrates this. The forecast in Chapter 
6 already considered the three left-most arrows in this diagram, as the impacts of future 
structural changes are endogenized within the IFs system. However, the long arrow 
showing the connection between the Deep Drivers and the Character of Dyadic 
Interaction was not represented in Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 93:  Conceptual Relationship between Deep Drivers of State Behavior, IR Indices and Character of State 
Behavior 
 The most interesting question answered by this type of analysis is whether 
structural changes in the international system—coupled with pressures arising from 
changes in the distribution of relative material power—have the real possibility of 
derailing the overall gains in stocks of interdependence and cooperative culture. This 
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chapter does not make any definitive conclusions to that end. However, this project has 
put in place the foundational pieces that can eventually lead to a more thorough 
evaluation of that question. 
 I conclude that pressures from Water Resources are likely to increase for specific 
dyads across the Middle East and Central Asia over the next four decades. Disruptive 
pressure arising from State Fragility is likely to decline across all politically relevant 
dyads, though specific pairs of states will continue to experience poor relations because 
of this driver of conflict. Finally, pressure arising from Fossil Fuel resources is likely to 
increase for some Great Powers and states with very large overall reserves.  
Fresh Water Resources 
Fresh water resources are a fundamental component of human development. As 
these water resources become increasingly stressed by overuse, aquifers will be drawn 
down, and countries that share river basins will increasingly see water resources cloud 
foreign policy decision-making. It is the goal of this section to highlight which dyads are 
most likely to experience these pressures. 
Water resource data is initialized in the IFs model using AQUASTAT data (FAO 
AQUASTAT 2012). Water use per capita—the distal driver of water use in IFs—is 
calculated using an equation that considers both agricultural production (as a proxy for 
the amount of irrigated land) and the overall size of the population. Water use per capita 
is multiplied by overall population to calculate overall water use. This is divided by the 
net amount of freshwater entering a country in a given year. 
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If countries use up to 20 percent of the net freshwater in a given year they are 
considered to be water stressed (United Nations Environment Programme 2007). The 
largest regional use of fresh water as a percentage of renewable resources occurs in 
Northern Africa, where 2010 values show that nearly 80 percent of freshwater reserves 
are being used on an annual basis. This number grows beyond 100 percent over the 
coming three decades, indicating that water use in this region will begin drawing down 
aquifers, that fresh water resources will be imported or that desalination processes will be 
used to produce the resource. The second highest fresh water use as a percent of 
renewable resources is the Middle East. Certain countries (such as Kuwait) currently use 
well above their annual freshwater reserves and actively import water or produce 
freshwater through desalination. 
The two maps below trace water stress levels for the 183 countries modeled in IFs 
for 2010 and 2050. First, in 2010, water stress is largely measured in the Middle East and 
North Africa, with notable additions in North America, Europe, East Asia and Southern 
Africa.  
 
Figure 94:  States Experiencing Water Stress – 2010 
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By 2050, water stress levels have expanded considerably. This Base Case forecast 
has water stress levels stretching from the Western Sahara to Japan. Countries that share 
river basins and experience water stress are more likely to consider water resource issues 
in foreign policy decision-making. High levels of up-stream water use (such as in the 
Colorado River in the USA) have negative implications on down-stream water 
availability and pollution levels. By 2050, 56 countries experience water stress. See 




Figure 95:  States Experiencing Water Stress 2050 
To measure the Dyadic Realist Index score for water resources, the first 
algorithmic component was a measure of whether the two parties shared a river basin. 
Shared river basin data was taken from the work of researchers at Peace Research 
Institute of Oslo (Brochmann and Gleditsch 2006; Furlong, Petter Gleditsch, and Hegre 
2006). Next, the IFs model measured the shared level of water stress, across the dyad. If 
the level was above 20 percent, the model took that to be the lowest threshold for 
identifying dyadic pressure related to water. In 2010 it took the upper bound of the 
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threshold to be the dyad with the highest level of water stress. The global average Dyadic 
Realist Index score for water shows an absolute decline across time. This corresponds 
with increased levels of fresh water use as a percentage of renewable water. 
Taking country average scores with the world for the Dyadic Index for water 
resources demonstrates which states are likely to see water resources play an increasing 
role in their foreign policy making across relationships. Those countries with a 0.1 
standard deviation deterioration in their relationship or more are listed in the table below 
ordered from greatest absolute change to least. Notably, much of this increase in water 
stress occurs in Central Asia. 










Afghanistan -0.309 -0.539 
Iran -0.304 -0.582 
Sudan -0.25 -0.511 
Iraq -0.204 -0.739 
Pakistan -0.175 -0.227 
Tajikistan -0.161 -0.376 
Turkey -0.148 -0.292 
China -0.142 -0.193 
Turkmenistan -0.137 -0.429 
Syria -0.127 -0.463 
Kyrgyzstan -0.123 -0.277 
Kazakhstan -0.11 -0.244 




 The table above provides an overview of the importance of relative water 
resources on a country basis. Moving down to a deeper level of granularity highlights 
specific relationships that are likely to experience increased pressures arrising from water 
resources. These dyads tend to be in areas that are less developed and include many pairs 
of states where relationships are already tense. The 10 greatest overall deteriorations in 
the dyadic measure of pressure occurs in the following pairs of states: 
Table 14:  Top 10 Dyads with Deteriorated Scores for Water Pressure 
Top 10 Dyads with 













Using the same logic as I tested in Chapter 5, I argue that measuring pressure 
from water useage but not considering any other theoretical driver of the character of 
dyadic interaction is misleading. Water stress between highly Liberal dyads in Europe is 
unlikely to lead to serious conflict; water stress between Syria and Israel is likely 
exaserbated by their character of interaction. I therefore take the dyadic water stress score 
and add it to the Integrated IR Index score. The table below highlights dyads with the 
lowest overall scores for the Integrated IR Index and Water Stress in 2025 and 2050. 
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Table 15:  Worst Dyadic Scores for Water plus Integrated IR Index in Selected Years 
Worst Dyadic Scores for Water plus Integrated IR 
Index in Selected Years 
2025 2050 
Afghanistan Uzbekistan Afghanistan Uzbekistan 
Israel Syria Afghanistan Tajikistan 
Libya Niger Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Oman Yemen Israel Syria 
Tajikistan Uzbekistan Egypt Sudan 
Chad Libya Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Egypt Israel Iraq Syria 
Jordan Syria Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Egypt Israel 
Egypt Sudan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan 
 
These dyads are concentrated in the Middle East, Central Asia and North-West 
Africa. Many of these dyads have a very poor character of interaction already which is 
likely to be exaserbated over time, such as Isreal and Syria or Egypt and Israel. Other 
dyads are not on most foreign policy radars, such as Central Asia which is likely to 
experience extended pressure from increased used of fresh water from a large agriculture 
sector. This shift, coupled with a large regional transition in material power resources 
(the rise of Turkmenistan, as discussed in Chapter 6) could lead to a situation where 
changes made to the Amu River could drive concerns regarding the Aral Sea bringing 
various groups into a conflictual situation. 
Specific dyads are likley to experience deterioration in their Integrated IR Index 
coupled with water stress, but this is not the case for the majority of dyads across time. 
The line-graph below demonstrates this by taking all dyad scores for 2010, 2025 and 
2050 and exploring their distribution when sorted from worst to best scores (left to right). 
The overall trend is a positive shift up in relationships across these time horizons for well 
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over 95% of dyads. However, as indicates in the small number of dyads with very poor 
scores to the far left, even in 2050 dyads will remain with overall IR indices coupled with 
water stress that are quite poor. The overall shift in imporvement across dyads does, 
however, lend credence to the idea that water stress is unlikely to undermine increases in 
overall interdependence and improvements to the overall stock of culture in the 
international system. 
 
Figure 96:  Dyadic Integrated IR Scores with Water Resources - Selected Years 
State Fragility 
Domestic instability in one country can lead to conflict across countries for one of 
two reasons. First, there are wars of distraction, which occur when the country 
experiencing domestic instability attempts to attack their neighbor to unify the country 
around a common enemy (that is not the domestic power structure). An example of this 
kind of conflict occurred between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s when Saddam Hussein 
attacked his neighbor, in part, to unify is fractured country.  
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The second way that state fragility can lead to international conflict occurs when 
the more stable neighbor state intervenes in the more unstable neighbor to produce 
stability. Take, for example, the various incursions into Somalia from her neighbors in 
recent years. Kenya recently engaged in bombing exercises, Ethiopia sent troops, etc. It is 
not just neighbor states who engage in this type of behavior. Great Powers are also prone 
to intervene in failing states in order to produce stability to protect interests, resources 
and promote international norms. See, for example, the recent intervention in Libya, 
condoned and actuated by Great Powers. 
There exist two general approaches to measuring domestic instability. The first is 
a probabilistic approach that fits the historic occurrence of instability (be that civil war, 
abrupt regime change, genocide or revolution) to a statistical model. The most notable 
example of this approach to measuring the occurrence of conflict is the Political 
Instability Task Force (previously the State Failure Task Force). They found that a simple 
probabilistic model of the occurrence of conflict could be made with four driving 
variables:  neighborhood effects, levels of international trade, infant mortality and degree 
of regime anocracy.  
The second approach to measuring domestic instability does not find the best fit 
statistically to the historic occurrence of domestic conflict. Instead, it takes theoretically 
salient categories and uses them to create an index measure of how unstable a country is. 
These categories typically include a measure of economic performance, demographic 
constraints, government character and the historic occurrence of conflict. 
Both probabilistic and index measures of domestic instability are useful for 
exploring the future of domestic conflict. Probabilistic measures tend to emphasize a 
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handful of countries being highly prone to the occurrence of conflict, as demonstrated in 
the line-graph below in the blue line. Index measures of domestic conflict, on the other 
hand, tend to see domestic instability as being a characteristic of governance that changes 
at different levels of development. This can be seen below in the linear distribution of the 
George Mason index of state fragility below, the red line. 
 
Figure 97:  Index verses Probabilistic Measures - State Fragility 
It may seem, prima facie, that the probabilistic measure of conflict would be a 
better determinant of the future occurrence of conflict. This has not proven to be the case. 
For example, see the table below which shows the country ranking for the Maryland 
Conflict and Peace Instability Ledger (a probabilistic measure) (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and 
Gurr 2010) and the George Mason State Fragility Index (an index measure) (M. Marshall 
and Cole 2009). In comparing the rankings of five Arab countries that experienced 
domestic instability in 2011, the measure that performs better consistently is from George 
Mason based on their country ranking. George Mason ranks all five countries below as 
























































































































though the later measure is based on a statistical model fit to the historic occurrence of 
conflict. 
Table 16:  Ranking Arab Spring Countries by Probabilistic and Index Approaches 
Ranking of Select Arab Spring Countries for Two Measures of Domestic 
Instability:  Higher Number More Unstable 
 
George Mason State 
Fragility Index, 2009 
Maryland Conflict and Peace 










Libya 95 115 
Bahrain 117 132 
 
This is likely to be a product of the (apparently) discrete nature of the occurrence 
of conflict. An incredibly small percentage of total possible dyad-years or country-years 
ever experience conflict (either domestically or internationally). Those that do may 
cluster around a series of events that have similar driving variables (such as the extreme 
democratic deficit experienced throughout the Arab world in 2011 coupled with cheap 
and widely distributed technology).  
For this reason I use the Government Risk Index in the IFs system to 
operationalize the Dyadic Realist Index related to State Fragility. The Government Risk 
Index is constructed using the same logic used in the construction of the George Mason 
State Fragility Index in that it identifies a series of conceptually relevant categories of 
variables related to domestic instability and operationalizes these categories. The table 
below outlines the sub-components and categories of the Government Risk Index. 
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Table 17:  Components of IFs Government Risk Index 









Perceived levels of corruption in country 
initialized with Transparency International 
data 
Effectiveness 
Measure of Governance Effectiveness 
initialized with World Bank Governance 
Matters data. 
Democracy 
Measure of regime type:  either more 
autocratic or more democratic initialized 
with Polity Project data. 
Freedom 
Measure of economic freedom within a 
country initialized with Fraser Institute data. 
Security 
Instability 
Aggregate measure taken from Major 
Episodes of Political Violence 
Internal War 
Aggregate measure taken from Major 
Episodes of Political Violence 
Economy 
Poverty 
The number of people living on less than 
1.25 USD per day, initialized with World 
Bank data. 
Inequality 
The distribution of income in a country, 




Percentage of exports that come from 
energy, initialized from various sources. 
Rate of Per 
Capita GDP 
Growth 
GDP divided by population and the rate of 





Number of children dying in their first year 
of life per 1,000, initialized with World 
Health Organization data. 
Life 
Expectancy 
Number of years of average life at birth in a 
given year, initialized with World Health 
Organization data. 
Malnutrition 
Percentage of people who suffer from 
malnutrition, considering both quality and 
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quantity of caloric intake, initialized with 
World Health Organization data. 
HIV Prevalence 
Percent of population with HIV/AIDS, 





Percent of eligible students who attend 





Average number of years spent in formal 
education for a person aged 15 and above, 
initialized with UNESCO data. 
Population 
Youth Bulge 
Percent of the population aged 15-29 as a 
share of total adult population, initialized 
with United Nations data. 
Elderly Bulge 
Percent of the population above 65 years as a 
share of total adult population, initialized 
with United Nations data. 
Urbanization 
Rate 
Percent of the total population that migrates 
to urban areas, initialized with United 
Nations data. 
Environment 




Percent of fresh water resources used in a 




Percent change in agricultural yields relative 
to 1990 levels stemming from climate 
change (change in temperature and 
precipitation along with carbon fertilization) 
initialized from various sources. 
 
To take the above sub-components and calculate the Government Risk Index, 
each sub-measure is indexed. This is the process of dividing the current value of a 
country by the upper threshold for all countries across time. Next, each of the sub-index 
values are averaged. 
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In general terms, the Government Risk Index is forecasted in the Base Case to 
improve across time. The line graph below demonstrates the behavior of this index for 
World Bank regions. Here, lower levels indicate more domestic stability. High income 
countries—the grey line at the bottom—are the most stable across time, with the next 
closest region—Latin American and the Caribbean—not achieving their level of stability 
in 2010 even by 2050. The world average improves by nearly 16% across this time 
horizon. In terms of relative improvement, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa both 
improve their domestic security relatively more quickly than either the Middle East and 
North Africa or East Asia. 
 
Figure 98:  Government Risk Index Scores - World Bank Regions 
Across the entire forty year time horizon, there is not one country whose 2050 
value exceeds its 2010 value, indicating that all countries improve in stability. The 
countries that experience the smallest improvement in their domestic security are forecast 
to experience future problems, including large increases in elderly populations, low rates 
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countries that improve the least—in absolute terms—are New Zealand, Spain, Barbados, 
Cyprus and Portugal. Other countries improve their domestic stability situation 
significantly. Angola shows the greatest improvement in the forecast reducing their value 
from the fourth most unstable in 2010 to the average for East Asia and the Pacific in 
2050. Nigeria, Mozambique and India also are forecast to greatly improve their domestic 
security situations. 
The trends in the Governance Risk Index at the country level are also seen at the 
dyad-level. When comparing the average Dyadic Realist Index score for each country 
and the world (without considering the impact of Great Powers), 37 countries have an 
overall reduction of more than one standard deviation. The countries with the greatest 
reduction—in order—are Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Afghanistan and the Republic of 
Congo.   See Appendix 7 for a full list of state fragility forecasts to 2050 in IFs. 
Table 18:  Change in Average Dyadic Score for State Fragility 
Change in Average Dyadic Index Score for Country and World for State Fragility 
from 2010 to 2050 













in 2050 over 
2010 value 
Angola 0.539 2.517 Togo 0.021 0.386 
Nigeria 0.907 1.857 Bosnia 0.731 0.513 
Sudan -0.1 1.777 Libya 0.177 0.554 









0.688 1.608 Mauritania 0.021 0.614 







Ethiopia 0.763 1.418 Benin 0.72 0.639 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.578 1.39 Serbia 1.09 0.639 
Turkmenistan 0.561 1.299 Madagascar 0.07 0.645 
  
Including Great Powers into this analysis mirrors many of the conclusions drawn 
in the previous section regarding the Dyadic Realist Index and changes in relative power 
distributions. The Base Case of IFs forecasts that four countries will move from Great 
Power status to Non-Great Power Status out to 2050. These four—as noted above—are 
Russia, United Kingdom, France and Germany. When included in the Dyadic Realist 
Index for State Fragility, they become the four countries that, on average with the rest of 
the world, see the greatest reduction in their vulnerability to Realist pressures stemming 
from state fragility. Again, this conceptually relates to the decreased global 
responsibility—and capabilities—that keep a Non-Great Power from being unilaterally 
active in policing issues of domestic instability.  
Moving from the level of average country Dyadic Realist Index scores to the 
actual dyad scores highlights the specific dyads that are more likely to experience 
pressure stemming from domestic instability. Currently, the lowest Dyadic Realist Index 
score related to state fragility is any relevant country—those contiguous and those who 
are Great Powers—and Somalia. The next dyads at greatest pressure related to state 
fragility are those countries that score the worst on the Government Risk Index. These 
are, in order, Somalia, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Sudan. 
In 2050 the distribution of the dyads that most experience Realist pressures related to 
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domestic instability also correlate to the most unstable countries then, in order from most 
unstable, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Chad and Myanmar. 
88.3 percent of all dyads do not experience any pressure stemming from measures of 
domestic instability. These dyads are not contiguous and do not have one member that is 
a Great Power. Of the remaining 11.7 percent of dyads, no dyads experience an 
intensification in their Dyadic Realist Index score relating to State Fragility because no 
state in the Base Case of IFs shows a deterioration in their domestic political stability.  
The impact of the four falling Great Powers can be seen in those dyadic 
relationships that experience less impact from Realist pressures stemming from State 
Fragility. The four falling Great Powers see their Dyadic Realist Index scores improve 
considerably, in some cases by as much as 5 standard deviations. The y axis below is the 
absolute number of standard deviations that a dyad has changed comparing 2010 and 
2050 for the Dyadic Realist Index for State Fragility. The x-axis is a sorted number of 
dyadic observations, from least change being closest to the graph origin and most change 
further to the right. The right 35 percent of this graph shows how four falling Great 
Powers change their perception of state fragility in the international system. The higher a 
dyad scores on the y axis below, the lower the importance of state fragility in material 




Figure 99:  Integrated IR Index plus State Fragility - Selected Years for Politically Relevant Dyads 
Removing the impact of the falling Great Powers does little to change the 
generally positive forecast for domestic instability within IFs. While all dyads improve 
across time, those that improve the most correspond to those countries (discussed above) 
that show great improvement in domestic stability. These include countries like Angola, 
Nigeria and Sudan and their politically relevant dyads. Dyads that show the smallest 
improvement include Japan and Barbados, USA and Barbados and Japan and Spain. 
Again, while these three dyads improve (at the lowest, by 5 over the 2010 value) they 
improve the least. By 2050, the dyads that experience the highest level of threat from the 
Dyadic Realist Index related to State Failure reflect those states that are forecast to have 
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the worst Government Risk Index scores, discussed above. These include Somalia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad. 
Fossil Fuel Resources 
Moving through the next four decades, fossil fuel resources will continue to 
remain a fundamental input to global economic production. IFs does not forecast peak 
oil—where global production goes into steep decline—but rather a peak plateau—where 
production neither declines or increases as the cost of fossil fuel production is made less 
lucrative by renewable energy. While fossil fuels remain fundamentally important, they 
also become consolidated in the hands of fewer states. Some of these states—like Qatar 
and Turkmenistan—are likely to move from proximate players in the fossil fueled 
economy to central stars. This will shift how Great Powers interact with states with large 
fossil fuel resources in order to keep prices from becoming either too high or too low—a 
condition that would either cripple the global economy or producers.  
Currently, fossil fuels make up nearly 90% of total global energy production. This 
crucial input to the global economy comes from three sources:  natural gas, oil and coal. 
Natural gas and oil are responsible for just over 30% of total energy production, while 
coal is responsible for nearly 25%. In the Base Case, fossil fuel energy production as a 
share of total energy production declines to 2050, eventually representing nearly 60% of 
total global energy production. At this time, the three components of fossil fuels each 
represent around 20% of total energy production, a fundamental and large component to 
total production. The largest reduction in fossil fuel production comes from non-OPEC 
countries, increasing the future importance of that political association (Bielecki 2002). 
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Fossil fuels are traded on global markets. Casper Wienberger—former Secretary 
of Defense for Reagan—referred to the Middle East as the, “…umbilical cord of the free 
industrialized world” (Jhaveri 2004, 4). The implication for this is that prices are 
determined by equilibrium between global supply and demand. As no one country 
controls either supply or demand, the market for oil should be relatively stable, with no 
state having sway over the machinations of the movement of resources into our out of 
supply. 
Even though global cartels exist to control the price of oil—though none currently 
controls the price of gas—their influence tends to be mitigated by their desire for 
government revenue which necessitates keeping global energy prices at levels that 
promote global consumption. The Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) currently keeps global oil production at levels that both promote global 
economic growth (oil that is too expensive hinders growth) yet high enough to not over-
draw reserves and keep sufficient funds flowing to their domestic coffers. 
Because fossil fuels are traded on a global market they become less of a 
determinate of bilateral state relations for contiguous pairs. Think about Venezuela and 
Columbia. Decisions made in Bogota and Caracas have little to do with Venezuela’s 
large oil reserves and Columbia’s relative dearth. It is known by Columbia that—if 
Venezuela were to shut off the tap and stop trading oil bilaterally, that they could go to 
global markets to satisfy domestic energy demand.  
While fossil fuel resources do not play into decision-making for all traditionally 
defined politically relevant dyads (those with at least one Great Power and/or territorial 
contiguity), they are for those that contain a Great Power and a state with large fossil fuel 
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resources. The United States, for example, is interested in keeping the supply of oil and 
natural gas freely flowing to promote global economic growth (Barnes and Jaffe 2006). 
Countries with large oil and gas reserves are the focus of much US diplomatic 
engagement, and occasionally military action. See Yergin’s Foreign Affairs piece on the 
importance of energy security for G-8 countries (Yergin 2006; Yergin 1991).  
It is not coincidence that many have argued that fossil fuels play a role in the 
decision-making of Great Powers. Many have linked historic US foreign policy 
decisions—such as the occurrence of conflict—with a country’s level of overall fossil 
fuel resources. Most recently, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was connected to fossil fuels by 
Jhaveri, who argues that the massive existing and potential reserves of oil were a key 
driver of the decision to go to war, initially citing writing by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul 
Wolfowitz and Richard Perle from 1998 indicating that Saddam Hussein’s existence in 
power jeopardizes a large amount of fossil fuel resources (2004). Other authors speculate 
about the impact of the rise of China and their foreign policy related to fossil fuels 
(Downs 2004). 
This section measures the Dyadic Realist Index for Fossil Fuel pressures between 
dyads. It makes the claim that politically relevant dyads in this arena involve at least one 
state is a great power and the other to contain large fossil fuel reserves. It then takes the 
fossil fuel reserves of gas and oil for the most endowed partner and divides them by the 
global total. States with very high levels of fossil fuel in dyads with Great Powers will 
produce scores that indicate that fossil fuels play into material decisions taken related to 
foreign policy within that dyad. 
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IFs forecasts global energy production by six types:  oil, gas, coal, hydro, nuclear 
and renewable. The Base Case shows global production of fossil fuels to increase until 
the mid-2030s and then plateau. However, this stagnation in growth in fossil fuels occurs 
at a time when global energy production is on the incline. This is due to the massive 
increase in growth in renewable energy resources. The line-graph below demonstrates 
this massive transition in global energy production to 2050. By the end of this time 
horizon, renewable energy is forecast to provide more than twice the amount of energy 
than oil today. 
 
Figure 100:  Energy Production by Type - World 
The impressive increase in renewable energy occurs because it becomes relatively 
less costly to produce than alternatives. This is due to two things:  first, fossil fuels 
become more expensive to produce as technological improvements that reduce cost are 
out-stripped by deeper wells, less pure oil and more hazardous drilling environments. 
Second, the cost of renewable energy declines as new technologies decrease the 
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infrastructure gradually transitions from a singularly fossil fuel driven framework to a 
fossil fuel/electricity hybrid framework.  
Not only do fossil fuels remain a crucial component of global growth for the next 
four decades, but they become increasingly isolated in the hands of fewer and fewer large 
producers. Across this time horizon OPEC goes from producing 40% of the world’s total 
oil to over 70%. The three countries with the highest levels of reserves—Russia, Iran and 
Qatar—move from production today of nearly 25% of total natural gas to nearly 50% by 
2050.  
 
Figure 101:  Oil and Gas Production as Percent of World Total - Selected Groups 
An increase in the concentration of fossil fuels and their continued importance 
across the time horizon indicates that there is likely to be an increased pressure from the 
Dyadic Realist Index across time. This is not true at a global level, and for the same 
reason as discussed above:  the absolute number of Great Powers declines across this 
time horizon. Conceptually, this means that there are fewer states with the will and ability 
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Take the global average for the Dyadic Realist Index measuring fossil fuels—with 
no falling Great Powers included—demonstrates that this will be an issue of increasing 
importance across time. The line-graph below demonstrates this pressure. It remains 
relatively stagnant for the next 30 years and then begins to deteriorate. The increasing 
Realist pressure from this measure occurs in those states that remain large producers of 
oil and gas across this time horizon.  
 
Figure 102:  Dyadic Index for Fossil Fuels - World Average 
On a country-average basis, the country with the lowest global average Dyadic 
Index score for fossil fuels—indicating that these resources play into their foreign policy 
decision making more broadly than any other country, is Russia. Russia has the world’s 
largest reserves of natural gas (with more than 50% more than the second largest gas 
reserves in Iran) and also substantial reserves of oil (the world’s 7th largest reserves 
overall). They also begin the time horizon as a Great Power, thus making the size of 
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table below summarizes the top 10 countries in 2010 and 2050 for their average global 
Dyadic Index score for fossil fuels.  
Table 19:  Top 10 Dyads with Most Deteriorated Dyadic Index for Fossil Fuels 
Top 10 Dyads with 
Most Deteriorated 
Dyadic Index Score for 
Fossil Fuels between 


















The dyads where fossil fuels play the largest role are those with a member that 
has great reserves, at any point in time. The dyadic relationships that experience the 
largest amount of overall deterioration are those with one member that has a large amount 
of fossil fuel resources that are currently under-developed. Dyads with one Great Power 
and the following countries will experience an increasing importance of fossil fuel 
resources in their political decision-making:  Russia will become an increasingly 
important country for mainly natural gas, but also oil reserves. With their decline as a 
Great Power, their reserves will become an increasingly important feature of international 
274 
 
life moving forward. Saudi Arabia will become an increasingly important player in 
foreign policy decisions surrounding fossil fuel due to their massive oil reserves. Iraq—
having the second largest overall oil reserves—will also continue to be an increasingly 
important player in this realm. Qatar has huge natural gas reserves—the world’s third 
largest—but they remain only a medium-sized producer of natural gas—currently the 
world’s 10th largest. This will rectify, and Qatar will become an increasingly important 
player in the world of natural gas production, and thus an increasingly important country 
when it comes to foreign policy decisions involving fossil fuels. Finally, Turkmenistan 
will represent an increasingly important country regarding fossil fuel foreign policy 
decisions. They currently have the world’s fourth largest reserves but are the world’s 31st 




Figure 103:  Integrated IR Index plus Fossil Fuels - Selected Years Politically Relevant Dyads 
Overall Deep Drivers of State Behavior 
I combine the different Deep Driver pressures described above to highlight dyads 
and countries that experience multiple pressures. These pairs of states may be more 
vulnerable to deteriorated relations across time. The next section of this Chapter 7 brings 
these deep drivers together with the Integrated IR Index to identify the most vulnerable 
dyads to conflict in the international system moving forward in a more comprehensive 
measure. I reiterate that I am not deploying a conceptual framework for evaluating 
exactly how these deep drivers impact state behavior in isolation or conjunction.  
A key trend ameliorating negative pressure moving forward is improvements in 
vulnerability to state fragility across time. State fragility—as operationalized in this 
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project and defined earlier—is an index measure that captures general levels of human, 
social, economic, political and environmental development. For the lion’s share of the 
world’s countries these measures have been improving historically, and IFs forecasts this 
to continue for the next four decades. This general improvement in human development 
leads to an overall reduction in the chance that a state would experience a domestic 
instability event, which would lead to dyadic pressures on contiguous states and Great 
Powers. 
While there is an absolute reduction in pressure stemming from state fragility, 
concerns arising from water resources and fossil fuel resources may increase in many 
regions. This will—in certain dyads—force resource availability to be a key component 
of decision making in foreign policy. See the table below for IFs Base Case treatment of 
various deep drivers. 
Table 20:  Base Case Behavior of Various Indices Related to Deep Drivers 
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Of the over 16,653 dyad years explored in this exercise, 126 experience 
deterioration in the Deep Drivers of state behavior across the forty year time horizon 
representing 0.5 percent of the total. These 126 pairs of states represent 6.5 percent of 
politically relevant dyads (sample size of 1,944). The majority of dyads in the 
international system do not experience negative pressure stemming from changes in the 
deep drivers, discussed above, even without mitigating impacts from Liberalism and 
improvements in the stock of cooperative culture. The change in this pressure on a dyad 
basis across time is represented in the line-graph below, which organizes dyads by 
selected years from most pressure (to the left) to least (to the right). The majority of 
dyads that are politically relevant experience little to no pressure. A handful of these 
dyads (about 10 percent) experience increasing pressure. Across time, the majority of 
politically relevant dyads see reductions in these pressures. However, the lower 10 






Figure 104:  Deep Drivers of State Behavior - Politically Relevant Dyads Selected Years 
While most dyads enjoy less pressure in 2050 compared with 2010, some dyads 
are forecast to experience deteriorated relations based on the aggregation of these three 
deep drivers of state behavior between 2010 and 2050. The reduction in scores occur in 
water resources and changes in the production of fossil fuel resources as pressure from 
state fragility reduces across the time horizon (noted above). The table below lists the 64 
countries that are members in a dyad that experiences a reduction in their deep driver 
score across this time horizon along with the number of dyads that they experience a 
deteriorated interaction. The majority of these countries experience deterioration in either 
water or fossil fuel scores and not in both, and many have state fragility scores that 
improve only slightly. 
Table 21:  Dyads with Total Number of Relationships Deteriorated from 2010 to 2050 for Deep Drivers of State 
Behavior 
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Drivers of State Behavior 
Japan 16 Syria 5 Mauritania 3 Cyprus 1 
China 14 Venezuela 5 Morocco 3 Djibouti 1 
India 14 Algeria 4 Somalia 3 Eritrea 1 
Iran 12 Australia 4 Ethiopia 2 Georgia 1 
USA 12 Egypt 4 Germany 2 Lithuania 1 
Brazil 11 Kyrgyzstan 4 Israel 2 Luxembourg 1 
Iraq 10 Pakistan 4 Jordan 2 Moldova 1 
Turkmenistan 8 Spain 4 Kenya 2 Mozambique 1 
Sudan 7 Tajikistan 4 Mali 2 Myanmar 1 
Turkey 7 Uzbekistan 4 Norway 2 Nepal 1 
Afghanistan 6 Armenia 3 Swaziland 2 Netherlands 1 
Russia 6 Belgium 3 Ukraine 2 Poland 1 
Azerbaijan 5 France 3 Bangladesh 1 Tunisia 1 
Qatar 5 Italy 3 Bhutan 1 Uganda 1 




1 United Kingdom 1 
Suriname 5 Lebanon 3 Chad 1 Zimbabwe 1 
 
Many of the countries at the top of this list are Great Powers and all experience 
dyads that deteriorate because of increased pressure stemming from the centralization of 
fossil fuel production. The logic here is that changes in fossil fuel production will 
increasingly dominate some relationships (as described above). Removing Great Powers 
from the equation, however, produces a slightly different story and highlights specific 
states that are likely to experience increasing pressures from these drivers. The word 
cloud, below, takes the data presented in the table above sans Great Powers. It shows 
only countries that are members of a dyad that experience a deterioration across this time 
horizon stemming from these three drivers and the font size corresponds to the number of 
dyads in which they experience a reduction. It largely highlights dyads where state 
fragility improves only slightly and where water resources are becoming a more acute 
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issue. The countries on this list—especially those in large fonts—have historically 
experienced conflict. It is certainly worrisome to see both Iran and Iraq as two countries 
that are forecast to experience a large number of problematic dyadic relations. 
Additionally, Central Asia remains a point of concern with Turkmenistan representing a 
focal point for possible future conflict over Deep Drivers of state behavior. 
 
Figure 105:  Non-Great Powers with Deteriorated Relationships based on Three Deep Drivers of State Behavior 
- Size of Font Equals Number of Deteriorated Relationships from 2010 to 2050 
 Assessing the behavior of deep drivers of state behavior without also considering 
changes in the Integrated IR Index is misleading. In fact, the increasing pressure faced by 
the countries in the word cloud above might be entirely off-set by improvements in 
culture and increased interdependence. To more fully assess the future of interstate 
relations I combine the deep drivers with the Integrated IR Index. 
Behavior for Overall Combined Index 
The future for dyadic conflict, on a global basis, is rosy. To a large degree the 
world is becoming more interdependent in both simple and complex ways. These 
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interdependencies create space for dyads to engage in virtuous cycles of foreign policy 
that may lead to the lasting peace envisioned by Kant:  more trade leads to more shared 
IO membership and more thorough alignment of foreign policy interests in the 
international system. Historic development would also indicate that the culture of 
interstate interaction is moving towards more cooperation and away from more conflict. 
These are all good things. 
Not only are interdependencies deepening across the globe, but some negative 
pressures are also on the decline. The next four decades show a decline in foreign policy 
pressures related to material power considerations. This is based primarily on two 
powerful trends. First, there is a reduction in the number of Great Powers in the 
international system. The forecasts indicate that the falling Great Powers—Russia, 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom—no longer have the ability to exert power as 
effectively over the next 40 years. Such a reduction in the number of states with the 
capacity to exert foreign policy influence widely would lead to an absolute reduction in 
the overall amount of pressure stemming from relative material power considerations in 
foreign policy decision making. 
Additionally, international pressure stemming from domestic instability—leading 
to wars of opportunity (Iran and Iraq in the 1980s) or wars of neighborhood or 
international stability (Kenya and Somalia in 2012, or the US and Somalia in the 
1990s)—are forecast to decline substantially. Domestic instability events have been on 
the decline since the end of the Cold War, and I expect this transition to continue, driven 
largely by increased levels of education, health and income.  
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While the forecast for international conflict is generally positive, there are 
exceptions. Some pressures persist—either stemming from the Realist Index or Deeper 
Drivers explored in this chapter—and even intensify. First, the global shift from a 
unipolar world with multiple second-tier Great Powers to a world of three first tier Great 
Powers and two second tier Great Powers could lead to conflict. There is great 
uncertainty surrounding the rise of China and India and whether and how it will lead to 
shifting alliances and new proxy-conflicts, ala the Cold War. Second, other global power 
transitions may lead to conflict in specific regions. In Central Asia, Turkmenistan is 
forecast to grow significantly supported by very large natural gas reserves. Currently one 
of the smaller powers in the region, it is likely to grow into one of the largest over the 
next four decades. Shifts in material power concentrations can upset former patterns of 
foreign policy interaction and can lead to conflict. 
In certain regions water resources are becoming scarcer, and this could lead to 
conflict. Currently, levels of water stress are highest across the Arabian Peninsula, with 
many countries and dyads already drawing down water tables and importing fresh water. 
Pressures in these dyads are forecast to continue to increase. The largest new threat from 
water resources in dyads that share river basins comes in Central Asia, South Asia, 
North-East Africa and parts of the Middle East. Fossil fuels will also continue to play a 
critical role in the future of dyadic international relations. While renewable energy is 
forecast to grow into a (if not the) critical source of global energy demands, fossil fuels 
will remain available and cost-competitive for certain activities (such as space travel or 
jet flight, among manufacturing and fertilizer use). While many states will pump away 
their fossil fuels over the next two decades, states with large reserves will remain 
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crucially important—even relatively more important than they are today—when it comes 
to energy production. 
The final output of this project is a measure of the overall threat that a dyad 
experiences in any year. This is a simple aggregation of Kantian Liberal, Cultures of 
Interaction, Realist, Fossil Fuel, State Fragility and Water Resource Indices. The three 
curves in the line-graph below demonstrate how this index distributes for all dyads in the 
international system in 2010, 2025 and 2050. It is sorted—from left to right—by most 
overall threat to the least. First, the curves shift up across time indicating that the majority 
of dyads in the international system are forecast to experience better relations across time. 
A second characteristic of this line graph is the extremes of the distribution:  Both dyads 
with very good levels of dyadic interaction—and, as a counter, very low levels of 
threat—and those with very high levels of threat represent a very small percentage of the 
distribution in 2010, and this distribution does not change significantly across time. There 






Figure 106:  Integrated IR Index and Deep Drivers for All Dyads - Selected Years 
 The majority of dyads experience improved relations across time. However, there 
are some that do not. These pairs of states do not see the ameliorating impacts of 
interdependence operationalized in the Liberal Index out weight increased pressures from 
the combination of shifts in relative material power, state fragility, water resources and 
fossil fuels. The table below highlights countries and the number of relationships that 
they are a part of that experience reductions.  
Dyads with Total Number of Relationships Deteriorated from 2010 to 2050 for 
Integrated IR Index and Deep Drivers of State Behavior 
Iraq 10 Egypt 4 USA 3 Israel 1 
Mauritania 10 India 4 Uzbekistan 3 Jordan 1 
China 7 Pakistan 4 Ethiopia 2 Lesotho 1 
Iran 7 Turkey 4 Kenya 2 Mali 1 
Sudan 7 Chad 3 Swaziland 2 Mozambique 1 
Afghanistan 6 Kazakhstan 3 Armenia 1 Myanmar 1 
Kyrgyzstan 6 Lebanon 3 Australia 1 Nigeria 1 






















































Integrated IR Index and Deep 






Russia 5 Syria 3 Djibouti 1 Tunisia 1 
Saudi 
Arabia 
5 Tajikistan 3 Ecuador 1 Uganda 1 
Brazil 4 Turkmenistan 3 Eritrea 1 
  
  
 The countries in the table above are the ultimate result of this project, and 
represent countries that have long-term interstate security concerns, some more than 
others. Iraq and Mauritania top the list, both with 10 dyadic relations that are forecast to 
reduce in character across the time horizon. This is so for various reasons.  First, neither 
state is forecast to become very liberal, though Iraq becomes more liberal than Mauritania 
by becoming an increasingly important producer of fossil fuels. However, the production 
of fossil fuels in Iraq becomes an important pressure in their relations with Great Powers:  
because they become increasingly important in this issue area, their domestic policy 
choices are increasingly put under pressure. Both of these states are in regions where 
fresh water use is already very high, and this is forecast to increase. Both Mauritania and 
Iraq are also in neighborhoods where pressures from state fragility remain relatively high. 
 The top seven states in the table above—Iraq, Mauritania, China, Iran, Sudan, 
Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan—all share characteristics. They share contiguous borders 
with many states, remain fairly illiberal across the time horizon, share river basins that 
are over-stretched and have regional issues with state fragility that are forecast to 
continue. The largest number of states in the table above is located in the Middle East and 
North Africa (14 out of 47 states) followed by Sub Saharan Africa (13) and Central Asia 
(8). Remaining countries are scattered across the globe. 
 Deterioration of bilateral relations across this number of important dyads is an 
important conclusion of this project. I have identified potential hot-spots using an 
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integrated approach. Most notably, the future of interstate relations in Central Asia is 
contentious, as it experiences all of the pressures conceptualized in this dissertation. The 
great gas reserves of Turkmenistan will lead to its rise and transition to regional power 
status. This, coupled with pressure from water resources, illiberal governments and the 
continued specter of state fragility makes the region a potentially dangerous zone moving 
forward. The Middle East and North Africa both remain concerns moving forward, as do 
selected areas in Sub-Saharan Africa, most notably around the river basin that stretches 
from Ethiopia to Egypt. 
Conclusion 
For the most part, the character of bilateral relationships in the international 
system seems likely to improve over the next four decades, though challenges will 
persist. Overall, this Base Case analysis forecasts that relationships will generally 
strengthen, diplomatic ties will increase and some Realist pressures will decline. That 
said there are still regions and dyads that will experience high levels of structural pressure 
that may lead to deterioration in the character of their interaction. Much of this pressure 
will come from increased pressures around water, fossil fuels and material power 
transitions in dyads with already low levels of Liberalism.  
It must be reiterated that these forecasts are from the Base Case of the IFs system. 
Future work must focus on exploring uncertainty around this forecast through the 
creation of scenarios. While the Base Case is a good place to start, it certainly is not a 
sufficient place to end. Deterioration of globalization, state failure in China and many 








8. Conclusions:  Lots of Next Steps 
This dissertation contributes to the fields of International Relations (IR) and 
Integrated Assessment Modeling by operationalizing historic measures of IR theory from 
1960 to 2001 and forecasting these indices from 2010 to 2050 in the International Futures 
(IFs) model. In this project, I build a tool that can be used to quantitatively assess the 
character of interaction between all sovereign dyads across this long time horizon. This 
tool can be used to evaluate the logical outcomes of theoretical assumptions, produce 
policy relevant analysis, and can be used as a pedagogical tool for teaching about IR.I 
have used this dissertation to lay a foundation for a broader research agenda that creates 
macro level, structured representations of the behavior of states in the international 
system that are integrated across issue areas and that embrace pragmatism in analysis and 
not ideology. I have not fully succeeded in this goal. I have not, for example, fully 
structured a model of state interaction over long time horizons, nor have I shown how to 
deeply integrate IR theory quantitatively. With those shortcomings in mind, I have 
attempted to present myself as being opposed to the following three perspectives:  
First, much quantitative analysis in the field of IR is not structured, and relies on 
statistical evaluations of drivers of one dependent variable or another. Purely statistical 
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approaches to doing analysis—for example, those deployed by Bennett and Stam 
(citation)—are useful for pushing towards quantitative verification of theoretical 
perspectives, but they must be augmented with model building approaches that embrace 
formal structure. By that, I mean that it is problematic to evaluating the historic onset of 
conflict by throwing every theoretical perspective into a model and seeing what emerges. 
An alternative to this is an approach that starts with a structured representation of theory 
(how material power interacts with alliance building, and how that drives culture, etc) 
and builds up. I began to do this, but fell well short of a fully structured model of 
international interaction across long time horizons. That failure in mind, I did approach 
the problem of measuring the character of state interaction from a systems theory and 
structured perspective. 
Second, this dissertation presents an integrated approach to doing analysis, both 
from a quantitative perspective as well as a qualitative perspective. The IFs system is 
unique in providing a wide range of quantitative integration across key global systems. I 
augment that by arguing that IR theory should also be treated as an integrated whole and 
not as separate islands of insight that are to be drawn from. I show through statistical 
analysis that this is reasonable, though my integration of IR theories is only of the most 
thin kind (simple aggregation). 
Finally, this dissertation challenges those would embrace IR theory from 
perspectives that are ideologically driven. It is not true that relative material power is a 
tranhistorical fact in the same way that it is not true that interdependence is a panacea. 
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Instead, these different perspectives have the ability to provide ranges of insight that 
should be seen as complimentary. This dissertation demonstrated that. 
More specifically, this project creates historic measures of IR for all dyads from 
1960 to 2001 by measuring Liberal, Realist and the Cultures of Interaction indices. I 
improve on the previous operationalization of these indices in the following ways. First, I 
create a new data set (country embeddedness in treaties held by the UN secretariat) and 
integrate that data into the historic and forecast measure for Liberalism. Second, I 
historically operationalize a measure of relative material power (using the 
Hillebrand/Herman method) that previously did not exist in the public domain. Third, I 
build a measure called the “Cultures of Interaction Index” (CoI Index) entirely from the 
dyad-level up. This index leverages conceptual elements of Liberalism (such as complex 
interdependences) and also attempts quantify, albeit imperfectly, a stock of cultural 
engagement between pairs of countries. Derivations of this measure have already been 
used in policy analysis both by and for the US government.
55
  
This dissertation also contributes to the quantification of IR theory by showing 
that standard quantifications of Liberalism and Realism provide more explanatory power 
when used in concert to explain the historic occurrence of conflict than either do in 
isolation. I also show that the newly created measure of CoI Index adds to the overall 
explanatory power of the Liberal-Realist model. This logistic regression analysis 
                                                 
55
 A version of the Cultures of Interaction graph analyzed against the natural log of the Hillebrand and 
Herman Power Index is currently used in the draft of the Global Trends 2030 report, to be sent to the 
incoming US president this fall. Also, the CoI Index has been used as a foundation for two contracts with 
the US Intelligence Community and the Frederick S Pardee Center. The final output of that interaction will 
be a long-term forecast of relative diplomatic power. 
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provides further support for the assertion that general IR perspectives contain more 
explanatory power when used in conjunction than isolation, and analysts should see them 
as complimentary and not competing approaches to explaining behavior in the 
international system. 
This project contributes to the abovementioned fields by endogenizing both 
Liberal and Realist indices within the IFs—and using the CoI Index exogenously—to 
model dyadic behavior over a 40 year time horizon. This work informs analysis about the 
changing character of dyadic interactions across long time horizons. The final output of 
this dissertation project has policy relevance and identifies specific dyads that are most 
likely to experience deterioration in the character of their interaction based on the IR 
indices modeled. 
This project contributes to long-term understandings of distal drivers of conflict in 
the international system. Chapter 7 explores three theoretically relevant distal drivers of 
dyadic conflict—drivers that both impact IR theories along with dyadic relations between 
states. These are domestic state fragility, depleted water resources for dyads who share 
river basins, and shifts in fossil fuel production for dyads with one Great Power. 
I conclude that the future of international relations is generally positive with 
increases in Liberalism likely to offset the majority of drivers of deteriorated relations, 
even Deep Drivers discussed in Chapter 7. That said, there are still problematic regions 
and relationships that deserve extended focus. Standard Realist pressures will exert 
themselves on specific dyads, notably around the relationship between China - India and 
China – US. Deep Drivers are forecast to have negative impacts on relations across the 
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Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Most notably, every country in Central Asia 
experiences at least one reduction in bilateral relations over the next forty years. Future 
work should include scenario analysis to frame more of the uncertainty in these forecasts 
and conclusions. 
 In terms of policy, this dissertation does not provide specific recommendations, 
such as “plan for war between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan”. Instead, it extends the 
horizon across which policy planners can scan in order to allocate resources that help 
shape strategic alliances. Specifically, policy makers should be interested in the 
following: 
 Gains in Classical Liberal drivers—trade, democracy and embeddedness in 
international political systems—are forecast to improve state relations across the 
great majority of dyads  
 Pressures from relative material power are forecast to have destabilizing impacts 
on Great Powers relations in spite of gains made by Liberalism:  China – India, 
China – US and India – US 
 Stabilizing interventions brought about by state fragility are forecast to be less 
common, though some states remain concerns over the next four decades:  
Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Chad and Myanmar 
 Fossil fuel production is forecast to become increasingly concentrated (mostly in 
OPEC countries) and will continue to remain a key for Great Power planning 
even as the world moves towards greater renewable energy production 
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 Water resources are forecast to become more constrained in key river basins 
(North-East Africa, Middle East, Central Asia), leading to the possibility of 
deteriorated relations among states in these regions 
 The following states experience a confluence of pressures that do not outstrip 
gains from Liberalism, and should be of general concern:  Iraq, Mauritania, 
China, Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan 
 Central Asia remains a serious concern for deteriorated interstate relations driven 
by low levels of growth in Liberalism coupled with the rapid rise of Turkmenistan 
(and their increased importance as a gas exporter), pressure from water stress and 
slow improvement in state fragility 
 
While this project has contributed to the field—both in terms of long-term 
forecasts and applied international relations analysis—there are certainly shortcomings.  
One of the most glaring is the lack of treatment of alliances and networks across 
countries.  The real test of a dyads relationship has to do not only with the variables 
captured in this analysis, but also with variables that we have yet been unable to quantify.  
Whether the US and China enjoy stable relations moving forward is heavily contingent 
on the degree to which they are both embedded in a similar alliance network or whether 
they are embedded in distinct alliance networks with the emergence of a new bi-polar 
world. 
 While neglecting alliances has been a hindrance to analysis, our ability to think 
about the future of networks and relationships will be greatly enhanced by the variables 
created in this forecasting exercise.  Specifically, the Cultures of Interaction index sub-
293 
 
components provide fertile ground for future research (perhaps using methods like cluster 
analysis) to determine political affinity historically in order to hopefully model it in the 
future.  The work of this project essentially lays the foundation for future forecast work 
on alliances and networks. 
 The treatment of Great Powers in this work should be improved upon.  I did not 
consider regional power dynamics.  For example, in Chapter 6 I produced results 
showing that Iran and Israel enjoyed a reasonable relationship and we know that this is 
not the case. This criticism can be levied at other regions as well, including in the African 
context. One way to treat this with more nuance is to add an additional component to my 
algorithm that determines whether a dyad is politically relevant.  Instead of being driven 
by a global power threshold, this could be driven by a regional power threshold that 
would capture the relationship between Iran and Israel, for example.  A problem with this 
would be the identification of regional boundaries in a reasonable way. 
 As stated in Chapter 2, we are all stuck with the "problem of the future".  We are 
compelled to find out as much as we can about what is likely to happen, but we have an 
absolute inability to know what events will transpire. This project has taken a mighty stab 
at trying to formally model and understand the future of interstate relations in the 
international system.  It has demonstrated policy, pedagogical and theoretical relevance.  
It has also shown that we have good reason to expect a future international system that is 
generally better behaved than today, along with evidence to aim resources at mitigating 
conflicts that may emerge around the next bend of history. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Countries in International Futures 
Afghanistan Denmark Liberia Samoa 
Albania Djibouti Libya 





Lithuania Saudi Arabia 










Austria Eritrea Maldives Slovak Republic 
Azerbaijan Estonia Mali Slovenia 
Bahamas, 
The 
Ethiopia Malta Solomon Islands 
Bahrain Fiji Mauritania Somalia 
Bangladesh Finland Mauritius South Africa 






Belgium Gambia, The Moldova Sudan 
Belize Georgia Mongolia Suriname 
Benin Germany Montenegro Swaziland 
Bhutan Ghana Morocco Sweden 






Botswana Guatemala Namibia Taiwan, China 
Brazil Guinea Nepal Tajikistan 




Bulgaria Guyana New Zealand Thailand 
Burkina Faso Haiti Nicaragua Timor-Leste 
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Burundi Honduras Niger Togo 
Cambodia Hungary Nigeria Tonga 
Cameroon Iceland Norway 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Canada India Palestine Tunisia 












China Israel Paraguay 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Hong Kong Italy Peru United Kingdom 
Colombia Jamaica Philippines Tanzania 
Comoros Japan Poland United States 
Congo, 
Republic of 
Jordan Portugal Uruguay 
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Puerto Rico Uzbekistan 












Yemen, Republic of 
Czech 
Republic 
















Appendix 2:  UN Treaty Categorization 
The categorization of UN Treaties into sub-categories. Note, the “political” sub-category 
was not displayed above. 
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Appendix 3:  Gravity Model Regression Results 
Dependent Variable = 
Level of Dyadic 
Trade 
Independent Variable 1 = 
Log of GDP 
Summed 
Independent Variable 2 = Distance 
Independent Variable 3 = Year 
   
   
Coef_of_X1: = 1.69 
Coef_of_X2: = .000385 
Coef_of_X3: = .0129 
Y Intercept = -39.43 
R-Square = 0.645 
Adj R-Square = 0.645 
   
   
   
SE of Y-Intercept = 1.15 
SE_of_X1: = .0028 
SE_of_X2: = .000002 
SE_of_X3: = .000584 
t-Value of Y-Intercept = -34.02 
t-Value_of_X1: = 605.77 
t-Value_of_X2: = 220.42 
t-Value_of_X3: = 22.17 
Prob of Y-Intercept = <.0001 
Prob_of_X1: = <.0001 
Prob_of_X2: = <.0001 
Prob_of_X3: = <.0001 
Multiple R = 0.781224 


















































































































































































































Appendix 5: Base Case Characteristics of International Futures 
International Futures Base Case Characteristic – Version 6.43 
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Appendix 6:  Fresh Water Renewable Resources Percent Used in 2050 
Countries Ranked By Water Stress in 2050 with Percent 
Water Stress Shown 
1 - Kuwait 7,418 29 - Taiwan 53.77 
2 - UAE 1,555 30 - India 50.21 
3 - Saudi Arabia 1,190 31 - Belgium 41.87 
4 - Libya 1,029 32 - Macedonia 37.22 
5 - Palestine 671.1 33 - Kazakhstan 36.64 
6 - Yemen 398.1 34 - Lebanon 35.1 
7 - Qatar 334.2 35 - Spain 34.29 
8 - Oman 201.4 36 - Zimbabwe 33.45 
9 - Jordan 190.7 37 - Bulgaria 31.92 
10 - Turkmenistan 163.3 38 - Armenia 31.18 
11 - Israel 157.2 39 - Mauritania 29.67 
12 - Uzbekistan 149.3 40 - Mauritius 29.55 
13 - Egypt 145.3 41 - Sri Lanka 29 
14 - Tajikistan 116.9 42 - Ukraine 28.51 
15 - Syria 114.3 43 - South Africa 28.5 
16 - Iraq 112.6 44 - Cyprus 27.44 
17 - Sudan 105.1 45 - USA 26.75 
18 - Afghanistan 82.17 46 - Korea South 25.62 
19 - Iran 81.02 47 - Timor-Leste 24.73 
20 - Tunisia 77.87 48 - Germany 24.61 
21 - Kyrgyzstan 74.62 49 - Thailand 22.72 
22 - Pakistan 74.6 50 - China 22.44 
23 - Azerbaijan 70.63 51 - Italy 21.14 
24 - Swaziland 59.11 52 - Moldova 20.79 
25 - Morocco 58.47 53 - Turkey 20.7 
26 - Algeria 58.39 
54 – Dominican 
Republic 
20.67 
27 - Puerto Rico 58.38 55 - Hungary 20.56 
28 - Somalia 56 56 - Cuba 20.18 
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Appendix 7:  Government Risk Index scores for countries in 2010 and 2050 
Government Risk Index Most Unstable to Least 
2010 2050 







0.489 Afghanistan 0.385 
Angola 0.483 Chad 0.384 
Sudan 0.475 Myanmar 0.377 
Chad 0.467 Burundi 0.365 
Myanmar 0.454 Eritrea 0.364 
Eritrea 0.441 Central African Republic 0.352 
Congo, Republic of 0.43 Sudan 0.351 
Burundi 0.423 Cote d'Ivoire 0.345 
Central African Republic 0.418 Rwanda 0.344 
Yemen 0.408 Madagascar 0.343 
Nigeria 0.406 Guinea Bissau 0.342 
Rwanda 0.405 Mauritania 0.341 
Sierra Leon 0.405 Togo 0.341 
Equatorial Guinea 0.404 Haiti 0.328 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.398 Libya 0.328 
Papua New Guinea 0.395 Niger 0.324 
Swaziland 0.391 Iraq 0.322 
Turkmenistan 0.39 Guinea 0.321 
Liberia 0.387 Zimbabwe 0.321 
Laos 0.386 Swaziland 0.32 
Uganda 0.386 Yemen 0.319 
Uzbekistan 0.385 Sierra Leon 0.315 
Ethiopia 0.383 Korea North 0.314 
Guinea Bissau 0.381 Gambia 0.312 
Haiti 0.381 Iran 0.312 
Niger 0.381 Congo, Republic of 0.311 
Nepal 0.38 Liberia 0.311 
Mauritania 0.378 Cameroon 0.31 
Gambia 0.377 Tajikistan 0.306 
Iraq 0.377 Saudi Arabia 0.304 
Burkina Faso 0.376 Laos 0.303 
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Madagascar 0.376 Angola 0.302 
Korea North 0.374 Burkina Faso 0.299 
Azerbaijan 0.373 Nepal 0.299 
Zimbabwe 0.372 Comoros 0.298 
Guinea 0.37 Turkmenistan 0.298 
Djibouti 0.369 Uganda 0.298 
Pakistan 0.367 Uzbekistan 0.298 
Cameroon 0.364 Azerbaijan 0.296 
Mozambique 0.363 Papua New Guinea 0.296 
Mali 0.362 Pakistan 0.295 
Libya 0.358 Belarus 0.292 
Togo 0.357 Djibouti 0.291 
Algeria 0.355 Equatorial Guinea 0.29 
Cambodia 0.355 Gabon 0.29 
Iran 0.353 Syria 0.29 
Gabon 0.352 Vietnam 0.29 
Tajikistan 0.351 Kuwait 0.287 
Zambia 0.349 Solomon Islands 0.286 
Vietnam 0.346 Senegal 0.284 
Saudi Arabia 0.343 Algeria 0.283 
Timor-Leste 0.341 Benin 0.282 
Malawi 0.339 Egypt 0.281 
Russia 0.339 Venezuela 0.281 
Syria 0.339 Bosnia 0.28 
Tanzania 0.339 Zambia 0.28 
Comoros 0.338 Kazakhstan 0.278 
Lesotho 0.337 Ethiopia 0.277 
India 0.336 Morocco 0.277 
Senegal 0.336 Mali 0.276 
China 0.335 Palestine 0.275 
Kuwait 0.335 Fiji 0.274 
Solomon Islands 0.331 Russia 0.274 
Philippines 0.33 Cambodia 0.273 
Bangladesh 0.329 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
0.271 
Belarus 0.328 Colombia 0.27 
Kazakhstan 0.327 Malawi 0.269 
Oman 0.326 Honduras 0.268 
Egypt 0.324 Sao Tome and Principe 0.268 
308  
Colombia 0.323 Tunisia 0.268 
Sri Lanka 0.322 Cuba 0.267 
Venezuela 0.322 Philippines 0.267 
Guatemala 0.318 Sri Lanka 0.267 
Palestine 0.315 Lesotho 0.264 
Kenya 0.314 China 0.263 
Namibia 0.313 Guatemala 0.262 
Fiji 0.311 Tonga 0.262 
Morocco 0.31 Jordan 0.261 
Thailand 0.309 Nicaragua 0.261 
Benin 0.308 Nigeria 0.26 
Indonesia 0.307 Thailand 0.26 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.305 Bahrain 0.258 
Maldives 0.304 Oman 0.256 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
0.303 UAE 0.256 
Bahrain 0.302 Kyrgyzstan 0.253 
Honduras 0.301 Kenya 0.251 
Cuba 0.297 Armenia 0.247 
Qatar 0.295 Maldives 0.247 
Tunisia 0.295 Mozambique 0.247 
UAE 0.295 Paraguay 0.245 
Bhutan 0.293 Tanzania 0.245 
Bolivia 0.293 Namibia 0.243 
South Africa 0.292 Qatar 0.243 
Ecuador 0.291 Ecuador 0.24 
Jordan 0.291 Timor-Leste 0.239 
Kyrgyzstan 0.291 Bangladesh 0.238 
Bosnia 0.29 Ghana 0.237 
Paraguay 0.289 Indonesia 0.237 
Nicaragua 0.287 Guyana 0.236 
Ghana 0.286 India 0.231 
Turkey 0.283 Georgia 0.23 
Vanuatu 0.283 Samoa 0.23 
Guyana 0.277 Serbia 0.23 
Botswana 0.275 Vanuatu 0.23 
Tonga 0.275 Bolivia 0.229 
Mongolia 0.274 Ukraine 0.229 
Armenia 0.273 Lebanon 0.228 
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Samoa 0.273 Moldova 0.228 
Peru 0.272 Turkey 0.228 
Lebanon 0.271 El Salvador 0.223 
Belize 0.264 Bhutan 0.222 
Georgia 0.264 Mongolia 0.222 
Suriname 0.264 Bulgaria 0.221 
Trinidad 0.262 South Africa 0.221 
Brunei 0.261 Mexico 0.22 
Dominican Republic 0.261 Montenegro 0.22 
Mexico 0.258 Albania 0.218 
Ukraine 0.258 Jamaica 0.218 
Grenada 0.257 Belize 0.217 
Moldova 0.256 Grenada 0.217 
El Salvador 0.255 Puerto Rico 0.216 
Albania 0.254 Cape Verde 0.214 
Cape Verde 0.254 Macedonia 0.214 
Malaysia 0.252 Botswana 0.213 
Puerto Rico 0.252 Brunei 0.213 
Brazil 0.247 Suriname 0.211 
Macedonia 0.246 Hong Kong 0.209 
Serbia 0.246 Peru 0.208 
Jamaica 0.244 Singapore 0.208 
Montenegro 0.242 Brazil 0.207 
Bulgaria 0.239 Malaysia 0.207 
Argentina 0.237 Trinidad 0.207 
Israel 0.237 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
0.206 
Panama 0.237 Romania 0.205 
Singapore 0.233 Israel 0.204 
St. Lucia 0.229 Dominican Republic 0.203 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
0.227 Costa Rica 0.196 
Romania 0.225 Croatia 0.194 
Croatia 0.223 Panama 0.193 
Costa Rica 0.221 St. Lucia 0.193 
Hong Kong 0.218 Argentina 0.191 
Latvia 0.215 Greece 0.19 
Mauritius 0.214 Lithuania 0.19 
Lithuania 0.207 Mauritius 0.19 
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Chile 0.205 Latvia 0.189 
Italy 0.204 Chile 0.188 
Greece 0.203 Italy 0.185 
Bahamas 0.197 Portugal 0.185 
Hungary 0.196 Hungary 0.18 
Uruguay 0.196 Barbados 0.178 
Malta 0.194 Spain 0.178 
Poland 0.193 Uruguay 0.178 
Portugal 0.193 Bahamas 0.176 
Slovak Rep 0.193 Cyprus 0.174 
Czech Republic 0.192 Czech Republic 0.173 
Korea South 0.188 Slovak Rep 0.173 
Barbados 0.185 Malta 0.172 
Estonia 0.185 Slovenia 0.171 
Slovenia 0.183 Estonia 0.17 
Spain 0.183 Taiwan 0.166 
Taiwan 0.183 Belgium 0.165 
Belgium 0.181 Poland 0.165 
Cyprus 0.181 France 0.163 
USA 0.179 Korea South 0.161 
France 0.177 Australia 0.159 
Iceland 0.177 USA 0.159 
United Kingdom 0.174 New Zealand 0.156 
Ireland 0.171 Iceland 0.155 
Japan 0.169 Japan 0.155 
Norway 0.169 Netherlands 0.154 
Australia 0.167 Ireland 0.153 
Luxembourg 0.167 Luxembourg 0.153 
Netherlands 0.167 Austria 0.152 
Austria 0.166 Germany 0.152 
Switzerland 0.165 Norway 0.15 
Canada 0.164 Switzerland 0.15 
Germany 0.162 United Kingdom 0.15 
New Zealand 0.159 Canada 0.149 
Denmark 0.157 Denmark 0.146 
Finland 0.155 Finland 0.144 




Appendix 8:   Multivariate Regression Used To Forecast Political 
Embeddedness in International Political Organizations 
Dependent Variable = 
Political Embeddedness in 
International Political Organizations 
Independent Variable 1 = GDP per capita at PPP 
Independent Variable 2 = Gov Expense % GDP 
Independent Variable 3 = Historic Material Power 
   
   
Coef_of_X1: = 1.884102 
Coef_of_X2: = 1.438121 
Coef_of_X3: = 16.10293 
Y Intercept = 58.8817 
R-Square = 0.610311 
Adj R-Square = 0.593368 
F-Value = 36.02139 
Probability of Zero = 4.00E-14 
   
   
SE of Y-Intercept = 10.84787 
SE_of_X1: = 0.423389 
SE_of_X2: = 0.459673 
SE_of_X3: = 3.391678 
Beta_of_X1: = 0.413867 
Beta_of_X2: = 0.284317 
Beta_of_X3: = 0.367212 
t-Value of Y-Intercept = 5.427949 
t-Value_of_X1: = 4.450054 
t-Value_of_X2: = 3.128574 
t-Value_of_X3: = 4.747779 
Prob of Y-Intercept = 7.98E-07 
Prob_of_X1: = 3.21E-05 
Prob_of_X2: = 2.57E-03 
Prob_of_X3: = 1.08E-05 
Multiple R = 0.781224 
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